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Hispanics, and similar ethnic groups, are socially and politically recognized in 
American society because belonging to such groups is often thought to be central to 
members’ identities.  But is “Hispanicity” central to members’ identities?  What is the 
significance of being a Hispanic?  My general thesis is that contrary to the common 
assumption of governmental agencies, advocacy groups, policy-makers, and American 
society in general, belonging to the Hispanic group is not currently central to its 
members’ identities.    
I develop my thesis in two parts.  In chapters two through four, I address 
philosophical questions about membership and groups.  I argue that the sort of 
membership that is central to group members’ identities is basic.  Basic membership 
consists of traits that are essentia l to someone’s self-understanding, making such a person 
a member of a particular group.  Groups in which membership is basic generally satisfy 
three conditions: relevant identification, differentiation, and intrinsic identification.            
 In chapters five through seven, I then turn to Hispanic identity.  I argue that given 
the national identities of Hispanics, membership in the Hispanic group is generally not 
basic.  Hispanic membership is an epiphenomenon of national membership, and thus the 
latter is basic whereas the former is not.  I also point out that Hispanic membership could 
be a tipping phenomenon.  A process of Hispanic people-making, in which the American 
state plays a key role, could turn Hispanic membership into a basic one.        
 By way of conclusion, I discuss some possible implications of Hispanic identity 
for American national unity and for U.S.-Latin American relations.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One ethnic category officially recognized by the American government through 
the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity is that of 
“Hispanic.”1  Such an ethnic category stems, to a large extent, from the attempt of the 
government to identify and gather data on populations that have historically “experienced 
discrimination and differential treatment because of their race or ethnicity.”2  The 
assumption underlying the category of Hispanic is that there is, in fact, an identifiable 
group whose ethnic identity is of paramount value and significance.  Examining this 
assumption is the purpose of the present project.           
The phenomenon of Hispanic identity raises the following questions:  What is a 
Hispanic?  Who classifies as Hispanic?  How meaningful and valuable is it to be 
Hispanic?  How different are Hispanics from other particular groups in American 
society?  In probing these questions, my general thesis is that Hispanic identity does not 
always carry the weight that is commonly assumed by American governmental agencies 
and society in general.  Nonetheless, Hispanicity could be on its way to becoming a 
significant identity.        
                                                 
1 The definition was first issued by the Office of Management and Budget on May 12, 1977, in the “Race 
and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting;” otherwise known as “Statistical 
Directive No. 15.”  According to the latest revision, the definition remains the same, but the category is 
now “Hispanic” or “Latino,” and “Spanish Origin” could also be used.  See “Revisions to the Standards for 
the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,” in Federal Register, vol. 62, no. 210, Thursday, 
October 30, 1997, Notices, p. 58789.   
2 “Revisions to the Standards,” p. 58782.   
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I develop my thesis in two sections.  In chapters two through four I focus on 
membership and groups.  I begin in chapter two with a discussion of Will Kymlicka’s 
multiculturalism.3  Kymlicka has brought the themes of membership and groups to the 
forefront of recent political philosophy discussions.  So he provides a good starting point 
for my project.  The framework and vocabulary used in subsequent chapters will be first 
brought up in a general discussion of Kymlicka’s multiculturalism.         
 According to the kind of multiculturalism proposed by Will Kymlicka, 
membership in a national or ethnic minority is highly significant and valuable to group 
members.  Membership in a nation such as Quebec or the Quechua is so significant that 
the group’s culture should be protected for the sake of its members.  Similarly, ethnic 
groups and identities are very significant and so they should receive public recognition in 
societies based on the principles of equality and justice.   
 The question that arises is whether membership in ethnic or national cultural 
groups is always highly significant and valuable to group members.  I first argue that 
highly significant and valuable membership is not always confined to ethnocultural 
groups.  My thesis here is that membership in different group-types, not just ethnocultural 
groups, could be a primary source of meaning and direction.  Thus different group-types 
could have the function of endowing members with the relevant membership.   
 Note that I share with Kymlicka the assumption that membership in particular 
groups may be a primary source of meaning and direction.  Thus, I do not share the 
                                                 
3 As developed primarily in Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
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cosmopolitan assumption that group membership is less robust as a source of identity 
than people like Kymlicka have assumed.4  I part ways with Kymlicka, however, when it 
comes to the type of group in which membership is of the relevant kind.  As mentioned, I 
wish to broaden the scope of group-types in which membership is a primary source of 
meaning and direction.     
If my thesis on membership and diverse group-types is correct, there are several 
consequences affecting Kymlicka’s multicultural model.  I examine these consequences 
in the second part of the chapter.  One of the consequences is that different group-types, 
and not just ethnocultural ones, could be accorded group-specific rights.  Another 
consequence that follows from the previous one is that given the variety of memberships 
that could potentially count as a primary source of meaning and direction and thus 
receive public recognition, it is difficult to speak of a multicultural “model.”     
My general conclusion in this chapter is that multiculturalism ought to be more 
diverse than Kymlicka’s model of diversity.  But this diversity requirement makes me 
skeptical about the coherence of certain multicultural policies, and leads me to suggest 
that the principle of neutrality is worth exploring further before adopting the ethno-
conscious and group-rights paradigm proposed by Kymlicka and other multiculturalists.         
As I said, chapter two provides the building blocks and working framework for 
the rest of the project.  But although I address group-rights in chapter two, I will not have 
                                                 
4 For a statement of the cosmopolitan view, see Jeremy  Waldron, “Cultural Identity and Civic 
Responsibility,” in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000).  See also his “Multiculturalism and Mélange,” in Public Education in a 
Multicultural Society: Policy, Theory, Critique , ed. R. Fullinwider (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). 
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much to say about this topic in subsequent chapters.  My focus will be rather on the 
theme that membership in certain group-types is a primary source of meaning and 
direction.  I then devote chapters three and four to a discussion of membership and 
groups.   
In chapter three, I turn to membership.  The question I address in this chapter is 
this: if different membership-types are a primary source of meaning and direction, when 
is membership of the relevant kind?  The central thesis of this chapter is that membership 
is a primary source of meaning and direction when it is central to members’ identities.   
 I begin with a general discussion of what it means to have an identity.  Identity-
bearing has two aspects: self-understanding and group membership.  Someone is said to 
have an identity when she characterizes herself, and thus shows self-understanding, in a 
way that typically makes her a member of a particular group.  Note that, in the spirit of 
Wittgenstein, I speak of identity as a public and not a strictly private phenomenon.  I also 
speak of identity in a way that is broader than how proponents of the politics of 
difference and recognition normally use the term. 
 In order to explain the centrality of identity, I then introduce the notion of basic 
membership.  In describing this new notion, I make a distinction between the types of 
traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding and the types of traits that are 
not.  Typically, someone’s membership is basic when a set of traits that are essential to 
her self-understanding are also the traits that make her a member in a particular group.  It 
is worth highlighting that although I argue that certain traits are essential to someone’s 
self-understanding, I also point out that some complexities are inevitable.   
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 A question that arises in my discussion is this: what sorts of traits tend to be 
essential to people’s self-understanding?  In addressing this question, I make a distinction 
between inherent and accidental markers of personhood.  The former are generally non-
voluntarily acquired and the latter are rather voluntarily acquired.  I argue that the sorts of 
traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding are often, as a matter of tendency, 
inherent makers of personhood, i.e., non-voluntarily acquired traits.  Incidentally, I am 
also quick to point out that the claim must be qualified so as to open space for ambiguous 
and complex cases.                   
 I close this chapter with a discussion on the value of membership.  Here I return 
to Kymlicka and argue two points.  First, membership is instrumentally valuable because 
it gives group members an identity.  Second, the value of basic membership stems from 
the fact that it significantly contributes towards personal well-being.  The type of 
membership that is central to someone’s identity is an integral part of their human well-
being.           
 Having focused primarily on membership as such, I turn my attention to groups in 
chapter four.  What sorts of groups endow group members with the type of membership 
that is central to members’ identities, i.e., basic membership?  In chapter four I discuss 
three conditions that are generally satisfied by groups in which membership is central to 
members’ identities.   
 The first condition is relevant identification.  Group members interact with each 
other on the basis of properties of identification that make it possible for them to 
recognize group members and non-members.  There are many types of groups that have 
identifiable properties by which one can recognize members.  In some particular 
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instances, however, the identifiable properties by which a group member is recognized 
are also properties that happen to be essential to her self-understanding.  When this is the 
case, the identifiable properties make her membership in the group basic.  If a group is 
identifiable by virtue of properties that make membership in the group basic, the group is 
said to satisfy the condition of relevant identification.   
 Second, I consider the condition of differentiation.  Here I argue that when 
membership in a particular group is basic, this membership is necessarily connected with 
the difference-sensitive attributes of the group.  In other words, the properties that make a 
group distinguishable from other groups are also the properties that endow group 
members with basic membership.   
 I explain my point in the following manner.  Groups that can be described on the 
basis of contrast and differences with other groups have what I call the “status of 
discernibility.”  According to the status of discernibility, members in a particular group 
have a common identity such that the group is distinguishable from other groups.  I then 
argue that, as a matter of fact, groups in which membership is basic are also groups that 
have the status of discernibility. 
 The third condition is intrinsic identification.  Groups are sometimes identified in 
a way that does not reflect the sorts of properties that are essential to the self-
understanding of group members.  This could be the case when groups are identified 
from the outside, i.e., by non-group members.  My point here is that in order to properly 
understand a group in which membership is basic, we must look at the way in which the 
group is identified from the inside, i.e., the way members identify their own group.  I call 
intrinsic identification the act of identifying a group from the inside.     
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 In dealing with the condition of intrinsic identification, I discuss part of the 
historical and sociological literature on the emergence of nations and national identity.  
This type of literature will be very helpful in attempting to understand the emergence of 
Hispanic identity.      
 With the previous chapters in mind, the project now transitions into the 
phenomenon of Hispanic identity.  The rest of the project will build on the framework set 
out in chapters two through four.       
It is important to point out that the U.S. is different from Canada and Australia in 
that its government does not have an official multicultural act or policy.  The U.S. 
government, however, recognizes certain ethnic and racial groups outlined in the 1977 
Statistical Policy Directive 15 from the Office of Management and Budget, and further 
specified (with some recent revisions) in the Standards for the Classification of Federal 
Data on Race and Ethnicity.  These groups are the beneficiaries of policies that seek to 
promote equality and end discrimination according to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, which forbids all programs receiving federal financial assistance from discriminating 
on the basis of race, color or national origin.   
 “Hispanic” is one of the groups included under the scheme of the Civil Rights Act 
and thus recognized by the U.S. government.  In the context of governmental and social 
recognition, the general question I begin exploring in the next few chapters is this: what 
is the status of Hispanic identity?  I argue that Hispanic identity is not a robust or 
meaningful identity.  I also point out that Hispanics are the recipients of an identity in the 
making, due to Hispanic-building policies enacted by the U.S government.      
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More specifically, I explore the question of Hispanics and basic membership in 
chapter five.  The reader will notice that chapters five and six mirror chapters three and 
four.  In chapter three I discussed membership, and turned to groups in chapter four.  
Chapter five will now specifically discuss Hispanic membership and chapter six will have 
us discuss the Hispanic group.        
I then focus on membership in chapter five and raise the following question: is 
Hispanic membership central to the identities of group members?  In other words, is 
Hispanic membership basic?   
I begin by establishing the fact that Hispanics have different nationalities.  This is 
an obvious fact, but one that is often overlooked.  Nationality has become such a 
pervasive condition in our world that it is easy to take this condition for granted.  
Virtually everyone has a nationality.   
If by nationality, we understand citizenship, the vast majority of people in our 
planet are members of some nation-state.  Similarly, if by nationality we understand 
national attachments (i.e., attachment to a national community) then—except for a 
cosmopolitan minority—most people on the planet have feelings of loyalty towards a 
particular national community.  One might even venture to suggest that cosmopolitans do 
not often realize how deep the undercurrent of nationality is among themselves.   
Next I proceed to suggest that the nationalities of Hispanics are generally basic.  I 
use some illustrations to make the point that the traits which make Latin American 
nationals members in their respective nations are essential to their self-understandings.  
So, for instance, traits that make someone a member in the Colombian nation are also 
essential to the sense of who she is. 
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Now the question is whether Hispanic membership is also basic.  I do not deal 
with this question in abstract terms, but rather by comparing Hispanic membership with a 
basic membership, namely, nationality.  By comparing the two memberships, I highlight 
how robust national membership is, and, in contrast, how weak Hispanic membership is 
in comparison with nationality  
I build my argument in the terms that follow.  First, whereas nationality meets 
what I call the criterion of pervasive basic membership, Hispanic membership does not.  
What I mean by this claim is that, as mentioned, national membership is basic for most 
Hispanics—one might add: the vast majority.   
Second, Hispanic membership only meets a much weaker criterion that I call 
partial basic membership.  What I mean here is that the extension of basic membership in 
the Hispanic group is not pervasive, but rather partial.  In short, Hispanic membership is 
basic for only some members of the Hispanic group.  It is important to immediately add 
here that the possible basicness of Hispanic membership is a concession I make for the 
sake of argument.  For reasons that I explain in chapter six, I do not believe that Hispanic 
membership can indeed be basic—since it is an epiphenomenon of nationality.  
Third, there is the criterion of robust membership.  A certain membership is 
robust with regard to another membership when the former has a higher degree of 
basicness than the latter.  As I mentioned in chapter three, basic membership is a matter 
of degree.  My point now is that when comparing national and Hispanic memberships, 
the former always has a higher degree of basicness.  Hence, even if we grant that 
Hispanic membership is indeed basic, national membership is robust with regard to 
Hispanic membership.                              
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After discussing membership, I begin to focus on groups.  The question I raise is 
whether the Hispanic group satisfies the conditions of groups that have the function of 
endowing members with basic memberships.  These are the three conditions discussed in 
chapter four: relevant identification, differentiation and intrinsic identification.           
In chapter six, I discuss the first two conditions, relevant identification and 
differentiation.  The third condition, intrinsic identification, will be the subject of the next 
chapter, seven.  Intrinsic identification needs to be isolated because, as we will see, it 
provides the key for understanding Hispanic identity as a tipping phenomenon. 
Does the Hispanic group then satisfy the condition of relevant identification?  
According to this condition, group members are identified based on properties that make 
membership in the group basic.  I argue that Hispanic membership is not basic because it 
is an epiphenomenon of national membership.  Hence, nationality may satisfy the 
condition of relevant identification.  Nonetheless, since Hispanics cannot be identified 
according to properties that make membership in the group basic, the Hispanic group 
does not satisfy the condition at stake. 
In terms of the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and 
Ethnicity and the U.S. Census Bureau, a Hispanic is someone who was born in, say, 
Mexico, or has a Mexican heritage.  Note how the Hispanic category is defined and the 
criterion by which Hispanics are classified.  The definition and criterion are essentially 
national: a Hispanic is a Mexican, Salvadorian, Argentinean, etc.   
When we look for the traits that allow for basic membership among members of 
the Hispanic group, we always run into traits that are first and foremost national.  Now 
consider that Hispanic membership is not separate from nationality.  Rather, as 
  11 
mentioned, Hispanic membership is defined by virtue of nationality.  Given that 
nationality provides the basis for basic membership, and Hispanic membership is not a 
separate type of membership, it follows that Hispanic membership is an epiphenomenon 
of nationality.  National membership is then basic.  Hispanic membership may sometimes 
have the appearance of basicness, but the mirage disappears as soon as nationality comes 
into the picture.    
The end result is that national groups satisfy the condition of relevant 
identification across the board.  Nonetheless, since Hispanics cannot be identified 
according to properties of basic membership, the group does not satisfy the condition of 
relevant identification.  
Now we turn to the second group condition, i.e., differentiation.  The kernel of 
this condition is that basic membership is necessarily connected with the difference-
sensitive attributes of groups.  In other words, the traits of basic membership are precisely 
those traits that generally distinguish a particular group from other groups.   
 Groups that are different from each other have what I call the status of 
discernibility.  The status simply means that these groups have a common identity that is 
unique to them—and thus provides the grounds for distinguishing and recognizing the 
group.  In discussing the condition of differentiation for Hispanics, I concentrate on the 
question of common identity. 
There have been two attempts, one by Jorge Gracia and another by Angelo 
Corlett, to argue that Hispanics do have a common identity in the relevant way.  
Essentially the argument is that there is a criterion according to which Hispanics can be 
classified in a way that provides them with a common identity.       
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 I examine these two attempts and argue that they fail.  I point out that there is no 
satisfactory criterion for classifying Hispanics in a relevant way.  Hence, they cannot be 
said to have a common identity in the sense that matters.  As a final consequence, 
Hispanics do not satisfy the condition of group differentiation. 
 In chapter seven, I turn to the third condition, intrinsic identification, and look at 
what Hispanic identity could become—and might be already becoming.  I point out that 
since the Hispanic group does not satisfy the previous conditions, relevant identification 
and differentiation, it does not satisfy, a fortiori, the condition of intrinsic identification.  
 Intrinsic identification, however, is the key for understanding Hispanic identity as 
a tipping phenomenon.  In this chapter, I advance the hypothesis that a process of 
external Hispanic identification brings about Hispanic identity-making.  If identification 
and identity-making are internalized by the Hispanic group, Hispanics may become the 
sort of group that satisfies all relevant conditions.  In short, Hispanic membership may 
become basic and thus be at the center of group members’ identities.                   
 Roughly speaking, national identities are the result of top-down identification and 
bottom-up building blocks.  National identities generally emerge when there is a merger 
between the two elements.  The same is true of Hispanic identity—and so in this way 
there is a parallel between the emergence of national and Hispanic identity.  
 Given the robustness of national identities among Hispanics, they are a 
fragmented and incoherent group.  This is the picture we get when we look at the bottom-
up.  But the top-down gives us a different picture.  Hispanics are identified as a people 
with a common identity and heritage.  If the bottom-up and top-down merge, Hispanics 
may indeed become a people with a common identity and heritage.       
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 In order to get an idea of how such a merger has happened historically and may 
occur again, I examine classical top-down nationalist statements by Jules Michelet and 
Giuseppe Mazzini.  These top-down statements highlight certain themes that nationalists 
tend to have in common, namely, unity, destiny and sacredness.    
 Now, we see in the identification of the Hispanic group as a people glimpses of 
some of these nationalist themes.  Hispanics ostensibly have a certain level of unity 
determined by a common destiny, which has some degree of sacredness.  Hispanics then 
are—in terms of Ernest Renan, another famous nationalist—a people with a common 
heritage.  All of these themes are the content of identity-making.   
 The interesting point is that one of the main agents in the process of Hispanic 
identification and identity-making is the American state.  Here I look at how the 
Presidential Proclamations that open the Hispanic Heritage Month each year contain 
some of the elements of nationalist top-down identification.  Hispanics are identified as a 
people with a heritage.  And this sort of identification may indeed be one of the first steps 
for Hispanics to actually become a people with a common heritage.     
 If my observation is correct, it reframes certain questions and concerns regarding 
potential consequences derived from the presence of Hispanics in American society.  I 
take issue with Samuel Huntington’s views in his recent book, Who are We?: The 
Challenges to America’s National Identity.5   
 I argue that despite the legitimacy of the questions he raises, the topic of Hispanic 
identity is more complex than he assumes.  Examining the consequences of Hispanics for 
American national unity needs to take into account more than Latin American 
                                                 
5 (New York: Simon & Schuter, 2004). 
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immigration.  As mentioned, a crucial agent in Hispanic identity-making is the American 
state.  Thus, the American state is the point of departure for examining the potential 
consequences of Hispanics and their identity for American society.      
When one speaks of Hispanics, ostensibly the largest minority in American 
society, association with another large minority, African-Americans, is almost inevitable.  
The obvious question is: in what ways are the two groups similar, and in what ways are 
they different?  Comparing these two groups is the subject-matter of chapter eight.   
I frame the comparison in terms of what Horace Kallen called “cultural 
pluralism.” According to the pluralist view, American society consists of a variety of 
cultural minority groups who deserve public recognition.  In other words, America is a 
federation of cultures, all of whom are equally entitled to having their voices heard in the 
public sphere.   
I challenge the pluralist view.  I argue that a comparison between Hispanics and 
African-Americans shows fundamental differences between the two groups and the 
significance of membership in each one of them.  Essentially, African-American identity 
is central to members of this group, but the same is not true of Hispanics.     
As a consequence, the two groups find themselves in dissimilar situations and so 
the question of public recognition is different for each one.  If I am right, it is hard to see 
a clear analogy between Hispanics and African-Americans.  Thus, not all cultural 
minorities are the same.   
Since I have raised the question of whether Hispanic membership is basic, a 
fitting place to start the inquiry in this chapter is to raise the question of whether African-
American membership is basic.  I argue that given a historical process of racial exclusion, 
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African-American identity is indeed basic.  In other words, “race” is one of the essential 
traits for the self-understanding of African-Americans.  
African-Americans are also members of the American nation.  I argue that their 
national membership is generally basic.  So they have at least two basic memberships, 
racial and national.   
It so happens, however, that given the same historical process of exclusion that 
makes African-American membership basic, there is also a tension between racial and 
national memberships.  This tension is expressed in a famous passage by W.E.B. Du Bois 
as an irreconcilable “twoness.”6                             
We can then start to see the ways in which Hispanics and African-Americans are 
different.  First, there is the matter of basic memberships.  African-American membership 
is basic, whereas, as argued in chapters five and six, Hispanic membership is not.  
Moreover, African-Americans experience a tension between a racial and a national 
membership that finds no analogy in the Hispanic group.  National membership is basic 
for Hispanics, but their Hispanic membership is not; and so there is no tension.   
Second, we need to look at the topic of political membership.  African-Americans 
are members of the American polity, although (historically speaking) not always full 
members.  In contrast, examining the taxonomy of sub-groups within the Hispanic group 
shows that many are not members of the American polity.   
Third, African-Americans, and their struggle for liberation is essential to the self-
image of the American nation.  Hispanics, however, are a group of immigrants instead 
and are thus not essential to the American self- image.  It is true that immigration might 
                                                 
6 The Souls of Black Folk  (New York: Bantam Books, 1989 [1903]), p. 3. 
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be essential to the American experience, but many immigrant groups, and not only or 
even primarily Hispanics, are included.           
 Different situations raise different questions. African-American membership is 
basic and African-Americans are full members of the American polity.  The question for 
them is whether, given the significance of African-American identity, such an identity 
ought to be publicly recognized. 
 Hispanic membership is not basic and not all Hispanics are members of the 
American polity.  But we must also remember that Hispanics are the recipients of an 
identity in the making—brought about by public recognition.  The question here is 
whether, given the potential consequence of a possible Hispanic membership, this 
identity ought to be publicly recognized.          
 I conclude the project in chapter nine with some thoughts on Hispanic identity, 
American national unity and some possible benefits derived from a potential Hispanic 
identity.  Throughout the project, I speak about what Hispanic identity is and is not—and 
what it might become.  In the final chapter, I take the opportunity to move beyond 
description and look at some additional questions.  I make several tentative suggestions 
that will be hopefully developed in further projects.      
 I first look at the question of whether the prospect of Hispanic identity should 
indeed pose a threat to American national unity.  I argue that there are good reasons to 
believe that national unity is a good on the grounds of efficiency and justice.  Thus the 
weakening of nation-building policies and national unity ought to be a motive of concern.   
 Nonetheless, despite the possibility of Hispanic identity becoming robust and thus 
posing a potential threat to national unity, this identity will most likely be absorbed by the 
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American multicultural ethos.  This soft multiculturalism is largely harmless to American 
national unity.  Hence, if Hispanic identity is simply an addition to the melting pot, this 
identity should indeed be welcomed.     
 I then look at the question of whether the American nation derives any benefits 
from a new Hispanic identity.  I suggest that ethnic identities may be an instrument of 
foreign relations and national security—a much ignored dimension that played a part in 
the Civil Rights movement.7  If the U.S. wants to engage Latin America more effectively, 
and enhance its influence in the continent, it behooves the American state to breed a 
homegrown identity that could tend an effective bridge towards Latin America.       
 Before closing this introductory chapter, let me finally say a word about 
terminology throughout the project.  There is a debate on whether the group under 
consideration should go by the term “Latino” or “Hispanic.”  It has become customary to 
use the two terms interchangeably —a practice adopted by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The 
terminological debate is revealing and important, but it is for the most part ignored in this 
project.  I have decided instead to use a single term, “Hispanic,” for the simple reason 
that it seems to be more widespread.  Although I do not directly address the 
terminological debate, some of the tensions that such a dispute reflects are indirectly 
discussed in several sections.   
 Interestingly, Michael Barone believes that the term “Latino” is more commonly 
used than “Hispanic.”8  I have the opposite impression.  But be that as it may, I am more 
                                                 
7 For an extended treatment of this dimension, see John Skrentny, The Minority Rights Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).   
8 The New Americans: How the Melting Pot Can Work Again (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 
2001), p. 4. 
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concerned with the phenomenon of group identity as such than with mere terminological 
tendencies. 
 Lastly, I use the term “America” to refer to the United States of America and not 
the whole continent named after Americo Vespuccio—which is now spoken of in the 
Anglo-American world as “the Americas.”  When speaking of countries south of the 
United States, I usually use the term “Latin America”—not a good term, but a widespread 
one.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  19 
CHAPTER 2 
MULTICULTURALISM, GROUP RIGHTS AND  
THE VALUE OF MEMBERSHIP  
  
 According to the kind of multiculturalism proposed by Will Kymlicka, 
membership in a national or ethnic minority is highly significant and valuable to group 
members.  Membership in a minority nation such as Quebec or the Quechua is so 
significant that the group’s culture should be protected for the sake of its members.  
Similarly, ethnic groups and identities are very significant and so they should receive 
public recognition in societies based on the principles of equality and justice.  Public 
recognition could generally take the form of according group-specific rights to certain 
groups—e.g., bilingual education for Spanish-speaking immigrants in the U.S.—and 
promoting social events and venues that make the heritage and values of a certain group 
visible to the rest of society—e.g., celebrating the Hispanic Heritage Month or building a 
museum devoted to American Indians.   
 Is membership, however, in ethnic or national minority groups always highly 
significant and valuable to group members?  I will argue that highly significant and 
valuable membership is not always confined to national or ethnic minority groups.  
Membership in some types of groups is highly valuable to group members and is thus a 
primary source of meaning and direction to these members, but these are not always 
national or ethnic memberships.  My thesis is that membership in different group-types, 
and not just in national or ethnic minority groups, could be a primary source of meaning 
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and direction.  If my thesis is true, there are several implications, discussed at the end of 
this chapter, affecting Kymlicka’s multicultural model.   
 
1. CULTURAL GROUPS      
Let me begin with a general discussion of Kymlicka’s views.  Kymlicka develops 
a “sort of ‘multiculturalism’ which arises from ethnic and national differences.”  In 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, “culture” is used  “as synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a 
people’ —that is, as an intergenerational community, more or less institutionally 
complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and 
history.”1   
The way in which Kymlicka uses the term “culture” precludes other usages of the 
term.  One may speak of cultural groups “where ‘culture’ refers to the distinct customs, 
perspectives, or ethos of a group or association, as when we talk about ‘gay culture’ or 
even a ‘bureaucratic culture.’”  Similarly, one may speak of cultures in a broad sense and 
thus say “that all the Western democracies share a common ‘culture’ —that is, they all 
share a modern, urban, secular industrialized civilization, in contrast to the feudal, 
agricultural, and theocratic world of our ancestors.”2  Kymlicka constrains the usages of 
the term “culture” and makes it clear that he does not use the term in a non-ethnic sense.  
The implication is that, as already mentioned, Kymlicka uses “culture” and 
“multiculturalism” in the context of national and ethnic groups.              
                                                 
1 Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p. 18.   
2 Multicultural Citizenship, p. 18.  
  21 
It is important to emphasize, however, that Kymlicka is indeed sensitive to 
terminological differences and distinctions between specific circumstances.  He notes, for 
example, that “cultural groups” are different from “racial groups.”3  He makes a 
distinction between the situation and sets of questions that arise from the African-
American group in the United States and the aboriginal people in Canada.4  I will, in fact, 
follow Kymlicka’s distinction between racial and cultural groups and focus solely on the 
latter.5 
Kymlicka also makes an important distinction between “national minorities” and 
immigrant or “ethnic” groups.6  National minorities are cultural groups that have a 
“societal culture.” 7  Societal cultures generally have a concentrated territory, a shared 
language, and a set of public institutions.  Quebec, for instance, is a national minority 
within Canada because it has a societal culture—a common territory, language, and 
public culture reflected in governmental institutions, the school system and media.  
National minorities are generally societal cultures that have been colonized by another 
group, i.e., a larger nation.     
                                                 
3Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 22-23. 
4 Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 135-157.  
5 I elaborate on the differences between African-Americans, a racial group, and Hispanics, an immigrant 
group, in chapter eight. 
6 Multicultural Citizenship, p. 19.  For a discussion on the different kinds of “minority groups,” see Will 
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts,” 
in Citizenship in Diverse Societies, eds. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 18-24.   
7 The meaning of “societal cultures” is explained in Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 75-94.   
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Immigrant or ethnic groups, in contrast, are cultural groups that do not have a 
societal culture.  Since immigrants leave their country of origin and move to a different 
country, they do not live in a concentrated territory of their own or have a set of public 
institutions reflecting their own culture.  In other words, immigrants do not have a 
societal culture because they are part of a different society.  In the new society, they 
become an ethnic minority.    
Since a national minority such as Quebec is institutionally complete, i.e., has a 
societal culture, it is entitled to self-government rights.  Immigrants, in contrast, leave 
their societal cultures behind and become part of a new societal culture.  By leaving their 
own societal culture behind, immigrants waive their right to self-government.  
Nevertheless, since the cultural identity of immigrants is important, they are entitled to 
recognition in the host society.  Immigrants integrate into a new societal culture, but the 
host societal culture must make an effort to accommodate the cultural expression of 
immigrants.  National and ethnic minorities are then entitled to different group-specific 
rights.  National minorities are entitled to self-government rights, whereas ethnic groups 
are entitled to what Kymlicka has called “polyethnic” rights.8          
Despite the differences in circumstances between national and ethnic minorities 
and the sorts of rights to which they are entitled, the two groups have an important 
attribute in common.  Nationa l and ethnic minorities are each cultural groups.  We must 
then think of cultural groups as a group-type that encompasses groups in different 
conditions.    
                                                 
8 He later calls them “accommodation rights.” Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism 
and Citizenship  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 51. 
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It is hard to individuate cultural groups, but they are generally intergenerational 
groups that have a cluster of properties in common.  I have already noted the way in 
which Kymlicka uses the term “culture.”  A cultural group is an intergenerational 
community, institutionally complete, which shares a common territory, language and 
history.  As indicated above, not all cultural groups are institutionally complete or have a 
common territory—these are, in fact, the traits that distinguish national and ethnic 
minorities.  Cultural groups, however, are intergenerational communities that share some 
relevant features, e.g., language and history.  We should then think of cultures as groups 
with a cluster of properties.  Some cultures are institutionally complete and some are not.  
Cultural groups might have a common territory, but this is not always the case.  It might 
even be pointed out that cultural groups such as Hispanics or Asian-Americans—if they 
are indeed cultural groups in the relevant sense—do not have a common language.  
Nevertheless, Hispanics and Asian-Americans could presumably be intergenerational 
communities that have a common origin and history.        
Kymlicka claims that cultural groups are very important.  The significance of 
cultural groups derives from the fact that they give group members meaning and 
direction.  Cultural attachments give people a set of values and a sense of the world.  
Kymlicka sustains that “the causes of this [cultural] attachment lie deep in the human 
condition, tied up with the way humans as cultural creatures need to make sense of their 
world….”9  Note that human beings make sense of the world by virtue of their cultural 
attachments.   
                                                 
9 Multicultural Citizenship, p. 90.  
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Cultural attachments also provide a framework for making meaningful decisions.  
The importance of cultural membership lies in the following: “we decide how to live our 
lives by situating ourselves in [certain] cultural narratives.”  Similarly, “cultural 
structures” are important “because it’s only through having a rich and secure cultural 
structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, 
and intelligently examine their value.”10  The upshot is that membership in a certain type 
of group is a precondition for making significant and worthwhile choices.  Cultural 
attachments, which must be understood ethnically or nationally, are then significant 
because they endow group members with maps of meaning and direction.     
Cultural attachments are so significant that they ought to be publicly recognized 
and respected.  According to Kymlicka, there seems to be a dilemma between two 
different principles: “people are owed respect as citizens and as members of cultural 
communities.”11  The problem is that upholding citizens’ rights sometimes seems to 
violate the recognition of membership in a cultural community—and thus the apparent 
conflict between individual rights and group rights.12  Part of Kymlicka’s project is 
minimally to show that these two principles do not preclude each other—as liberals 
sometimes have assumed.  There is yet a more robust claim in Kymlicka’s project: 
respect towards people qua citizens often requires respect towards their cultural 
membership.       
                                                 
10 Liberalism, p. 165.  
11 Liberalism, p. 151.  
12 Kymlicka discusses this dilemma in Liberalism, pp. 151-157.  
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One of Kymlicka’s discussions helps us to further understand the significance of 
the groups he and similar multiculturalists have in mind.  In discussing recent literature 
on multiculturalism and minority rights, Kymlicka identifies a position that goes under 
the name of “liberal culturalism.”  Liberal culturalism encompasses “liberal nationalism” 
and “liberal multiculturalism.”  There are relevant differences between liberal 
nationalism and multiculturalism, but for our purposes, the point of concern is the way in 
which liberal culturalism is characterized.   
Liberal culturalism is the view that liberal democratic states should not 
only uphold the familiar set of common civil and political rights of 
citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies; they must also 
adopt various group-specific rights or policies which are intended to 
recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of 
ethnocultural groups [my emphasis].13      
We note in this passage that group-specific rights are intended to recognize and 
accommodate the identities and needs of a particular type of group: ethnocultural.  The 
obvious question is, why this particular type of group?  Kymlicka himself raises the 
following questions: “but why is it important to recognize and accommodate 
ethnocultural identities and practices?  Why does it matter whether society is 
multiculturalist?”14   
Three types of positions are then described.  First, there is the “identity” view.  
“On this view, there is a deep human need to have one’s identity recognized and 
                                                 
13 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 42.  
14 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 47.  
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respected by others.  To have one’s identity ignored or misrecognized by society is a 
profound harm to one’s sense of self-respect.”  Second, there is the “freedom,” 
“autonomy,” or “context of choice” view.  15  “On this view, one’s culture determines the 
boundaries of the imaginable, so that if the options available in one’s culture diminish, so 
too does one’s autonomy.”16  The last position is that of “intrinsically valuable diverse 
cultures.”  “Different cultures are seen as the repository of unique forms of human 
creativity and accomplishment, and to let cultures die out is to lose something of intrinsic 
value.”17              
It is important to highlight that the point of departure for all three positions—
“identity,” “context of choice” and “intrinsic cultural value”—is that ethnocultural 
membership has a degree of significance that other types of memberships do not 
generally have. 
   
2. THE CLAIMS OF MULTICULTURALISM 
The sort of multiculturalism I have been discussing makes two claims.  The first 
claim is that cultural membership—in some particular instances, at least—ought to be 
publicly recognized by means of, say, group-specific rights, whether self-government 
rights or polyethnic rights.  The second claim is that cultural membership has a degree of 
significance that other types of memberships generally do not have—which is one of the 
reasons why cultural membership ought to be publicly recognized.  In what follows, I 
                                                 
15 Presumably, Kymlicka’s own position, although he also seems to endorse the “identity” view.    
16 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 47. 
17 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 48. 
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will first focus on the second claim, i.e., the value of cultural membership.  Then I will 
examine some of the implications affecting the first claim, i.e., group-specific rights.         
The multiculturalist claim on the value of cultural membership entails two points.  
First, cultural membership is a primary source of meaning and direction in the lives of 
group members.  Note that in the multiculturalist outlook under consideration cultural 
membership is not only a significant but also a primary source of meaning and direction.  
Many memberships might be highly significant.  For example, someone’s membership in 
the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle Association, a Mason Lodge or 
the Eastern Orthodox Church might be highly significant.  The type of cultural 
membership, however, the multiculturalist has in mind is different from these other 
memberships.  This particular cultural membership has a degree of significance that other 
memberships generally do not have.  Thus the type of membership the multiculturalist 
has in mind is a primary source of meaning and direction for group members.             
The second point is that cultural groups are national or ethnic minority groups—a 
cluster of groups Kymlicka refers to as “ethnocultural” groups.  It is necessary always to 
bear in mind that in the multiculturalist outlook under consideration “culture” is 
understood in terms of “national” or “ethnic” minorities.  The sorts of groups that come 
to mind are those that generally have a common history, set of beliefs and customs, and 
language.  As noted earlier, these groups might be territorially concentrated, but they may 
not have a homeland.  They might also have a set of public institutions, e.g., school 
system, but not necessarily.  So the cluster of groups under description includes groups 
like the Basque in Spain, which has a homeland and a set of public institutions—albeit 
not having a state of its own.  Also included are groups such as immigrants in the United 
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States, Canada or Australia who do not have a homeland or public institutions, not even 
perhaps a common language; but they have a common history, beliefs and customs.          
Given these two points, the multiculturalist view under examination is that 
membership in an ethnic or national minority is a primary source of meaning and 
direction for group members.  The multiculturalist reasons thus: (a) membership in 
certain groups is a primary source of meaning and direction; (b) these groups are 
generally ethnic or national minorities—henceforth “ethnocultural” groups for short; 
lastly it follows then that (c) membership in ethnocultural groups is a primary source of 
meaning and direction.   
 I now wish to raise the following question: should we single out ethnocultural 
membership as the preferred type of group membership representing a primary source of 
meaning and direction?  In examining this question, I will suggest that the claims of 
multiculturalism must not be conflated.  I agree with the claim that membership in certain 
groups is a primary source of meaning and direction.  Nonetheless, the claim that 
ethnocultural membership must be singled out as a primary source of meaning and 
direction is sometimes hard to justify.  For my suggestion to be sound, I would have to 
show that (i) there are types of groups in which membership is a primary source of 
meaning and direction for group members, but (ii) the groups at stake are not necessarily 
ethnocultural groups.           
 
3. GROUP-TYPES AND THE VALUE OF MEMBERSHIP  
 The case against privileging ethnocultural membership as a primary source of 
meaning and direction has been made against Kymlicka and the multicultural outlook in 
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general.  Brian Walker, for example, identifies two non-ethnocultural groups in which 
membership has presumably been a primary source of meaning and direction for some 
people: the “family farm” and the “urban neighborhood.”   
 He points out that “for millennia, most people lived an agricultural life, which had 
its own folklore and culture, with knowledge and narratives passed down from generation 
to generation.”  With the development of agricultural technology, rendering family 
farming untenable, farmers were forced to assimilate themselves into the urban lifestyle.  
The result is that urbanization “marked the loss of a rich culture, and generations of 
people were cast adrift in a foreign world.  The disappearance of the family farm marked 
the death of a lifeway and of a structure of sensibility.”18   
 Similarly, Walker uses the disappearance of “urban neighborhoods” as “another 
example of a swift change in institutional structure that has devastating effects on cultural 
membership and on the life-chances of the people who rely on it.”  The reason for such a 
consequence is that “neighborhoods play a crucial role as carriers of culture.  They 
solidify a sense of identity and they serve as a site for groups to create a sense of 
community and security in a frequently hostile environment.”19   
 The first point in these examples is that the decline of certain groups has grievous 
consequences for group members because the flourishing of group members is bound 
with the flourishing of the group itself.  Note that group flourishing is essential for 
members’ flourishing, but why so?  Presumably, the answer is because group 
                                                 
18 “Modernity and Cultural Vulnerability: Should Ethnicity Be Privileged,” in Theorizing Nationalism, ed. 
R. Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 145-146. 
19 “Modernity and Cultural Vulnerability,” p. 146.   
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membership endows members with maps of meaning and direction.  If membership in 
group G is essential for members’ flourishing, then membership in G is most likely more 
significant than other memberships.  Membership in G is then a primary source of 
meaning and direction.   
 Note, however, a second point in the examples above: family farms and urban 
farms are non-ethnocultural groups.  If membership in family farms and urban farms 
could indeed be a primary source of meaning and direction, it follows that non-
ethnocultural memberships could be a primary source of meaning and direction.            
 The observation I have just made suggests the view that we should be impartial 
towards the types of identity groups that are worthy of recognition and protection.  The 
implication is that different types of groups may be equally valuable—or more precisely, 
membership in different types of groups may be a primary source of meaning and 
direction.  So Thomas Pogge observes that  
whatever we demand from a just and fair political process for ethnic 
minorities, we should also demand for any other minorities: if enough 
citizens share a certain identification and are willing to form a coalition for 
the sake of securing representation for themselves in the legislature, then 
they should be able to gain such representation, irrespective of the type of 
their identification [my emphasis].20  
 The claim in the passage just quoted is concerned with the recognition of minority 
rights for non-ethnocultural groups in a fair and equal system—a thesis that is defended 
                                                 
20 Thomas Pogge, “Group Rights and Ethnicity,” in Ethnicity and Group Rights, eds. I. Shapiro and W. 
Kymlicka (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 200. 
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in explicit contrast with Kymlicka’s view.  What I wish to emphasize, however, is the 
assumption that whatever the merits of ethnocultural groups, these groups per se should 
not be privileged before the law.  The relevant implication for our purposes is that 
ethnocultural groups should not be necessarily privileged because membership in 
ethnocultural groups might be valuable just as membership in other types of groups might 
be valuable as well.          
 The point to be highlighted in the discussion so far is that we should not 
necessarily think of ethnocultural groups as a special type of group because membership 
in groups other than ethnocultural ones might also be a primary source of meaning and 
direction.   
 
4. MEMBERSHIP AND GROUP FUNCTION  
 Membership in ethnocultural groups is not the only primary source of meaning 
and direction.  The question then is: how could we think of the relevant kind of 
membership without necessarily linking such memberships with ethnocultural groups?  
My suggestion is that a modal framework pointing to the functional quality of groups will 
help achieve two purposes.  First, we could preserve the view that membership in certain 
groups is a primary source of meaning and direction.  And second, we could also move 
away from categories such as “ethnicity” and “nationality,” namely, the vocabulary of 
ethnocultural groups and multiculturalism.  It is my view that such a language ends up 
creating more confusion, instead of contributing to an understanding of what highly 
valuable membership entails.   
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 The guiding idea of the framework in mind is that highly valuable membership is 
based on the function that a group has in the lives of group members.  As a result, we 
must think of groups in which membership is a primary source of meaning and direction 
not as group-types, e.g., religious, national, ethnic, racial, etc, but rather as groups that 
have a certain function in the lives of group members, i.e., the function of endowing 
members with relevant memberships.21      
 Think of group-type A in a possible scenario PS1.  Membership in A is a primary 
source of meaning and direction since membership in A will tend to be more valuable 
than other memberships.  Now imagine that, in possible scenario PS2, membership in 
group-type B—and not membership in A— is, in fact, a primary source of meaning and 
direction.  A in PS1 has the function of endowing group members with the relevant 
membership, whereas B in PS2 has the same function.       
 To illustrate the point just made with social categories, consider an instance in 
which membership in a national minority group, e.g., Quebec, is a primary source of 
meaning and direction for some group member.  In this case, Quebecois membership has 
a degree of significance that other memberships generally do not have.  Now imagine 
another instance in which membership in a religious group, e.g., Muslim, is a primary 
source of meaning and direction for some group member who also happens to be a 
Quebecois.  In this second instance, the significance of Muslim membership is higher 
than the significance of other types of memberships, e.g., Quebecois membership.  
Membership in two different types of groups, national and religious, might be a primary 
source of meaning and direction for two different people.  The two group-types, national 
                                                 
21 I will turn to a characterization of groups that have this function in chapter four.  
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and religious, might then have the function of endowing group members with the relevant 
membership in different scenarios.   
 It is indeed true that religious impulses are often connected with nationalism.  The 
people of a nation can also be the people of a deity or a set of deities.22  That groups of 
people belong to deities has been an old theme in human history.  There is, for example, a 
Sumerian poem from 2000 BC expressing grief because the city of Ur has been 
conquered by the Amorites and Elamites.  The poem cries out to the god of the city, 
Nanna: “As for me, the woman, the city has been destroyed, my house too has been 
destroyed; O Nanna, Ur has been destroyed, its people have been dispersed.”23  Using 
more modern examples, we can think of the American “city on a hill,” or movements 
such as the Afrikaans or Zionism.  Truly, nations are often sacred or chosen communities 
and one can sometimes see how religious metaphors are connected with national 
identities, e.g., the Virgin of Guadalupe is a crucial element of Mexican “national 
identity.”  
 By the same token, however, religious affiliation can be trans-ethnic or trans-
national, or independent from someone’s current ethnic affiliation or nationality.  
Religion could help us to understand modern nationalism, but religion is also an older 
phenomenon than modern nationalism.  The point is that religious affiliation and national 
membership do not always overlap.  We can then think of situations in which religious 
                                                 
22 For an interesting and helpful discussion on the inter-relation between religion and nationality, see 
Anthony Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
23 Readings from the Ancient Near East: Primary Sources for Old Testament Study, eds. B. Arnold and B. 
Beyer (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), p. 225.   
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membership is a primary source of meaning and direction, whereas ethnocultural 
membership is not. 24  Consider a Dominican monk in California who happens to be a 
member of the Hispanic group; or a Buddhist monk in Tibet—a minority nation within 
China.  It is quite possible that membership in the Dominican or Buddhist communities is 
a primary source of meaning and direction.  It is also quite possible that the Hispanic or 
Tibetan memberships of these monks—or other ethnocultural memberships—will be of 
relatively little importance.   
 Imagine also a Jehovah’s Witness for whom her Kingdom membership is 
preeminent in comparison with her worldly ethnocultural membership.  Ethnocultural 
membership for a Jehovah’s Witness could not only be relatively unimportant, but certain 
views and practices linked with ethnocultural identities, e.g., saluting or pledging 
allegiance to a particular symbol, rituals that entail dancing or intoxication, may be 
associated with idolatry—a grievous sin.   
 Turning now to other group-types, consider a situation in which the identity of a 
certain small group does not coincide with the larger national identity of the state that the 
smaller group inhabits.  Think of a Yanomami in “Venezuelan” or “Brazilian” territory.  
The Yanomami will presumably see her place in the world through the lens of her 
                                                 
24 For purposes of analytical consideration one can tend to be emphatic when distinguishing different types 
of groups, e.g., “national,” “religious,” “social class,” etc.  In reality, however, groups in which 
membership is a primary source of meaning and direction are generally highly complex and often difficult 
to categorize.  I then agree with Steven Grosby when he points out that we may distinguish nationality from 
religion; but he then observes that these distinctions “vary historically and by civilization.” “Nationality 
and Religion,” in Understanding Nationalism, eds. M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson (Malden: Polity Press, 
2001), p. 104. 
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Yanomami membership.  The meaning of the term “Yanomami” and what membership in 
the group entails is explained by the anthropologist Jacques Lizot:  
We can better understand the tendency of ethnic groups to call themselves 
by a name that, in their language, means simply ‘man,’ ‘folk,’ or 
something to that effect.  That is very precisely the meaning of the word 
yanomami.  The ethnic group is the central focus of the human universe; it 
is humanity par excellence, around which everything must necessarily 
converge or gravitate.  For a Yanomami, anything that doesn’t belong to 
his own sociocultural world is necessarily alien, nab?.  The words 
yanomami and nab? form both a pair and an opposition. 25  
 The Yanomami would certainly qualify as an “ethnocultural” group.  In fact, these 
are the sorts of groups Kymlicka often has in mind.26  Imagine, however, someone who is 
born from Yanomami parents but is brought up in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela, or 
Sao Paulo, Brazil.  The person in mind attends the public school system in Caracas and 
one of the national universities, Universidad Simón Bolivar.27      
 What is her primary source of meaning and direction: her Yanomami or her 
Venezuelan membership?  The multiculturalist will be inclined to say that her Yanomami 
membership is a primary source of meaning and direction.  My view, however, is that 
                                                 
25 Tales of the Yanomami: Daily Life in the Venezuelan Forest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), pp. 2-3.  
26 See Liberalism, p. 136.    
27 The two groups being compared in this example—Venezuela, a nation-state, and the Yanomami, an 
ethnic minority—are in some sense “cultural” groups.  But we must remember that when multiculturalists 
speak of cultural groups, they often refer to minorities and not nation-states.    
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either group membership—or another group-type membership—might be a primary 
source of meaning and direction.   
 At least four scenarios are possible.  First, her Yanomami membership is a 
primary source of meaning and direction.  Second, her Venezuelan membership is a 
primary source.  In the third scenario, her Yanomami and Venezuelan memberships are 
competing and conflicting primary sources of meaning and direction.  In the fourth 
scenario, neither her Yanomami nor her Venezuelan memberships are primary sources 
because a different group-type membership is a primary source of meaning and direction.  
The point is that different groups might have the function of endowing this person with 
the relevant membership.       
 I have so far mentioned “national,” “religious” and “ethnic” groups as types of 
groups in which membership might be a primary source of meaning and direction.  Other 
groups one might consider include “political parties,” “continental groups,” or “social 
classes.”  Imagine someone growing up in a communist family in Latin America around 
1958 strongly influenced by the Pan-American ideology characteristic of authors such as 
José Martí and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.  In the latter scenario, we must bear in mind that 
events such as the Cuban Revolution created an atmosphere of “commonality,” “unity” 
and “solidarity” in the struggle for liberation across the Latin American continent.  In this 
circumstance, it is plausible to believe that the struggle for liberation is associated with a 
large continental group in which membership is a primary source of meaning and 
direction.  Thus, in words of José Martí: “our America is to show itself as it is, one in 
spirit and intent, swift conqueror of a suffocating past, stained only by the enriching 
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blood drawn from hands that struggle to clear away the ruins, and from the scars left 
upon us by our masters [my emphasis].”28   
 Much to the disappointment of Marxists in the Second International, “social 
class” did not have the strength to pull the proletariat of different nationalities together. 29  
During the sixties however, the “social class” factor did seem to play an important role in 
Latin America—although perhaps still not strong enough to override the “national” 
factor.  But recent conflicts between the “rich” and the “poor” in Venezuela, and other 
Latin American countries, seem to be showing that membership in a “social class” could 
be a primary source of meaning and direction for class members.               
 The purpose of my discussion is to highlight the fact that membership in different 
group-types, in different scenarios, could be a primary source of meaning and direction.  
Thus different group-types might have the function of endowing group members with the 
relevant membership.  As a result, the value and significance of group membership is not 
based on the type of group per se, but rather the function of the group in the lives of 
members.   
 In order to avoid giving what might seem like an oversimplified account, let me 
now make some clarifications.  If different types of groups in different scenarios might 
potentially have memberships that are a primary source of meaning and direction for 
members, then two questions arise: (a) is there an unlimited range of such groups?; and 
                                                 
28 “Our America,” in Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, Values and 
the Search for Identity, eds. J. Gracia and E. Millán-Zaibert (New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), p. 251.  
29 In other words, communism did not fulfill its 1848 prediction that the common interests of the proletariat 
would supersede regional or national interests.  See Karl Marx, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in 
The Portable Karl Marx (New York, Penguin Books, 1983), p. 218.  
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(b) how do we recognize groups in which membership is a primary source of meaning 
and direction?    
 With regard to (a), different group-types, hypothetically speaking, could have the 
function of endowing members with the relevant membership.  We could imagine any 
group-type from nations to aficionado clubs.  But we know that membership in some 
groups tends to be a primary source of meaning and direction, whereas membership in 
other groups does not.  We know that national memberships tend to be very significant, 
whereas membership in aficionado clubs does not often have the same degree of 
significance as national memberships.  How do we know about these tendencies?   
 With regard to (b), suppose that someone might be a member in two or more 
groups in which membership tends to be a primary source of meaning and direction, e.g., 
a religious group and a nation.  How do we know whether those memberships are 
competing and conflicting sources of meaning and direction, or whether one of the 
memberships is indeed more significant than the other?     
 The answer to these two questions is a matter of empirical evidence.  If we want 
to inquire, for example, whether a particular membership is a primary source of meaning 
and direction, we must not begin by looking at the traits of the group or the group-type 
per se.  We must look at the function the group has in the lives of its members.   
 Consider, for instance, the “Asian-American” group and identity.  If we want to 
know the status of Asian-American membership, we will not get very far by looking at 
the group-type—which could be thought of as an “ethnocultural” type.  We must consider 
instead whether the group endows group members with the relevant membership or not.  
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Accordingly, we will be able to find out whether membership in the Asian-American 
group is a primary source of meaning and direction or not.     
 
5. WHY MULTICULTURALISM?  
 I have challenged the notion that ethnocultural groups should be singled out as the 
preferred group-type in which membership is a primary source of meaning and direction.  
I have suggested instead that different group-types, in different possible scenarios, might 
have the function of endowing members with such a membership.    
 Now, if the claim is right that membership in different types of groups, and not 
just ethnocultural ones, can be a primary source of meaning and direction, there are three 
implications for Kymlicka’s multicultural theory of group recognition.  The implications 
I discuss are based on the premise that when membership in a certain group is a primary 
source of meaning and direction, the group, under some conditions, could potentially be 
accorded group-specific rights by the state.  This premise is one that I have borrowed 
from Kymlicka himself.   
 The first implication is that different group-types ought to be the potential 
recipients of public recognition, i.e., different group-types could be potentially accorded 
group-specific rights.  As we will see, however, the notion of publicly recognizing 
different group-types is contrary to Kymlicka’s theory.   
 We must remember at this point that the primacy of ethnocultural membership is 
not in Kymlicka’s view the only rationale for group recognition.  Certain disadvantaged 
groups ought to be recognized and be granted rights because a society is based on 
principles of justice.  But group recognition on grounds of justice assumes that 
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membership in these groups has a special status—for why recognize disadvantaged 
groups unless membership in these groups is of a special kind?30  Kymlicka does not 
believe that all disadvantaged groups should receive recognition.  Take, for example, two 
groups: lawyers and musicians.  Lawyers generally have greater access to a distributional 
good such as salaries than musicians do.  So in a certain sense musicians are 
disadvantaged with regard to lawyers.  Nonetheless, Kymlicka’s multiculturalism does 
not contemplate musicians—presumably because membership in the group of musicians 
is not generally thought to be a primary source of meaning and direction. 31                        
 Let us grant that if membership in a disadvantaged ethnocultural group is indeed 
of the relevant kind, then it might be necessary to recognize the group and accommodate 
its needs.  But now suppose that membership in a religious community, e.g., Muslims, is 
a primary source of meaning and direction for some group of Middle-Eastern immigrants 
to the U.S.32  Let us also point out that the Muslim faith is indeed disadvantaged in 
                                                 
30 According to Kymlicka, “if state institutions fail to recognize and respect people’s culture and identity, 
the result can be serious damage to people’s self-respect and sense of agency.”  Then he adds: “if we accept 
either or both of these points, then we can see minority rights not as unfair privileges or invidious forms of 
discrimination, but as compensation for unfair disadvantages, and so consistent with, and even required by, 
justice.” Politics in the Vernacular, pp. 32-33.  Note that minority rights are necessary not only because 
they compensate for certain disadvantages.  They are rather necessary because they compensate for 
disadvantages that arise when people’s self-respect and sense of agency are damaged.    
31 Kymlicka would also probably point out that the group of musicians does not have a societal culture or 
that being a musician is not a precondition for making meaningful choices.   
32 According to Yvonne Haddad, “for Christians, Muslims, and Jews from the Middle East, one’s religious 
affiliation determines one’s identity.  A person is born, grows up, and dies in a specific religious 
community.” “Maintaining the Faith of our Fathers: Dilemmas of Religious Identity in the Christian and 
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comparison with the Anglo-Protestant majority in American society.  Should the 
American state then specifically accommodate Muslims by recognizing group-specific 
rights in public life (e.g., celebrate Muslim holidays and allocate public funds for Muslim 
schools)?  Given the presumed religious neutrality of the American state, the answer is 
negative.  Kymlicka’s answer is also negative.33 
 If the criteria for public recognition and minority-group rights are relevant 
membership and disadvantage with regard to a majority group, then Kymlicka’s theory is 
not wholly consistent.  According to Kymlicka, ethnocultural membership is a primary 
source of meaning and direction.  Additionally, when an ethnocultural minority is 
vulnerable to a majority society, the minority group ought to be recognized and protected 
by means of group-specific rights.  Recognition and protection require the state to put 
aside any ethnocultural neutrality pretensions, and be in some measure “ethno-
conscious.”34  But why should the state be ethno-conscious and not religious-conscious or 
social class-conscious—assuming that all these groups satisfy the criteria for public 
recognition and protection?  It would seem that different group-types, and not just 
ethnocultural ones, ought to be the potential recipients of public recognition.                 
                                                                                                                                                 
Muslim Arab-American Communities,” in The Development of Arab-American Identity, ed. E. McCarus 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 65. 
33 Kymlicka claims that the idea that liberal-democratic states “are ethnoculturally neutral is manifestly 
false.”  But “the religion model is altogether misleading as an account of the relationship between the 
liberal-democratic state and ethnocultural groups.”  The reason is presumably because the state should be 
neutral with regard to religion, but not with regard to ethnocultural groups.  Politics in the Vernacular, pp. 
23-25.      
34 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 32. 
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 Second, the view that ethnocultural groups always ought to be publicly 
recognized is put into question.  Group-types other than ethnocultural ones merit 
recognition.  But now a different question arises.  Regardless of the merits of other 
group-types, do ethnocultural groups always have merits for public recognition?  
Kymlicka’s answer is presumably positive.  Membership in ethnocultural groups is a 
precondition for self-respect, identity, and being able to make meaningful choices.  Thus 
in the case of immigrant groups, for instance, Kymlicka’s view is that  
we need to ensure that the common institutions in which immigrants are 
pressured to integrate provide the same degree of respect, recognition and 
accommodation of the identities and practices of immigrants as they 
traditionally have of the identities and practices of the majority group.35 
Now, drawing on our earlier example, suppose that for a group of Middle Eastern 
immigrants to the U.S., membership in a religious group is a primary source of meaning 
and direction.  The situation I have in mind requires that the state recognizes the Muslim 
identity of group members, which, as we saw, is not really contemplated in Kymlicka’s 
view.  Should the state, however, recognize the Arab identity of group members?  A 
positive answer would seem to be plausible if “Arab” is construed ethnoculturally.  But 
suppose that the Arab identity of the group at stake is of lesser value than its Muslim 
identity.  If this is the case, the type of membership the state intends to recognize and 
protect, i.e., Arab, is not a primary source of meaning and direction for group members.  
And if membership is not of the relevant kind, this seems to be a case in which the 
ethnocultural identity of a group does not have enough merits for public recognition.            
                                                 
35 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 30. 
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One might object that the religious identity of Arab immigrants is interwoven 
with their ethnocultural identity.  Thus, recognition of ethnocultural identity requires 
admitting overtly religious elements.36  The observation, however, ignores the fact that 
the group of Arabs is not coextensive with the group of Muslims—not all Arabs, for 
instance are Muslims and the group of Muslims is greater than the group of Arabs.    
Suppose the state recognizes the religious practices of Arabs on the basis that 
these practices are part of their ethnocultural identity.  Still, non-Arabs who happen to 
profess the Muslim faith are not entitled to public recognition because their religious 
identity is not attached to an ethnocultural membership.  Note, however, that the last 
claim seems quite odd—for we would expect that if the state recognizes the religious 
practices of some Muslims it should then recognize the practices of all Muslims.   
Let me explain the point differently.  Two sets of people share the attribute of 
relevant membership in a religious group.  The two sets, however, have a differential 
attribute: ethnocultural membership, i.e., one set is Arabic and the other is Anglo-
American.  Given that the two sets have relevant memberships in a religious group, why 
then should recognition be extended to a certain set and not to the other one on the 
grounds of ethnocultural membership?  If it is not clear that ethnocultural membership is 
                                                 
36 I am not sure if Kymlicka would endorse this connection or not.  He takes pains to point out that societal 
cultures are not distinguished by religious elements.  He says, for instance: “I call it a societal culture to 
emphasize that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, 
family customs, or personal lifestyles.” Politics in the Vernacular, p. 25.   
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a primary source of meaning and direction for the set of Arabs, as opposed to Anglo-
Americans, I do not think there is a good way to answer the question. 37          
 The third implication, and perhaps the most important one, is that given the 
variety of memberships that could potentially count as a primary source of meaning and 
direction, it is difficult to speak of a multicultural “model.”  Kymlicka’s aim is to “clarify 
the basic building blocks of a liberal approach to minority rights.”38  These building 
blocks consist of cultural diversity patterns in Western liberal democracies.  The patterns 
Kymlicka has in mind are minority nations and immigrants, which give rise to 
multinational or polyethnic states.39  Although Kymlicka makes special mention of the 
Canadian case, e.g., aboriginal groups and the Quebecois, it is clear that his project is to 
develop a general multicultural theory for liberal democracies.  One of the major themes 
in Politics in the Vernacular, for instance, is the general success of certain minority-
rights patterns in multicultural societies.40                         
                                                 
37 The state could also find itself in the dangerous business of judging and creating group-type hierarchies.  
On this point, see Thomas Pogge’s helpful discussion about equality and group value.  “Accommodation 
Rights for Hispanics in the United States,” in Language Rights and Political Theory, eds. W. Kymlicka and 
A. Patten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 109. 
38 Multicultural Citizenship, p. 2. 
39 Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 11-17. 
40 See p. 3.  The aim to provide a general theory becomes evident in Kymlicka’s attempt to answer his 
critics.  One of the criticisms against Kymlicka’s minority rights theory is that too much weight is put on 
two paradigmatic cases: minority nations and immigrants—who are generally legal immigrants.  Kymlicka 
acknowledges that several groups are left out in his theory, most notably African-Americans, because they 
do not fit any of the paradigmatic cases (see Multicultural Citizenship, p. 24, and Politics in the 
Vernacular, p. 56).  Nonetheless, he points out that “the fact remains that immigrants and national 
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I suggested earlier that distinguishing groups and memberships that count as a 
primary source of meaning and direction is a matter of empirical evidence.  Based on my 
previous discussion, I suspect that the empirical evidence in different societies is 
mixed—we could minimally count three group-types: ethnocultural, religious, and social 
class.  It seems to me that this observation casts doubts on Kymlicka’s multicultural 
model for Western countries.  If membership in different group-types is a primary source 
of meaning and direction, different groups should ostensibly be recognized because of the 
value such groups have for their members.  In other words, different group-types should 
potentially be accorded group-specific rights.  It is then difficult to speak of a uniform 
multicultural model across Western societies.  
 I have assumed for each of the implications above that groups could potentially be 
accorded group-specific rights by the state, under some conditions, when membership in 
these groups is a primary source of meaning and direction.  If we take the assumption 
seriously, it would seem that we need a model of diversity that is more diverse than 
Kymlicka’s model.  But what if the assumption I have taken for granted is not entirely 
sound?   
 Let us think for a moment what a more diverse model of diversity would entail.  
First, policy-makers would need to determine the group-types in which membership is of 
                                                                                                                                                 
minorities form the most common types of ethnocultural pluralism in Western democracies.” Politics in the 
Vernacular, p. 57. Moreover, “insofar as secure membership in a viable societal culture is a precondition 
for the sort of freedom and equality that liberalism aspires to, then the immigrant/national minority models 
are worth considering, even if this would require both the majority and minority to rethink their self-
identities.” Politics in the Vernacular, p. 58.                     
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the relevant kind.41  Second, the degree of disadvantage of each group with regard to 
other groups will have to be determined.  Third, assuming that there are several 
disadvantaged groups with relevant memberships, which ones should be accorded group-
specific rights?  Not all of groups could be publicly recognized because then nation-
building policies would not have much coherence, so some groups will be accorded rights 
whereas others will be left out.     
 These considerations would seem to make the task of the state very complicated. 
Is it really practical to expect for policy-makers to determine the group-types in which 
membership is of the relevant kind?  Should we expect them to also determine which 
groups ought to be accorded group-specific rights?  Additionally, do we want policy-
makers to make determinations about the value of group membership?  Questions of this 
sort make me somewhat skeptical about group rights.   
 Kymlicka believes there is a growing consensus regarding group rights.  
According to Kymlicka, “liberal culturalism has arguably become the dominant position 
in the literature today, and most debates are about how to develop and refine the liberal 
culturalist position, rather than whether to accept it in the first place.”  Liberal culturalists 
believe that the state “must also adopt various group-specific rights or policies [in 
addition to individual civil and political rights] which are intended to recognize and 
accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups.”42      
                                                 
41 I am assuming for the sake of argument that there are group-types such that membership is a primary 
source of meaning and direction for most group members.  But this picture can get somewhat complicated.  
Is Jewish membership, for instance, of the relevant kind?  The answer will vary for different people.   
42 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 42.  
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 But I am not entirely convinced that we should accept multiculturalism and the 
group-rights paradigm instead of, say, the principle of neutrality.  Given the skepticism I 
have expressed about the exclusive value of membership in ethnocultural groups, I 
believe that the matter is, to say the least, still an open one.        
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I argued two points. First, ethnocultural membership should not be 
privileged as a primary source of meaning and direction.  I accept Kymlicka’s thesis that 
membership in some group-type is a primary source of meaning and direction.  But then I 
argue against Kymlicka that the type of membership that constitutes a primary source of 
meaning and direction is not always or necessarily confined to ethnocultural groups.     
 Based on the first point, I also argued a second point.  Kymlicka’s model of group 
rights and diversity is not diverse enough for the sake of recognizing group-types other 
than ethnocultural ones.  If the rationale for the public recognition of groups hinges on 
the fact that membership in a group-type is of a special kind, then the spectrum of group-
types that merit public recognition should be broader and include more than just 
ethnocultural groups.  The corollary, as mentioned, is that Kymlicka’s model of diversity 
ought to be more diverse than what he contemplates.  I incidentally suggested that the 
necessity for more diversity makes me skeptical about the prospects for coherent 
multicultural policies.          
 In the remainder of this project, I will not have much to say about group-rights or 
multicultural policies as such.  In other words, I will not pursue the second point any 
further.  My attent ion will rather focus on the claims made with regard to first point, i.e., 
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membership as a primary source of meaning and direction and group-types.  I will then 
turn to a discussion of membership and relevant groups in the next two chapters.   
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CHAPTER 3 
BASIC MEMBERSHIP AND THE CENTRALITY OF IDENTITY 
 
 In the previous chapter, I suggested that membership could be a primary source of 
meaning and direction in different group-types.  The question that arises now is this: if 
membership in different group-types could be a primary source of meaning and direction, 
when is membership of the relevant kind?  In other words, under what conditions is 
membership a primary source of meaning and direction?  
 In this chapter, I will discuss membership.  I wish to suggest that membership is a 
primary source of meaning and direction when it is central to members’ identities.  I will 
begin in the first section with a discussion on the general meaning of identity.  In the 
second section, I will introduce and discuss the notion of basic membership; and then 
finally, in the third section, a few remarks about the value of membership will be made.           
        
1. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO HAVE AN IDENTITY?  
 In order to speak of “identity,” we must know what is meant by the term.  We 
speak of our identities as something highly significant for personhood, but what does it 
mean for a person to have an identity?   
Let me first suggest that having an identity means to possess a certain 
understanding of who I am, which entails a certain grasp of the traits that characterize me 
as a human being.  I may characterize myself as a baseball fan, a clever person, a 
Jamaican, an opera lover, a Muslim, or a high school student; and in such an act of 
characterization, I am articulating self-understanding.  When I am able to characterize 
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who I am, and thus show a degree of self-understanding, I may be said to have an identity 
to myself. 1           
 My first point implies a second characteristic of identity that must be made 
explicit.  We have seen that I show self-understanding by characterizing myself: I am an 
opera lover, a Buddhist, an office manager, a sad person, an athlete, etc.  Note that 
characterization mostly entails association with and membership in a group.   
 The understanding of who I am is often relational, namely, connected with a set of 
people.2  For instance, in characterizing myself as an athlete I am saying that I belong to 
the set of athletes, which means that I have certain features in common with other 
athletes.3  Within the set of athletes, I may in turn be a member of the subset of soccer 
players.  Even as a soccer player, I could be a member of the subset of goalkeepers, etc.  
What I wish to illustrate is that the characterization of who I am, i.e., self-understanding, 
generally entails group membership.   
                                                 
1 Human beings are capable of self-understanding because of their level of cognitive complexity.  I take it 
then that trees, ants, and dogs do not have identities to themselves.  Since they do not possess the cognitive 
complexity necessary for developing self-understanding, it is not possible to say that they have identities in 
the same sense that human beings do. 
2 For relevant literature on the connection between self-understanding and self-knowledge with groups, see 
Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 205-
220; Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 41-92; and G.H. Mead Mind, Self and Society: 
From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).   
3 Properly speaking, identity consists of having traits in common with other members of the group.  I 
belong to a group and thus derive an identity from such a group because of traits that, in some respects, 
make me identical with other members.   
  51 
 Descriptions of who I am will commonly join me to a set or class of people,4 and 
thus the understanding of who I am is often coupled with membership.  The main point is 
that self-understanding is tied with groups.  Such a connection highlights the fact that the 
collective dimension is an integral part of the human experience.       
 What does it mean then for a person to have an identity?  I have so far pointed out 
two aspects of identity-bearing: self-understanding and group membership.  To have an 
identity is to possess an understanding of who I am, indicated by characterization, that 
makes me a member of a group. 
 In order to clarify my view of identity, let me make a distinction between the 
phenomenon and the vocabulary of identity.  Truly, the vocabulary of “identity” is 
relatively new in human history and seemingly unique to the modern world.  The ways in 
which modern people are able to think in and formulate detailed accounts of who they are 
and how they view themselves, seem to be absent in, for example, some pre-modern 
societies.5  One might therefore be inclined to suggest that the phenomenon of identity is 
a modern one.  I wish to suggest, however, that it is possible to speak of identities in pre-
                                                 
4 The exception, of course, is belonging to a set with only one member: the father of Mary, or the Fire 
Chief of Boston.  But even in this case one may point out that the connection is with a broader set, i.e., the 
set of fathers or Fire Chiefs.    
5 For an interesting discussion of this point, see Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition , ed. A. Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 26-31.   
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modern and non-modern societies, which is why it is essential to draw a distinction 
between the phenomenon and the vocabulary. 6     
It may be the case that a member of the Yanomami7 tribe in the Amazon, a non-
modern community, does not readily give an account of his or her identity as a 
Yanomami.  It would be wrong to say, however, that the Yanomami does not possess a 
certain degree or capacity for self-understanding that makes her a member of a group.   
Suppose that I, a Yanomami, am able to characterize myself as someone who 
believes in certain myths and carries out tasks such as parenting, fishing, and providing 
for my community, in a way that is similar to what other people around me do.  Imagine, 
for instance, that my name is Ebr?w?, living in a community by the name of 
“Yanomami” which is surrounded by objects described as waima, tokori, shitibori, hoko 
(types of tress) and kirakirami, kõbari, kreõmri (types of birds), etc.  There are also other 
types of invisible objects that go by names such as hekura, bore koko and hera.8  I, along 
with other men of my group, hunt wild pigs according to certain rituals and customs.9  
Like other people in my group, I believe that our ancestors were at one time immortal, 
                                                 
6 I follow Taylor’s insight when he says that “in premodern times, people didn’t speak of ‘identity’ and 
‘recognition’ —not because people didn’t have (what we call) identities, or because these didn’t depend on 
recognition, but rather because there were then too unproblematic to be thematized as such.” “Politics of 
Recognition,” p. 35.    
7 In using this example, I draw from Jacques Lizot’s well-known ethnographic study, presented in a 
narrative form, first published in 1976, Tales of the Yanomami: Daily Life in the Venezuelan  
Forest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  
8 For a glossary of words and proper pronunciation for the transliteration, see Tales of the Yanomami , pp. 
190-196.    
9 See Tales of the Yanomami , pp. 144-152.  
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but because they stole the fire from Caiman, we ceased to be immortal.  Now after death 
my bei kë mi amo (soul) will leave my body and “rise along the ropes of the hammocks 
and climb up the supporting posts of the shelter to go to live on the celestial disk.”10       
In characterizing myself, I show an understanding of who I am.  My community is 
known as the “Yanomami” and so my self-understanding entails being a member of the 
Yanomami.  I presumably view myself and the world through the lens of my membership 
in the Yanomami community.  Note that, in our example, I characterize myself and thus 
show self-understanding, which connects me with the Yanomamis.  I may not possess the 
vocabulary of “identity,” but according to the phenomenon described I may be said to 
have an identity.       
The phenomenon of identity I have described must also be distinguished from the 
vocabulary of identity in another respect.  The phenomenon I have in mind is different 
from what goes on in identity politics or the politics of difference and recognition.  On 
my view, identity simply means that I see who I am, the world and my place in it, 
through the lens of a worldview that makes me a member of a group.  This phenomenon 
is to be distinguished from the vocabulary of identity in identity politics. 
In the framework of the politics of difference, identity means that I—as, say, a 
member of an “ethnic” group in modern American society—am fully aware of certain 
features that distinguish me and the group to which I belong, and am hence able, for 
example, to demand political recognition for those features.  The vocabulary of “identity-
value” and “distinctiveness” is conducive to demands of difference-recognition.  Here, 
                                                 
10 Tales of the Yanomami , p. 26.  
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one sees group members “insisting on their value as a group and on the solidarity of its 
members” and thus demanding “some form of public recognition.”11 
The phenomenon of identity I have described, however, is not necessarily related 
with the politics of difference and recognition.  In order to distinguish the phenomenon 
from the vocabulary of identity politics, let us make a distinction between identity as self-
understanding and identity-awareness.  The first type of identity requires self-
understanding, nothing else.  The second type of identity entails a strong awareness of the 
distinctiveness of my features, which may lead to the demand of public recognition.   
The Yanomami has an identity, in that he or she possesses self understanding; but 
the Yanomami may not necessarily have an identity if we require that he or she be 
strongly aware of his or her Yanomami distinctiveness and thus be in a position to 
demand public recognition.  The point is that self-understanding is different from a deep 
consciousness and articulation of “Yanomami identity.”12   
In conclusion, human beings, given their cognitive complexity, are able to 
characterize themselves and as such show self-understanding.  Such a self-understanding 
makes them members of a group.  People may not be deeply aware of their identity—in 
the way that many modern citizens are—but they possess self-understanding and group 
membership, which is all that is required fo r my view of identity.        
 
                                                 
11 Michael Walzer, What it Means to Be an American: Essays on the American Experience (New York: 
Marsilio Publishers, 1996), p. 4.   
12 On this point, see Jeremy Waldron’s interesting discussion about cultural identity and the requirements of 
authenticity and self-consciousness. “Cultural Identity and Civic Responsibility,” in Citizenship in Diverse 
Societies, eds. W. Kymlicka and W. Norman (Oxford: Oxford Un iversity Press, 2000), pp. 168-169. 
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2. MEMBERSHIP’S CENTRALITY TO IDENTITY 
a. Basic Membership 
 Now that we have discussed identity we can move on to examining the conditions 
under which membership is a primary source of meaning and direction.  My thesis is that 
membership is a primary source of meaning and direction when such a membership is 
central to members’ identities.     
 The first question that arises is this: when is membership central to members’ 
identities?  In order to answer this question, I wish to introduce the notion of basic 
membership.  Membership is basic when certain group traits are essential to a member’s 
self-understanding.   
 Suppose it were virtually impossible for me to characterize myself as anything 
other than an Irishman, a Roman Catholic or a Communist because the traits that are 
essential to my own self-understanding make me an Irishman, a Roman Catholic or a 
Communist.  Then my membership in the Irish nation, the Catholic Church and the 
Communist Party is said to be basic. 
 Notice that basic membership has two components: (a) certain traits are essential 
to my own self-understanding and (b) these traits make me a member of a particular 
group.  Keeping these two components together is important because otherwise we will 
not be clear about the notion of basic membership.  If we isolate these two elements from 
each other, we will end up with two incomplete pictures.        
 First, one might simply think of traits that are essential to someone’s self-
understanding.  It is necessary to see, however, that these traits derive from and are 
associated with a particular group.  And so the traits that are essential to someone’s self-
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understanding are generally traits that presumably make her a member of such a 
particular group.     
 It is important to incidentally mention the following point: the insistence that 
someone is a member of particular group is not innocent.  A trait that is essential to 
someone’s self-understanding could potentially make her a member of a very general 
group, e.g., the group of English speakers or human beings.  But this is not basic 
membership.  Membership is basic when certain essential traits make someone a member 
of a particular group, e.g., Americans or Australians.  I will turn to the discussion of 
relevant groups in the following chapter. 
 Second, one might think that being a member in a particular group might be 
essential to a member’s self-understanding.  But this is not always the case.  Think, for 
example, of nationality.  In many situations, nationality will be the type of membership 
containing traits that are essential to a member’s self-understanding. Imagine a case, 
however, in which someone is born in France, but is brought up in a very strong Muslim 
setting, which isolates her to a significant extent from French mainstream society.  In this 
case, most of the traits that are essential to her self-understanding derive from and are 
associated with the Muslim faith and not the French nation.  So despite being a French 
citizen, one can assume that her national membership is not basic, for the traits that are 
essential to her self-understanding are not the ones that make her a member of the French 
nation.  Another way of expressing the point is this: membership is basic if and only if 
group traits are essential to a member’s self-understanding.         
 Now that I have explained basic membership, I will flesh out the notion with 
some examples.  Let me begin by mentioning two traits that are likely, as a matter of 
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factual tendency, to be essential to someone’s self-understanding: language and 
birthplace.   
 First, consider language.  The language I speak (with a certain accent) as my 
native tongue must generally be one of the core properties for the depiction of who I am.  
If I did not speak the language I do, I would probably not be the same person I am now.  
Imagine I spoke Italian or English—as my first and native language—instead of, say, 
Spanish.  My self-understanding would be different than what it currently is.  Native 
language then is a trait that is likely to be essential to someone’s self-understanding. 
 In order to reinforce the claim that language is generally essential to self-
understanding, let me turn for a moment to a discussion about the relationship between 
language and culture.  In making a case for linguistic self-defense, George Fletcher points 
out that language is closely related with culture.13  I am not concerned with his case for 
linguistic self-defense or the direction in which he takes his discussion.  I simply want to 
use one of his arguments in order to highlight the significance of language for cultures, 
and more specifically the self-understandings of culture’s members.   
 Fletcher devices a thought-experiment in which Germans during World War II 
initiate a campaign called “operation Babelosa.”  The idea is that Germans abandon their 
efforts to physically conquer England and instead design a strategy whereby the English 
language is transformed into German.  Accordingly, all means of communication, 
telephone, radio, typesetters, etc., are programmed so that when ideas are expressed in 
English the output is changed into German.  The end result is that this subterfuge will 
                                                 
13 “The Case for Linguistic Self-Defense,” in The Morality of Nationalism, eds. R. McKim and J. 
McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 326 
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force the English-speaking culture to adopt the German language in order to make 
communication possible. 
 If the English language is not essential to the maintenance of English culture, the 
linguistic transformation described in the thought-experiment will not be a casus belli.  If, 
in contrast, the English language is essential to the maintenance of English culture, “then 
the imagined substitution of German for English would arguably be as serious a form of 
aggression as a physical invasion.”  And as a result, the English will have as much of a 
right to go to war for their language as they would “for the flowered fields of Wiltshire or 
the white Cliffs of Dover.”14      
 The conclusion in this though-experiment is that, given the violation of linguistic 
sovereignty, the English presumably have a right to self-defense.  And the reason why the 
English have such a right to self-defense is because language is indeed essential to the 
maintenance of English culture. 
 The insight in the thought-experiment that interests us at this point has to do with 
language being essential to the maintenance of a culture.  If English culture were not, for 
example, English-speaking (it would be German-speaking instead), it would not be 
English culture.  This is presumably true of many cultures: language is essential to their 
collective self-understanding.  It is also generally true of individuals.  Everyone speaks a 
language as a native-speaker.  These languages make us who we are.  If we spoke a 
                                                 
14 “The Case for Linguistic Self-Defense,” p. 326.  Further on, he exp resses the point this way: “The history 
of any people is tied to its language.  The narrative of the people unfolds in legends, historical events, 
poetic renditions of key moments, slogans that never die, great oratory, and, of course, legal phrases that 
define a culture’s sense of justice.” p. 332.      
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different native language than the one we do, we would probably be a different person.  
Thus native languages are an essential trait of who we are.   
 Consider, likewise, a trait such as birthplace.  For example, one of the traits by 
which I characterize myself is that of being born in a particular place.  Here we must 
remember that birthplaces are often “homelands.”  Birthplaces are not only the place 
where someone is born, but they are also places representing a sense of belonging.  
Imagine, for instance, that I was born in India or Australia, instead of my homeland.  In 
this case, the course of events would have made my self-understanding different than 
what it currently is and thus I would be a different person. 
 Homelands are significant because of a phenomenon that Anthony Smith 
describes as the “territorialization of memory.”  The term refers “to a process by which 
particular places evoke a series of memorie s, handed down through the generations, and 
it summarizes a tendency to root memories in persons and events in particular places and 
through them create a field or zone of powerful and peculiar attachments.”15  In short, 
homelands are symbolic territories that create strong attachments.  
 Another thought-experiment will help us see the significance of homelands.    
Suppose that we take two cultures, American and English, and exchange their respective 
territories.  In such an exchange, the key symbols and events of American culture become 
the House of Parliament, the Tower of London, the Battle of Hastings, etc.  Similarly, the 
key symbols and events of English culture become the Capitol and White House, the 
Washington Memorial, the Civil War, etc.  But there is something odd about such an 
exchange, for all these symbols and events (which are territorially confined) are 
                                                 
15 Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 134. 
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associated with a particular culture.  So American and English cultures would not be 
what they are if they did not have their respective symbols and events in their own 
territories. 
 In our thought-experiment, territory is essential to collective self-understanding.  
Something similar occurs with individuals.  Everyone has a certain birthplace and 
homeland.  We generally have strong attachments to these places because they make us 
who we are.  If we had a different birthplace and homeland, we would probably be a 
different person.  Thus birthplace and homeland are generally an essential trait of who we 
are.   
 Notice now that the two traits I have discussed so far, language and birthplace, 
derive from and are associated with a particular group.  So if I possess traits of this sort, 
they will make me a member of a particular group.  Take, for example, Argentina: it is a 
group that speaks Spanish and comprises a geographical region in the South Cone.  It is 
then the case that the property of speaking Spanish (with an Argentinean accent) and 
being born in the territory known as “Argentina,” make me a member in the Argentinean 
group.          
 In my example, membership in the Argentinean group is basic for two reasons.  
The first reason is that for me to be the person I am, I must be someone who speaks a 
certain language and has a certain birthplace.  In other words, these traits are essential to 
my self-understanding.  Second, the traits that are essential to my self-understanding 
derive from and are associated with the Argentinean group, making me a member of this 
group.  Putting these two reasons together, we can see that Argentinean traits are essential 
to my self-understanding and thus my Argentinean membership is basic.   
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 Basic membership can be contrasted with the kind of membership entailing traits 
that are not essential to someone’s self-understanding.  This contrast will help us to 
understand more clearly what basic membership is.       
 Suppose I characterize myself as someone who enjoys reading history, is a 
practicing psychologist and votes Democratic on every election.  Suppose further that the 
traits I have just mentioned might obtain or not without significantly affecting the sense 
of who I am.  These traits may change—I may stop reading history, change careers, or 
vote Republican—without significantly altering my self-understanding.  The traits I have 
in mind may be very significant to me, but they are not essential to my self-
understanding.                   
 Given that these traits are not essential to my self-understanding, I may lose my 
membership in the History Book Club, the American Psychological Association or the 
Democratic Party without significantly altering the sense of who I am.  So the 
memberships just mentioned may indeed fluctuate without a significant impact on my 
self-understanding.  This kind of membership is non-basic.   
 My discussion so far might make it seem like there are clear-cut categories and 
distinctions: essential and non-essential traits; basic and non-basic memberships.  This is 
true in a sense, but it can also be misleading.  At this point, two complexities in the 
notion of basic membership are worth highlighting.           
 First, a point underlying my discussion (one that I will bring up in other 
occasions) is that the traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding are often 
imprecise.  It is often very hard to be precise about which traits are essential to someone’s 
self-understanding and which are not.     
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 All that must be granted in my discussion, however, is that some traits are indeed 
essential for defining who I am, whereas others are not.  I think that there are significant 
generalities with regard to essential traits (e.g., non-voluntarily acquired traits such as 
language and birthplace), but I do not wish to focus on traits per se.  What I wish to focus 
on is the fact that there are essential and non-essential traits—whatever they may be—for 
someone’s self-understanding.  I will return to this point below when I discuss non-
voluntarily acquired traits.                       
 The second complexity is that basic membership admits of degrees.  Some of my 
examples may have sounded like people generally have one basic membership.  The fact 
of the matter, however, is that people have essential traits of self-understanding that make 
them members in different groups.  Among the traits that are essential to someone’s self-
understanding, one may find traits that make her a member in three different groups: an 
Argentinean, a Jew, and a Communist.  All three memberships are basic.      
 Nonetheless, despite the variety of basic memberships, one of these memberships 
may have a higher degree of significance.  In other words, several memberships may be 
basic; but among these, one membership may have a higher degree of basicness than the 
other basic memberships.  Suppose that three different memberships are basic, which 
means that certain traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding make her a 
member in these three groups.  The person has nine essential traits that make her a 
member of the first group.  She has seven essential traits making her a member of the 
second group; and, finally, six essential traits for the third group.  All three memberships 
are basic, but the first membership is more basic than the second and third one.  Basic 
membership then, when compared with other basic memberships, may have degrees of 
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basicness.  Another way of stating the point is by saying that basic memberships can be 
ranked.  I will come back to this point in chapter five when we compare national and 
Hispanic memberships.                    
 
b. Inherent Markers of Personhood  
 I said above that the traits which are essential to someone’s self-understanding are 
often imprecise.  I also suggested, however, that certain types of traits are, as a matter of 
general tendency, essential to people’s self-understanding (e.g., language and homeland).  
If this is right, the question is: what types of traits are generally essential to group 
members’ self-understanding?   
 Let us make a distinction between inherent and accidental markers of 
personhood.  Inherent markers are, generally speaking, non-voluntarily acquired traits.  
The reason these markers are inherent is because they cannot be changed; and they 
cannot be changed because I did not have an initial choice as to whether I should acquire 
a certain marker or not.16  
 I am born and raised in a milieu, non-voluntarily absorbing a set of traits that are 
very hard to change and that also essentially define who I am.  By way of illustration we 
could think of someone who is born and brought up in England, and thus acquires a series 
of traits and attachments that essentially define who she is.  She is someone whose native 
tongue is English, has British citizenship and is subject to British government and law, 
and participates in the English way of life.  These non-voluntarily acquired and thus 
                                                 
16 Not all unalterable markers are non-voluntarily acquired. I can, for instance, choose to put a tattoo on my 
arm: a situation that then becomes unalterable, despite being a matter of choice.    
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inherent markers will presumably be essential to her self-understanding.  So she will view 
herself as an Englishwoman in a way that makes her English membership basic.          
 Inherent markers are different from accidental ones.  Accidental markers are 
generally the result of choice.  I may decide to learn a new language, become a Buddhist, 
learn to play football, and identify myself with my Irish grand-parents.  Strictly speaking, 
I did not decide to have Irish grand-parents, but neither did I have a choice when they 
decided to migrate to the U.S., where I was born and raised.  So, in this case my 
American membership is non-voluntary, whereas identifying with my Irish background is 
optional.   
 The main point about accidental markers is that they can be altered without 
significantly modifying the sense of who I am.  So, many accidental markers are non-
essential traits of self-understanding.  The reason why accidental markers may vary 
without significantly altering my essential traits of self-understanding has to do with the 
fact that these markers are the result of choice.     
 My last point needs to be explained further.  Think about the complexities of 
basic membership I mentioned earlier.  Consider how memberships that are acquired 
voluntarily become very important to some people.  My suggestion, however, is that non-
voluntarily acquired traits are more stable because they are harder (and sometimes 
impossible) to change, and thus these traits tend to be essential for defining who I am.   
 I can convert to Hinduism (or any other religion), but also in the midst of a 
disappointment, stop professing Hinduism and go back to “who I was before.”  Let me 
incidentally mention that using religious examples can be misleading, for religion is not 
always a matter of choice.  Religion may, as a matter of fact, be in some sense non-
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voluntarily absorbed.  Religion is a matter of conscious decision, but I did not decide to 
be born in a Jewish family.  So if my family practices the rituals and teachings of the 
Jewish religion, the world-view conveyed by such ritua ls and teachings will be absorbed 
non-voluntarily.  When religion is in some sense non-voluntarily absorbed—meaning that 
one grows up within a certain religious environment—it often becomes a very powerful 
source for self-understanding.           
 Returning to voluntary memberships, I can choose, for example, to describe 
myself as an “Italian-American.”  But I could also drop the label without much impact on 
the features that are generally indispensable for my self-understanding.  In contrast, my 
first language, family members and birthplace are traits I did not choose and, moreover, I 
cannot alter.  Accordingly, any definition describing the essentially constitutive elements 
of who I am would generally include traits such as language, kinship and birthplace.  In 
other words, my self-understanding is often bound with the elements I cannot alter; and 
thus those elements are essential to the definition of who I am. 
 It is important to emphasize here a point that was made earlier.  We must be 
careful and avoid making clear-cut distinctions because the categories are not always 
clear.  Note that I speak in terms of tendencies and generalities, for the distinction 
between non-voluntarily acquired traits and those memberships that are voluntarily 
acquired is not always easy to point out in precise terms.  Donald Horowitz reminds us 
that it is true that certain memberships (e.g., ethnic) are not chosen but given.  
Nonetheless, the two “principles of membership—birth and choice—are capable of 
fictive elements.”17        
                                                 
17 Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 55-56. 
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 It is also important to emphasize that I am not implying any type of determinism 
when I speak about non-voluntarily acquired traits and inherent makers of personhood.  If 
such was the implication, I would be committing what might be described as the 
“culturalist fallacy.”  This fallacy consists in the belief that a group determines who we 
are, and thus precludes the possibility of significant personal change.18  I am only 
speaking here about general tendencies with regard to necessary traits for self-
understanding—not cultural determinism.        
 Let me go back at this time to an earlier point about identity groups, since a 
discussion on this topic will shed light on my understanding about the significance of 
non-voluntarily acquired traits.  One might think that inherent markers of personhood 
make people members of the identity groups in a multicultural society.  This could indeed 
be the case, but not necessarily.  Discussing the relationship between certain types of 
identity groups and inherent markers will help us to see more clearly what inherent 
markers are and how they are related to basic membership.   
 The sorts of traits we sometimes associate with “ethnic groups” are not always 
inherent markers.  Think for example of “Irish-American identity” in the multicultural 
context of American society.  In a study on the dynamics of “ethnic” identity within 
groups of European extraction in America, Mary Waters describes a kind of identity that 
is voluntary and thus selective.  So, for instance, “you can choose those aspects of being 
Irish that appeal to you and discard those that do not.”19   As Waters observes, Irish-
                                                 
18 See the discussion by Bhikhu Parekh for a description of this fallacy.  Rethinking Multiculturalism: 
Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 76-79.  
19 Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1990), p. 115. 
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American identity (or identities like Polish-American and Italian-American) may be, and 
is in fact, meaningful to people.  Nevertheless, despite being valuable, the identities she 
describes are not (for the most part), due to their voluntary and selective nature, the basis 
for inherent markers of personhood.   
 Not surprisingly, the identities Waters describes are not, generally speaking, 
essential to someone’s self-understanding.  I can choose to apply the label of “Irish-
American” (with its selective characteristics) to portray myself, but I could also choose to 
discard the label.  In this sense, my Irish-American identity, despite its potential personal 
significance, is not essential for characterizing who I am. 20  In other words, my Irish-
American membership may be put aside without significantly altering the essential traits 
for personal self-understanding.  As a consequence, Irish-American traits are non-
essential and thus Irish-American membership is non-basic.   
 
3. THE VALUE OF BASIC MEMBERSHIP  
 When membership is basic it is presumably valuable.  Here the following two 
questions arise.  First, in what ways is membership valuable?  And second, why is basic 
membership valuable?   
                                                 
20 The type of “ethnic” identity Waters examines, apart from being a matter of choice, does not have much 
relevance for everyday life: “it does not, for the most part, limit choice of marriage partner…. It does not 
determine where you will live, who your friends will be, what job you will have….” Ethnic Options, p. 
147.  Inherent markers of personhood, in contrast, will presumably determine to a larger extent where I 
work or who I marry.  For instance, I would not ordinarily work in a particular setting or marry someone 
without knowing the language in which business is conducted or my spouse speaks.         
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 In order to address the first question, I will turn to a discussion of Will Kymlicka 
and suggest that membership is, first, instrumentally valuable and, second, the value of 
membership derives from identity. 
 One of Kymlicka’s contributions to contemporary political thought has been to 
establish the connection, which John Rawls and the liberal tradition do not deal with in 
detail, between group membership and the primary goods of people.21  According to 
Kymlicka, “if we view cultural membership as a primary good within Rawl’s scheme of 
justice, then it is important to remember that it is a good in its capacity of providing 
meaningful options for us, and aiding our ability to judge for ourselves the value of our 
life-plans.”22  Note that, for Kymlicka, cultural membership is important because it 
provides individuals with a “context of choice.”      
 In establishing a warranted relationship between group membership and 
individual choice, Kymlicka also reacts against Michael Walzer’s view of group 
membership.  According to Walzer “the primary good that we distribute to one another is 
membership in some human community.”23  Note that for Walzer membership is a good 
in itself, or in the words of Kymlicka: “the theoretical framework Walzer employs seems 
to make cultural membership the foundational value.”24  Whereas for Walzer cultural 
membership seems to have some sort of intrinsic value, Kymlicka believes that cultural 
membership is instrumentally valuable because it points to a context of choice.    
                                                 
21 See chapters 7, 8, and 9 of Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
22 Liberalism, p.166. 
23 Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality  (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 31.  
24 Liberalism, p. 221.   
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 Walzer claims, for instance, that “the survival and flourishing of the groups 
depends largely upon the vitality of their centers,”25 but one is left wondering why such is 
the case.  What is the group’s “center” and what is so important about it?  Why should we 
think that certain groups ought to survive or flourish?  Why is group membership highly 
significant?  It seems to me that groups or cultures are not intrinsically valuable.  If that is 
indeed Walzer’s suggestion, he does not seem to go far enough.  Cultures and groups 
might be highly valuable, but we must go further than Walzer in inquiring about the value 
of groups and membership.                         
 Kymlicka’s instrumental approach seems more promising.  But here we must 
point out two different strands in Kymlicka’s view.  I already mentioned the first strand: 
the value of group membership is connected with the “context of choice.”  Thus group 
membership is valuable because our “range of options is determined by our cultural 
heritage.”26  The second strand has to do with “identity,” or a sense of who I am.  
Accordingly, “someone’s upbringing isn’t something that can just be erased; it is, and 
will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is.  Cultural membership affects our 
very sense of personal identity and capacity.”27  This type of membership is what I have 
described as basic membership. 
 It is not always clear how the two strands affect each other in Kymlicka’s view of 
membership.  Regardless of the interconnection between the two strands, I think that the 
importance of the context of choice must certainly be acknowledged.  Nonetheless, 
                                                 
25 What it means to be an American, p. 74. 
26 Liberalism, p. 165. 
27 Liberalism, p. 175.   
  70 
understanding who we are seems to be a more fundamental matter than having choices.  
The reason for this last point is that self-understanding is a precondition for the 
possibility of making choices.   
 We can indeed imagine coercive situations, legitimate or not, in which self-
understanding is not conducive to choices.  Coercive circumstances could arise when the 
expression of values and beliefs is legally forbidden.  These circumstances could also be 
more subtle.  Think of a situation in which the coercive mechanisms of family 
upbringing, deeply and successfully internalized, preclude the possibility of marrying 
someone who is not from the same culture.  The point is that there seem to be 
circumstances in which self-understanding is not conducive to choices—whether these 
circumstances are legitimate or not is beside my current point.     
 The insights just mentioned lead me to think that the value of membership derives 
from group members having a sense of who they are—namely, an identity.  I would then 
suggest that the instrumental case for the value of membership is better made when 
emphasizing “identity”—which, again, does not necessarily mean that “choice” is not 
important, but the emphasis should lie on “identity.”      
 I will now turn to the second question.  I have made the claim that certain types of 
memberships are a primary source of meaning and direction.  These memberships are 
central to members’ identities, which is also to say that they are basic.  These 
memberships are presumably highly significant and so I have also made claims about the 
value of membership.  I have argued that the case for the value of membership is best 
made when looking at membership instrumentally and emphasizing identity.   
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 But we have still not answered a more fundamental question: why is membership 
valuable?  Now, we clearly do not have just any type of membership in mind.  We have 
in mind the type of membership that is central to someone’s identity, i.e., basic 
membership.  So the question we need to address is really this one: why is basic 
membership, the type of membership that is central to someone’s identity, valuable?   
 Basic membership is often highly valuable to group members because it 
significantly contributes towards members’ well-being.  The essential traits by which 
group members characterize themselves give each individual a sense of who he or she is.  
Such a sense is often a vital condition for personal well-being.  If we posit that conditions 
of this sort are highly valuable because they contribute towards well-being, we can then 
say that basic membership is highly valuable.   
 Given the value of basic membership, it is no surprise that situations of tyranny 
often entail attacking the characteristic traits of basic membership in the oppressed group.  
Consider measures such as forbidding the religious or social practices of enslaved or 
oppressed groups.  For instance, African slaves brought to America were not allowed to 
practice their ancestral religions.  In another example, the Turkish government banned the 
use of Kurdish until 1991—although expressions of Kurdish culture are still deemed to 
have a separatist purpose.  These kinds of measures typically have the effect of 
subjugating a particular group by curtailing expressions of basic membership and 
hampering the well-being of oppressed group members.    
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4. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter has focused on membership.  I raised the question about the 
conditions under which membership is a primary source of meaning and direction.  My 
thesis is that membership is a primary source of meaning and direction when it is central 
to members’ identities.   
 My thesis immediately raises two questions.  First, what is identity?  I 
characterized the phenomenon of identity on the basis of two components: self-
understanding and group membership.  According to my account, to have an identity is to 
possess self-understanding, which generally makes someone a member of a group.         
 Second, when is membership central to members’ identities?  This question gets 
to the heart of the matter.  My answer has been that membership is central to members’ 
identities when it is basic.  Here I argued that some traits are essential to someone’s self-
understanding, and these essential traits make her a member of a group.  When this is the 
case, membership in a group is said to be basic.  I furthermore suggested that the traits 
which are essential to someone’s self-understanding are oftentimes non-voluntarily 
acquired.  So, non-voluntary memberships will generally have a propensity to be basic.   
 The type of membership I discussed is presumably very significant.  Thus my 
discussion of membership would not be complete without addressing the importance of 
membership.  In the final section of the chapter I made two points.  First, in the context of 
Kymlicka’s views, membership is valuable because it gives members an identity, which 
means that the value of membership is instrumental.  Second, Basic membership is highly 
valuable because it significantly contributes towards well-being. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE CONDITIONS OF RELEVANT GROUPS 
  
 I have discussed membership.  In this chapter, I will turn to groups.  I have 
claimed that certain groups have the function of endowing group members with the type 
of membership that is central to members’ identities, i.e., basic membership.  The 
question I now wish to address is this: how do we characterize groups that have the 
function at stake?  I wish to suggest that these groups generally satisfy three conditions: 
first, the condition of relevant identification; second, the condition of differentiation; and, 
third, the condition of intrinsic identification.   
 
1. THE CONDITION OF RELEVANT IDENTIFICATION  
a. Interaction 
 Let us begin with a basic fact about groups and societies: they are first and 
foremost interactive.  People belonging to the same group interact with one another.  
There is a process of socialization by which people develop and learn languages, habits, 
myths, values, and maps of meaning.  These elements are not absorbed in a solitary way, 
but rather in the context of social interaction. 
 In groups such as nations, for example, the process of socialization does not mean 
that I necessarily interact with all the members of the group, since the size of the group 
may make it literally impossible to even personally see all other co-members.  Nations, 
for example, are kinds of groups that Benedict Anderson describes as “imagined 
communities.”  Communities of this sort are imagined because group members “will 
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never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
mind of each lives the image of their communion.”1 
 We have then two levels of membership in groups such as nations: immediate and 
extended.  I am an immediate member of a given group, e.g., a family, and also an 
extended member of another group, e.g., a nation.  I grow up in the setting of a given 
family and circle of friends and acquaintances most of whom are presumably members of 
a larger group.  There is an immediate sphere of interaction that is part of a larger and 
indirect sphere of interaction.   
 Now, it is important to highlight that the former is oftentimes part of the latter.  
So, for instance, my family is, in fact, part of a nation, and thus being a member of my 
family also makes me a member of such a nation.  One could also put the matter in terms 
of coextensive membership.  I am part of a subset of the whole set.  Being a member of 
the subset is generally coextensive with being a member of the whole set.  Thus if I 
immediately interact with people in subset a, which would make me a member of such a 
subset, I will also be a member of the larger set A.    
 Note that the group in which I interact as an immediate and also an extended 
member generally has a limited number of members.  What I mean by limited 
membership is that not every single human being is, in fact, a member of my extended 
group.  So, for instance, not every human being living at the present moment is a fellow 
national.  The sort of imagined community I am now describing is then a partial portion 
of the whole living human community at a certain point in time.   
                                                 
1 Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 
2002 [1983]), p. 6.  
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 The set to which I belong is a community with a limited number of members 
drawn from the universe of “humanity.”  In other words, I am a member of a group that 
comprises only some human beings who presumably have a great deal in common.  So 
some people will be members of my group, whereas others will not be members.  I will 
have a great deal in common with, say, fellow nationals, whereas other people who are 
not members of my same nation will be foreign to me.      
 
b. Recognition  
 Given that group members interact with one another, they will learn to recognize 
fellow-members.  Similarly, mutual recognition between group members is what often 
makes interaction possible.  Interaction between group members is both a cause and a 
consequence of recognition.  So when we think of interaction between group members 
we must also think of recognition. 
 Recognition of fellow members, of course, makes it possible to also recognize 
non-members of a group.  If I can recognize those who belong to my group, it is because 
I can also recognize those who do not.  At the moment, however, I am not concerned with 
recognition of non-members, but rather recognition of fellow members.       
 When fellow members of a group recognize each other, what is it that they are 
able to recognize?  It is generally the markers of the social settings to which all members 
of the same group belong.  When coming across a fellow member of my group, I can 
recognize such a member because of the social markers she displays.  
 My point is best illustrated with an example of two tourists in a foreign land.  If I 
am a Spanish citizen from Madrid on vacation in Hawaii and come across a fellow 
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Spanish citizen from Madrid, I will most likely be able to recognize her due to a set of 
social markers.  Suppose I see her wearing a Real Madrid jersey, and immediately 
wonder about the reason why she would want to wear the jersey.  I engage her in a 
conversation and immediately detect a Madrileño accent, pretty much like mine.  I learn 
that she was brought up in Madrid under a school system that I can immediately 
recognize— presumably she has read excerpts of the Spanish classics, Miguel de 
Cervantes, Francisco de Quevedo, Pio Baroja, etc., played games that are also familiar to 
me, and has gone on field trips to places that I know. 2  I notice we communicate using 
similar jargon and have a peculiar picaresque sense of humor that we can both 
understand.  Someone who is not acquainted with our realm of references could probably 
not understand our jokes (even if such a person spoke our language).   
 
c. Relevant Identification 
 I have so far made the following points: (a) human beings interact with people in 
their groups; (b) these groups generally have a limited number of members; (c) human 
beings interact with people in their groups because they can recognize each other; and (d) 
recognition is based on social markers. 
 From these four points, it follows that groups and members are identifiable.  In 
the process of interaction, group members can discriminate members from non-members 
by recognizing certain social markers in fellow-members.  This process of discrimination 
                                                 
2 An important assumption in the illustration is that there is no “generational gap.”  Experiences for people 
belonging to different generations can vary, but there would still have to be enough elements in common 
between people from different generations for them to recognize each other as fellow-nationals.   
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by recognition means that groups and their members are identifiable.     
 Note first that groups are identifiable by virtue of their particular properties.  I can 
say, for example, that the American group is distinguished by certain properties such as a 
tradition of liberty and democracy, the practice of certain sports such as baseball and 
football, a geo-political affiliation, and a language, i.e., American English.  What we need 
to see is that a set of particular properties make it possible for us to speak of a group that 
can be identified as “American.”’  
 Note also, in the second place, that group members can be identified according to 
properties.  Think, for instance, of the fact that a graduate from a certain college can be 
identified by a graduation ring on her finger or by expressing her preferences on 
basketball college teams.  I can also recognize someone who shops in the same grocery 
store where I do by noticing the bags he happens to use for his garbage.  There are 
equally a huge number of markers that would allow me to potentially recognize people 
who drink coffee in the same coffee shop where I do, support the same political party I 
do, share my musical preferences for a particular band and use the same company I do for 
their cell phone service.       
 We are not concerned, however, with the possibility of identification through all 
those kinds of properties.  We are concerned instead with identification under some 
condition, i.e., by virtue of a certain kind of properties.  If such is the case, what is then 
the specific condition of identification? 
 Let us think here of two different situations.  In the first situation, mentioned 
above, I come across a fellow Spanish citizen while on vacation that I am able to 
recognize because of her jersey, accent, school education and characteristic sense of 
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humor.  In the second situation, I recognize someone who graduated from my same 
college, e.g., University of Maryland, by detecting the ring on his finger and his 
basketball college team preferences.   
 Now combine the properties in each situation.  These are all the properties from 
the two examples combined: (i) possessing Spanish citizenship (ii) wearing a jersey; (iii) 
speaking a language (with a certain accent); (iv) attending a particular school; (v) having 
a characteristic sense of humor; (vi) wearing a ring; and (vii) preferring a specific 
basketball team. 
 Note that a distinction between properties can be made.  Some properties are more 
significant to someone’s identity than others.  In fact, some properties will be essential to 
someone’s self-understanding, whereas others will not.  Let us say that there is a 
continuum in which one end represents “essential properties for self-understanding,” and 
the other end “non-essential properties for self-understanding.”  Along the continuum, we 
can place all the properties mentioned above.       
 Property (i) is essential to the self-understanding of most people.  Having a 
particular citizenship often defines where we come from, who we are and what we 
believe.  Property (ii) does not strike me as the kind of property that would be essential to 
someone’s self-understanding.  The sense of who I am is not linked in any significant 
sense to whether I wear a particular jersey or not.  Property (iii) does often seem to be 
essential to someone’s self-understanding.  As we saw in the previous chapter, native-
languages often define who we are, for we would probably be different people is we did 
not speak our native language.   
 Property (iv) could be very significant and even perhaps essential to someone’s 
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self-understanding.  Nonetheless, I do not think it has, generally speaking, the same level 
of significance as property (i) or (iii).  Property (v) is a difficult one.  I do not think that 
having a characteristic sense of humor is essential to someone’s self-understanding, but it 
could be for some people.  Property (vi) is non-essential.  Wearing a ring is like wearing 
a jersey: the property can be altered without significantly altering our self-understanding.  
Finally, property (vii) may be very significant to some people, but I doubt that the 
preference of sports teams is essential to the self-understanding of many people.  
Preference of sports teams can indeed be a manifestation of national or regional 
attachments.  If this is the case, then we must look not at the preference of a team as such, 
but rather the attachment underlying such a preference.                
 Four elements in our discussion must now be highlighted.  First, as we just saw, 
there are different kinds of properties.  An inventory of the properties in our examples 
shows that some are generally essential to someone’s self-understanding, whereas others 
are not.  The purpose is not to classify all the properties in a clear manner, but rather to 
show that different properties have degrees of significance for self-understanding ranging 
from essential to non-essential.      
 Second, the properties we have surveyed are properties that make someone a 
member of a particular group.  In our examples, those groups were the Spanish nation 
and the group of Maryland graduates.  
 Third, members of each group can be identified on the basis of the properties we 
discussed.  The point, which should be obvious by now, is that I recognize a fellow 
national or graduate on the basis of identifiable properties.     
 Fourth, the balance of properties in the situations we discussed is asymmetrical.  
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As a matter of tendency, we notice that there are more properties closer to the end of 
“essential for self-understanding” in the national group than in the group of college 
graduates.   
 We now have all the elements for arguing two points.  First, since properties make 
identification possible, group members can be identified according to different types of 
properties.  More specifically, we can identify members of two different groups on the 
basis of two types of properties: those that are essential to self-understanding and those 
that are not.  As we saw in our examples, the balance of properties shows that national 
members are identified according to properties that tend to be essential for self-
understanding.  In contrast, graduates are identified according to properties that, on 
balance, are not essential for self-understanding.  
 From this first point derives a second one.  We can identify members according to 
properties that make their membership basic and properties that do not tend to make their 
membership basic.  If we posit that membership is basic when properties are essential to 
members’ self-understanding, we can see that membership in the national group is basic 
whereas membership in the group of graduates is not.   
 One might object that the two memberships could be basic given that traits from 
each one of the memberships may be essential to someone’s self-understanding.  Even if 
this is true, note that according to the balance of essential properties in our examples, 
national membership will be more basic than membership in the group of college 
graduates.  For the sake of clarity in the argument, let us then say that one membership is 
basic, whereas the other is not.            
 I began my discussion by saying that we are not concerned with identification of 
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groups and memberships as such.  Instead, we are interested in identification under some 
relevant condition.  The question is: when are group and membership identification 
relevant?  
 We can now answer this question.  Identification is relevant when we are able to 
distinguish the sorts of properties that make membership in a particular group basic.  In 
other words, relevant identification is done on the basis of properties that are essential to 
the self-understanding of members in a particular group.    
   
2. THE CONDITION OF DIFFERENTIATION   
 We now know that relevant identification singles out properties that constitute 
basic membership in particular groups.  Attention now needs to be drawn to the fact that 
groups are different from each other, which is what makes identification of groups and 
members possible.  Highlighting this fact, I will now argue that basic membership is 
necessarily connected with the difference-sensitive attributes of groups. 
 I will begin the discussion with some general remarks about group description.  
Imagine three groups of people, farmers, Jews and Argentineans.  In attempting to 
describe farmers we can say that they are people who normally have families, believe in a 
deity, and ingest food.  Likewise, we describe Jews as people who normally have 
families, believe in a deity, and ingest food.  Lastly, we describe Argentineans in the 
same manner.  
  This mode of describing has two characteristics.  First, the descriptions are so 
broad that differences among groups are not evident.  Second, the description of these 
three groups is probably accurate, but it is so broad that it does not really say much about 
  82 
the meaningful features of groups or group members.  One could, however, describe, say, 
Argentineans by pointing to features that make them different from other groups and are 
also meaningful to Argentineans.        
 Let us say that Argentineans are the people living in a particular geo-political 
sector.  They have a history and a culture.  They generally accept the institution of 
monogamous marriage, mostly profess the Roman Catholic or Lutheran faiths, like to eat 
beef and churrasco, speak Spanish (with a certain accent) and like to watch soccer.   
 Argentineans will perhaps have some of these elements in common with the 
group of Jews and farmers; for example, monogamous marriage and Spanish.  We can 
perhaps also think of someone who is a member in all three groups, i.e., a Jewish farmer 
who is also Argentinean.  But despite the fact that all three groups might have features in 
common or that someone might be a member in all three groups, note the following: all 
three groups are different from each other.  The group of Argentineans is not the group of 
Jews or farmers.          
 Note also that some of the properties by virtue of which Argentineans will 
characterize themselves are meaningful to the point of being properties which are 
essential to their self-understanding.  An Argentinean will probably characterize herself 
as someone who was born in Argentina, speaks Spanish, has certain dietary customs (e.g., 
eats beef and churrasco), professes or has an affinity with a certain monotheistic religion 
(Christianity) and the moral outlook that originates from that religion, etc.  We can 
reasonably think of these traits as being essential to her self-understanding, and thus 
making her Argentinean membership basic. 
 What I wish to propose now is that there is a necessary connection between 
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differences among groups and properties that are essential for the self-understandings of 
group members.  Put differently, only groups that are distinguished by way of exclusion 
and contrast are likely to be the kind of group in which basic membership is possible.      
 Let me explain my thesis more formally.  Imagine a group Ga impossible to 
distinguish from groups Gb, Gc, or Gd.  Ga is so broad that it would be impossible to 
indicate the exclusive traits that all the members of Ga have in common, and that 
distinguish Ga from Gb, Gc, or Gd.  In other words, Ga would be indiscernible.  Now 
suppose that we are able to characterize Ga according to traits that all members of Ga 
have in common and separate the group from Gb, Gc, or Gd.  In this case, Ga would be 
discernable.   
 Note that for a group to have the status of discernibility two circumstances must 
be true. First, group members have traits in common.  Second, the traits that group 
members have in common are such that they make the group distinguishable from other 
groups. 
 My contention is now the following.  If Ga is indiscernible, it is not likely to be 
the kind of group that endows members with basic membership, i.e., according to 
properties that are essential to the self-understandings of group members.  If, in contrast, 
Ga is discernable, it could possibly be the kind of group that endows members with basic 
membership.   
 I have said that discernible groups may endow members with basic membership.  
Let me be more precise with regard to this statement.  Not all discernible groups give rise 
to basic memberships, but all basic memberships tend to stem from discernible groups.  
In other words, the status of discernibility is a necessary, yet not a sufficient, cond ition 
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for basic membership.       
 The reason for the necessary connection between discernibility and basic 
membership is ultimately a factual one.  As a matter of fact, particular groups have a 
sense of “us” based on difference-sensitive attributes.  This means that groups can be 
divided between us-type and them-type groups.  The properties that are essential for the 
self-understanding of group members are evidently not properties of them-type groups, 
but rather properties of us-type groups.  In other words, the properties that create the 
sense of “us” in a particular group are also the ones that could possibly make membership 
in the group basic.   
 Note first that human beings are members of groups that give them a sense of 
“us.”  The substance of the “us” is what Harold Isaacs, paraphrasing a term by Francis 
Bacon, describes as the “idols of the tribe.”  Different groups have different idols and so 
humanity consists of a composite of us-type groups, which are always set in contrast with 
other them-type groups.  Isaacs expresses his view by discussing the idols (or what he 
also calls “holdings”) that shape human identity—namely, birthplace, names, languages, 
history and origins, religion, and nationality.  He comments that:  
How [the holdings] are seen and celebrated has provided the substance of 
most of what we know as history, mythology, folklore, art, literature, 
religious beliefs and practices.  How the holdings of others are seen has 
provided most of the unending grimness of the we-they confrontation in 
human experience.  Raised high or held low, these are the idols of all our 
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tribes.3 
 These groups might also be thought of as what Michael Walzer calls “thick 
cultures.”  He observes, for instance, that “the crucial commonality of the human race is 
particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own.”4  Thick 
cultures are particular.  Thus these cultures are distinguishable from and contrasted with 
cultures that are not “our own.”  Not everybody has the same set of properties: not 
everyone is born in the same place, speaks the same language, and shares the same social 
practices and worldview.  Accordingly, people belong to different groups they call “their 
own.”   
 The point about the quality of contrast between groups is a clear one.  If I am born 
and raised a Protestant in Northern Ireland I will then be distinguishable by a set of 
recognizable group markers that separate me from a foreign group, namely, Catholics.  
Similarly, if I am born and reared in Quebec I will also possess recognizable traits that 
differentiate me from other Anglo-Canadians.  In another instance, I am born an African-
American and so given a set of markers, I will be a member of particular group, which 
separates me from other “racial” groups in American society.  What we see in these 
                                                 
3 Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1997 [1975]), p. 40.  
4 Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1994), p. 83.  For a similar view, see also Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory  (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).    
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situations is that there are us-type groups that are different from other them-type groups.5                      
 Also note, in the second place, that given the quality of contrast, the properties 
that are essential for the self-understanding of group members are not properties of them-
type groups, but rather properties of us-type groups, of groups they call “their own.”  The 
properties that will be essential to the self-understanding of the Protestant in Northern 
Ireland will be those of his group and not those of the Catholic group.  Something similar 
occurs with Quebecois and Anglo-Canadians, and African-Americans and other racial 
groups.             
 These facts about groups create a necessary connection between the discernibility 
of groups and basic membership.  Certain groups are different from and contrast with 
other groups.  Given such a differentiation and contrast, I can only find properties that 
will be essential to my self-understanding in the particular group in which I happen to be 
placed.    
 By way of afterthought, let me remind us of a point that was made in the previous 
chapter with regard to clear-cut distinctions.  What I wish to highlight now is that us-type 
groups are not always easy to distinguish from them-type groups.  I will mention two 
complexities here.  First, groups are not easy to individuate.  Second, all groups are 
generally an overlapping structure of many other us-type groups.          
                                                 
5 Incidentally, one might add that groups are different from each other due not only to social markers, but 
also norms of exclusion.  For a discussion on exclusionary group norms, see Russell Hardin, One for All: 
The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 72-106.  
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With regard to the first point, attention must be drawn to an assumption that 
underlies the way in which we commonly refer to some types of groups.  Such an 
assumption is pervasive in our ordinary language or common speech.   
In speaking about groups, or a particular group, it may sound like one might be 
referring to group units.  Such an impression is in fact misleading because groups are not 
always easy to individuate or even characterize.  Groups are indeed not only dynamic, but 
also complex phenomena.   
Nevertheless, as suggested above there are, in fact, properties that make it 
possible to identify groups at a certain point in time and thus differentiate them from 
other groups.  We see then that, on the one hand, groups are difficult to individuate, i.e., 
to single out as precise units. On the other hand, however, groups can indeed be 
identified—namely, particular groups can be distinguished from other groups due to a 
cluster of properties that group members have in common.       
 The distinction I am making is between individuating and identifying groups.  The 
upshot is that groups are often complex phenomena and are thus difficult to individuate.  
Groups are not always distinguishable units.  By the same token, however, one may say 
that there are a number of traits and properties that presumably allow us to identify 
certain types of groups.  Otherwise, the notions of “group” and “group identity” would 
not make much sense.  
 Let me turn here to the second complexity about groups mentioned above.  
Groups tend to consist of an overlapping structure of many other us-type groups.  
Consider, for example, a nation as an instance of an us-type group.  But here we think 
immediately of regional and cultural groups within nations.  
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 Think, for example, of the fact that that there are several us-type groups within a 
nation and these groups can be construed in different ways.  An instance of what I have in 
mind now is expressed by Neal Ascherson by raising the question about European unity.  
He asks: how European can or will we be?  And he comments that:  
to reach any answers several assumptions have to be made about this 
question.  And the first assumption is that ‘we’ can be interpreted in 
several ways, leading to several divergent conclusions.  ‘We’ may denote 
the inhabitants of Britain, or of the United Kingdom.  On the other hand, it 
could also stand for the English, the Scots, the Welsh, the people of 
Northern Ireland and the populations of the various autonomous small 
islands in the archipelago. 6       
 But let me now stick to a more simple point: us-type groups are overlapping 
structures of other us-type groups.  Think again of a nation as an us-type group and all 
other us-type groups within the national group. 
 By way of illustration, in the Venezuelan nation there are several distinct groups, 
e.g., Costeño (born on the coast), Maracucho (born in Maracaibo), Andino (born in the 
Andes), Isleño (born in one of the islands).  Members of those groups can usually be 
identified by different accents and regional idioms, food habits, personality traits 
(Maracuchos are extrovert and Andinos are introvert), skin complexion (those born on 
the coast tend to have a darker complexion than those born in the Andes), etc.  These 
regional groups are all us-type groups within an overarching national us-type group.  
                                                 
6 “How European Can We/Will We Be?,” in  Citizens: Towards a Citizenship Culture, ed. B. Crick 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 57.   
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 Given this complex structure of embedded us-type groups an interesting question 
arises.  Despite their differences, do all these groups have a strong enough sense of 
national commonality to bind them together?  There is obviously an us-type national 
group and an us-type regional group.  But imagine that the Maracuchos attempted to 
secede from the rest of the country—a theme expressed in popular jokes due to the fact 
that Maracaibo has the largest oil reserve in the country.  Or suppose that tension between 
regional groups began to escalate beyond the point of reconciliation.  In such instances of 
conflict, one can often see one of the us-type groups prevailing over the others.   
 We can think of conflict with regard to many us-type groups embedded in other 
us-type groups.  Using the Venezuelan example again, one could think of social classes—
the “rich” and the “poor”—instead of thinking about regional groups.  One can see in a 
country such as Venezuela, as well as other Latin American countries, how the tension 
between these two us-type groups is always on the verge of exploding.                     
 My general point is that people belong to several us-type groups—e.g., nations, 
fraternities, alliances, social classes, families, etc.—and all these us-type groups are often 
embedded within each other.  Us-type membership is then multi-dimensional.  
 Now, this general point has important implications for the significance of groups 
and memberships.  Given the reality of embedded us-type groups, when we look at the 
significance of us-type groups, what we need to examine is not so much the different us-
type groups to which someone belongs.  We know for a fact that people have different 
layers of membership in different (and sometimes conflicting) us-type groups.   
 The question is rather this: at what level do we generally find the primary sense of 
“us” —the one that tends to override and overpower all other us-type group 
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memberships?  Given my discussion in chapter two, I suspect that the answer to that 
question will vary for different groups and circumstances.  For some people the primary 
us-type group might be the nation; for others a religious us-type group; yet others will 
find their primary sense of “us” in their tribal group or clan.   The overlaying dimensions 
of membership are highly complex.  What does seem to be the case in many instances, 
however, is that one of the us-type memberships is a primary source of meaning and 
direction, and thus could have the potential for overriding other memberships.        
 
3. THE CONDITION OF INTRINSIC IDENTIFICATION 
 When we think of groups and identification several questions arise: How are 
groups identified?  Who or what defines and determines the cluster of properties that 
distinguishes a certain group?  In other words, how does group identity emerge?  Is such 
a process a fortuitous and spontaneous one, or is it primarily intentional?  Is it possible to 
misidentify a group, i.e., furnish properties that a group does not really possess?  Groups 
can presumably be identified in different ways.  We can speak for example of people 
coming from the Asian continent as “Asians.”  But is the identification of people from 
Asia as “Asians” necessarily relevant to them?    
  
a. Inside and Outside the Group    
 I can presumably characterize groups from two points of views.  I can 
characterize my own group, the one to which I belong, and I can also characterize other 
groups, those groups to which I do not belong.  When I characterize my own group I will 
express those properties that are meaningful to me and other members of the group.  
  91 
Hence my characterization of the group will be meaningful.  In contrast, when I 
characterize other groups, without much knowledge of the group, I may do it in a way 
that is either irrelevant or meaningless to them.         
 An example will help us to appreciate the contrast I have just described.  The 
description and studies of Bali culture by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz are well 
known. 7  Geertz’s sense of cultural practices, as an observer who identifies and codifies 
the way of life of the Bali people, is different from the sense such practices might have 
from the perspective of a Bali native.  The native, who is the object of study, may not 
necessarily be interested in identifying or codifying his or her culture in the same way as 
Geertz.  In fact, Geertz’s identification of Bali culture may be utterly irrelevant and 
meaningless to the native, who would perhaps identify his or her culture in a different 
way.    
 Notice in our example how there are two possible ways in which the Bali culture 
may be identified: from the inside and from the outside.  A group is identified from the 
inside when the person who identifies the culture is deeply immersed in the cluster of 
experiences, narratives and myths of such a group.  In contrast a group is identified from 
the outside when one is not an agent, but rather an observer, attempting to identify the 
group; or rather someone who is not deeply immersed in the cluster of experiences, 
narratives and myths of such a group.       
 My contention is that the identification of groups is meaningful when it is done by 
its members, i.e., from the inside.  Members of groups can characterize the narratives, 
myths, values and practices that give meaning and direction to their lives.  They are able 
                                                 
7 The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).  
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to characterize these traits because they are immersed in them.  Since members are 
embedded in the properties that are essential to their self-understanding, they are in a 
position to identify those properties in a meaningful way.    
 But when is one immersed in a group in a significant manner?  Presumably, an 
anthropologist can study and observe a culture as much as he can and in this sense be 
immersed in it.  He can even live within the culture for a number of years and behave as 
if he were a member.   
 Such an immersion would not be relevant, since the traits of the culture would 
presumably not be the ones that are essential to his self-understanding.  Suppose, 
however, that the traits of the culture he studies are indeed essential to his self-
understanding.  In this case he would be inside the culture.  He may be studying his own 
culture or perhaps becomes “adopted” and “naturalized” in a different culture.  When the 
latter situation is the case, the anthropologist or anyone who might have been formerly in 
the outside could be said to be immersed within the group in a significant manner.             
 The upshot of the discussion is that the act of identifying a particular group is 
generally meaningful when it is done by people whose membership in the group is basic.  
In other words, group identification is meaningful and relevant when it is done from 
inside the group.   
 
b. The Historical Emergence of National Identity 
 Nonetheless, a question now arises: can identification from outside a group ever 
be meaningful and relevant?  The question is an important one because that has often 
been the case with regard to the historical origin of national identities.        
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 States, in conjunction with nationalists, have been one of the factors shaping and 
codifying cultural groups in terms of national identities.  The process of national 
identification has not generally been a spontaneous one, but rather one that stems from 
states and nationalist ideologists.  It is then the case that nationalities consist of groups 
whose identities have been formed and defined from the outside.  National identities have 
not been generally characterized—at least initially—by members of cultural groups, but 
rather by states and nationalist ideologues.  As an instance of what I am now describing, 
we can think of Eugen Weber’s examination of the historical process that turned 
“peasants” into “French citizens.”8  
  I have suggested above that group identification is meaningful and relevant when 
it is done from inside a group, i.e., by group members.  Does that mean then that national 
identity, a kind of identity shaped by states and nationalists, who could very well be 
shaping the identity of the group from the outside, is meaningless or irrelevant?  In order 
to properly answer this question we must very briefly examine the process by which 
national identities have historically emerged.   
There is a debate among historians regarding the historical emergence of the 
nation.  The question is whether the nation is a feature of the modern era or if there are 
important antecedents that would allow us to speak of “nations” before the birth of the 
modern world.   
There are roughly two camps on the topic.  The modernists9 believe that the 
                                                 
8 Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1976).  
9 This seems to be the predominant approach. For authors in this camp, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities; John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, rev. ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994 
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nation could only arise in the social and cultural configuration of modernity.  The 
modernists characterize the nation as an “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm), an “imagined 
community” (Anderson), or a phenomenon that arises due to the operation of intellectual 
elites (Kedourie) or the needs of industrial society (Gellner).   
 The problem for the modernists is that nations seem to be more than fabrications 
or conceptual constructions of elites or political systems.10  Some elite leaders might 
declare that a people now become a “nation,” but that does not mean that the newly 
prescribed “national identity” becomes a reality for everyone.  As an illustration of this 
type of situation, consider the numerous groups in the African continent that can hardly 
identify themselves with the “national” structures set up by former colonial powers.  If 
nations are not merely the fabrication of elites or political units, what is it that makes 
nations and national identity possible?  Likewise, how do we describe the notions, 
                                                                                                                                                 
[1982]); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric 
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002 [1990]); Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875  (New York: Vintage 
Books 1996 [1975]), pp. 82-97; Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848 (New York: Vintage 
Books 1996 [1962]), pp. 132-145; Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 
Publisher, 1961). 
10 John Hutchinson remarks the following: “It is implausible […] to conceive of modernizing nationalists as 
outside their society mobilizing it from above. It implies that invoked ethnic memories have an independent 
force with which they have to negotiate. What modernists have failed to explore is the relationship of 
nationalism to other belief systems and the complex symbolic mediations by which nationalists are able to 
canalize the past for their purposes.” “Nations and Culture,” in Understanding Nationalism, eds. M. 
Guibernau & J. Hutchinson (Malden: Polity Press, 2001), p. 77.    
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sentiments and collective symbols by which masses that identify themselves with a 
particular nation are mobilized?   
In addressing the latter question, we find the second camp in the debate on the 
emergence of nations.  Ethno-symbolists or pre-modernists11 claim that modern nations 
have an “ethnic core.”  Given such a core, nations are, in fact, very old communities.  
Hence the modern nation is simply the development of political institutions that entail a 
pre-existing element, i.e., an ethnic core.12  The ethno-symbolists, however, often seem 
not to take fully into account the major political dimension of ethnic and national 
                                                 
11 The most prominent author within this approach is Anthony Smith. See “The Origins of Nations,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 12, 3 (July 1989), pp. 341-367; “State-Making and Nation-Building,” in States in 
History, ed. John Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986). Likewise, Smith offers a useful discussion on the topics and issues at stake in the current literature: 
Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, and History (Malden: Polity Press, 2001).  There is also a useful review on 
the different types of approaches and authors who have studied the origins of nations in Jocelyne Couture, 
Kai Nielsen and Michel Seymour, “Introduction: Questioning the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy,” in Rethinking 
Nationalism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 22, eds. J. Couture, K. Nielsen and 
M. Seymour (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996), pp. 10-23. 
12 It is important to point out that the notion of ethnicity is a problematic one. Smith believes, for example, 
that ethnic groups may be characterized in a more or less clear way. See “The Origins of Nations,” pp. 345-
345. Others believe that the notion of ethnicity confuses more than it clarifies things, specially in the study 
of nations and nationalism. For this view, See Walker Connor, “A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, is an 
Ethnic Group, Is a…,” in Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1994), pp. 100-103.  And yet others, like Jorge Gracia, believe that ethnicity may be characterized in 
terms of clusters of properties (a position that seeks to avoid the pitfalls of other misleading 
characterizations, but does not do away with the notion completely). See “The Nature of Ethnicity with 
Special Reference to Hispanic/Latino Identity,” Public Affairs Quarterly 13, 1 (January 1999), pp. 25-42.     
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identity. 13  If political units (e.g., states) do, in fact, play a role in the formation of 
national and ethnic identity, then the ethno-symbolists need to explain how such 
identities are possible before the emergence of the modern nation-state. 
An interesting notion proposed by Eric Hobsbawm in an attempt to address the 
complexity of national identity, in some sense “invented” and yet in a different sense 
“preexistent,” is that of proto-nation. 14   A proto-nation is a pre-political community 
bound by feelings of collective belonging.  One of the benefits of the notion just 
mentioned is that we are able to make a distinction between nations and proto-nations.  
Nations are the phenomena modernists attempt to describe.  Proto-nations, in contrast, 
are the phenomena described by ethno-symbolists.      
 The distinction would make it possible to acknowledge that modern nations are 
the result of a process that goes in two directions.  On the one hand, the top-down 
represents the role of political units and elites in developing national identities.  On the 
other hand, the bottom-up captures the collective forms of identity that serve as building 
blocks for national identity. 15  States or elites, by themselves, do not “create” nations and 
national identity.  But neither do communities, for the most part, spontaneously become 
full-blown nations or develop strong nationalist feelings without the intervention of either 
states or ideological elites.  Nations are often the result of proto-nations that have been 
mobilized by political units and also nationalist intellectuals. 
 
                                                 
13 In fact, nations have to be analyzed in terms of “political, technical, administrative, economic and other 
conditions and requirements.” Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, p. 10. 
14 For this notion, see Nations and Nationalism, p. 46. 
15 Hobsbawm expresses this point in Nations and Nationalism, p. 10-11. 
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c. The Internalization of Identity 
 In some sense, nations could be identified in a way that does not immediately 
portray the properties that are essential to the self-understanding of a given people.  
Political units and nationalist intellectuals are not always in touch with the meaningful 
features of the people they wish to portray—imagine the Peruvian state speaking about 
the “Peruvian national identity” of the Quechuas.  Or also think of the fact that states and 
nationalist intellectuals have often preceded the “nation.”   
 But when do states and nationalist ideology reach the point in which they become 
meaningful for the proto-nations they represent?  This is a complex matter, but for our 
purposes we simply need to see that national identities can be internalized by a group and 
hence become meaningful.  So, for instance, members of cultural groups, that have 
internalized the national identities often engineered and managed by states and 
nationalists, can identify their cultural groups in terms of such national identities.  But 
note that this is possible because the group has appropriated and internalized features, 
symbols, narratives, and practices that then become essential to the self-understanding of 
group members.   
 An example will help us to illustrate the point at stake.  When I characterize 
myself as a “Mexican,” I may be describing experiences and properties that are essential 
to my self-understanding—in this way I identify my culture from the inside.  Since I am a 
member, in a significant manner, of the culture I am identifying, then my identification is 
meaningful.  But the category “Mexican” would be unintelligible without a nation-state 
and certain nationalist principles.  Thus my characterization of Mexican culture coincides 
with certain nationalist notions of Mexicanness.   
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 This example shows that meaningful identification, from inside the culture, has 
effectively merged with a type of identification that might have been historically external.  
The latter, however, is possible because external identification has been internalized by 
members of the culture.  We can say then that identification from outside a culture could 
be meaningful when such a form of identification is internalized by the culture at stake.  
Drawing on Weber’s illustration, we could say that peasants can identify themselves as 
French citizens, in a meaningful and relevant sense, when they have internalized 
Frenchness. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I raised the following question: how do we characterize groups that 
have the function of endowing members with the type of membership that is central to 
members’ identities?    
 The groups that have the function at stake generally satisfy three conditions.  
First, there is the condition of relevant identification.  This condition sustains that group 
members are identified according to properties that are essential to their self-
understanding, i.e., properties that make their membership basic.   
 The second condition is that of differentiation.  Here, basic membership is 
necessarily connected with groups that have difference-sensitive attributes—what I called 
us-type groups, which contrast with them-type groups.  Groups with difference-sensitive 
attributes posses what I called the status of discernibility.  This status entails two 
circumstances: group members have traits in common; and these common traits are such 
that they generally make the group distinguishable from other groups.    
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  The third and last condition I discussed is that of intrinsic identification.  Under 
this condition, groups and members are identified from what was described as the 
“inside” of a group and not the “outside.”  Two important elements discussed within this 
condition are group identification and national identity formation.  We will see at a later 
point the significance of these two elements for understanding Hispanic identity-
formation.   
 I have now completed my discussion of membership and groups.  With this 
framework in mind, I will now turn to the discussion of the Hispanic group and 
membership.  The general question guiding subsequent chapters is this: does the Hispanic 
group, and its corresponding membership, satisfy the conditions discussed so far? 
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CHAPTER 5 
NATIONALITY AND HISPANIC MEMBERSHIP  
  
 The American Federal Government officially recognizes certain groups by means 
of the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity.  One of the 
reasons for such recognition is a governmental attempt to identify and gather data on 
populations that have historically “experienced discrimination and differential treatment 
because of their race or ethnicity.”1  But the purpose behind the recognition of racial and 
ethnic groups is not only to identify groups that have experienced discrimination.  These 
groups are also recognized by governmental agencies, policy-makers and society in 
general because membership in racial or ethnic groups is often thought to be central to 
members’ identities.     
 “Hispanic” is one of the groups recognized by the Federal Government, policy-
makers and society.  A Hispanic in American society is someone who has a particular 
cultural or national origin.  According to the official definition of the Federal Standards, a 
Hispanic or Latino is a “person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South 
American or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.”2    
                                                 
1 See “Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,” in Federal 
Register, vol. 62, no. 210, Thursday, October 30, 1997, Notices, p. 58782.   
2 The definition was officially issued by the Office of Management and Budget on May 12, 1977, in the 
“Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting,” otherwise known as 
“Statistical Directive No. 15.”  According to the latest revision, the definition remains the same, but the 
category is now “Hispanic” or “Latino,” and “Spanish Origin” could also be used.  See “Revisions to the 
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 In focusing on this group, the question that arises is whether membership in the 
Hispanic group is indeed central to members’ identities.  Another way of formulating the 
question is this: is Hispanic membership basic?  In order to shed light on the basicness of 
Hispanic membership, I will compare this membership with another membership, i.e., 
nationality.  I will argue that national membership is basic for most members of the 
Hispanic group; but, in contrast, Hispanic membership is not basic for most members of 
the Hispanic group. 
  
1. THE NATIONALITY OF HISPANICS 
When we think of Hispanic membership, what type of membership is it?  The 
question is whether Hispanic membership can be thought of as basic.  The first step for 
examining the basic membership of Hispanics is to take a closer look at the nationality of 
Hispanics.  After all, Hispanics are characterized in terms of national groups, i.e., 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Colombian—or any other Latin American nation—
culture or origin.     
I will begin by highlighting the fact that people included in the category of 
“Hispanic” generally have different nationalities.  By nationality, in this specific context, 
I mean (a) feelings of loyalty towards a nation, i.e., national identity, or (b) citizenship, 
i.e., the formal acknowledgment of a state that someone is a member of such a state.  
Taking into account the national identities and citizenships of Hispanics we find at least 
four different groups.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Standards,” p. 58789.  I use the term “Hispanic” throughout the next few chapters because it seems to be 
the one most widely used in media and policy circles.  
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The first group of Hispanics is composed of American citizens who identify 
themselves with the American nation.  These citizens might be either born in the United 
States or naturalized.  We can think here of second-generation Mexican or Cuban-
Americans or someone who was born in Latin America, but then becomes a U.S. citizen 
and pledges allegiance to the American nation.      
A second group is composed of American citizens who identify themselves with 
their nation of origin in Latin America.  In this second group, people are nominal 
members of the American nation since despite their American citizenship their feelings of 
loyalty are primarily oriented towards a Latin American nation.  As an example, let us 
think of a Cuban exile who immigrates to the United States and becomes a naturalized 
American citizen; and yet his or her national allegiance remains in the former birthplace 
and homeland.  According to the 2002 National Survey of Latinos conducted by the Pew 
Hispanic Center and the Kaiser Family Foundation, “Hispanics who are American 
citizens are still more likely to identify themselves primarily by country of origin (44%) 
than to identify primarily as an ‘American’ (33%)….”3  It is reasonable to expect that at 
least some of those who identify themselves by country of origin do indeed have feelings 
of loyalty towards their nations.    
One could contend at this point that someone from Colombia, who then becomes 
an American citizen, might have mixed allegiances.  She could have, say, both a 
Colombian and an American national identity.  This might indeed be true.  Suppose, 
                                                 
3 Mollyann Brodie, Annie Steffenson, Jaime Valdez, Rebecca Levin, and Roberto Suro,  2002 National 
Survey of Latinos. Report prepared by the Pew Hispanic Center and the Kaiser Family Foundation, 
December 2002, p. 29. 
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however, that there were a highly conflictive situation, e.g., a war, between the United 
States and Colombia.  In a conflictive situation someone with a mixed identity is likely to 
be partial to either one side or the other.  Considerations such as a sense of justice might 
determine the choice of partiality.  But a crucial element in taking sides will be the 
person’s national identity.  Conflict might make the person realize that despite a mixed 
identity, one of her identities is dominant.4  Thus, given that her dominant identity is 
being threatened, she will probably feel compelled to be partial and defend her dominant 
identity.  I will return to this point below since it is important for understanding the 
basicness of Hispanic membership.                     
It is important to incidentally point out that there are significant incentives for 
group partiality in cases of conflict.  This is one of the reasons why conflict is so 
revealing in analyses of group membership and thus figures prominently in my 
understanding of the contrast between members and non-members.  Given a situation of 
conflict, group member will benefit from strict partiality. 
Let us continue with the third group of Hispanics: those who are not American 
citizens and do not identify themselves with the American nation.  We could think, for 
instance, of a migrant worker from Mexico who crosses the border purely for the purpose 
of obtaining a particular job.  Accordingly, there is no interest in the American nation as 
such; but rather the interest is oriented towards an economic opportunity that as a matter 
of contingence happens to be found in American territory.  The worker presumably 
                                                 
4 This interesting point is one of the premises underlying Russell Hardin’s analysis of group membership 
and conflict.  See One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 
particularly chapter six.              
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continues to identify herself with her nation of origin, i.e., Mexico, and has no interest in 
American citizenship.   
The fourth and last group consists of those who are not American citizens, but 
identify themselves with the American nation.  In this category, we might think of 
someone who was born in Panama and has the citizenship of her birthplace, but then 
comes to the United States as a child.  The parents of the child are not American citizens 
and thus the child, who was not born on American soil, is not an American citizen either.    
Since the person in mind grows up in American society, it is possible that she feels 
identified with the American nation.  As she becomes an adult, it would be quite natural 
to have feelings of loyalty and an identity related to the United States, despite not being 
an American citizen. 
In the four groups I have outlined, two points must be highlighted.  First, all 
Hispanics have a nationality.  Here we must remember that the Hispanic category is 
defined and understood in terms of nationality.  This is a very important point and one 
that we will return to in the next chapter.  A Hispanic is a “person of Mexican, Puerto 
Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of 
race.”5  It is worth pointing out that the nations mentioned in the definition are from Latin 
America, but there is also an implied nation, i.e., the United States of America.  The 
category “Hispanic” does not attempt to define Mexicans in Mexico, or Colombians in 
Europe.  The category attempts to define Mexicans, Colombians, Venezuelans, Cubans, 
etc., who are now in American territory.  As pointed out, a Hispanic might be an 
                                                 
5 See “Revisions to the Standards,” p. 58789.   
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American citizen or not, but must now be residing, whether legally or not, in the United 
States.   
The second point is that Hispanics have a variety of nationalities.  I mentioned 
earlier that when speaking of nationality I had two variables in mind: (a) national 
identity, and (b) citizenship.  In accordance with the four groups I described, it is fair to 
say that Hispanics have both a variety of national identities and citizenships.  But one of 
the complications when looking at Hispanics is that, as we saw, national identity does not 
always overlap with citizenship.  Such a complication is an important one, but since it is 
not crucial for my argument, I will ignore it in much of the discussion.  I will speak of 
nationality focusing primarily on national identity, namely, feelings of loyalty towards a 
nation.  Hispanics have different nationalities—by which I mean that they have different 
national identities.  Some Hispanics have feelings of loyalty towards Mexico, others 
towards Cuba or Venezuela, and yet others towards the United States of America.  The 
latter observation is in line with the way different Hispanics identify themselves:  
“Foreign-born Latinos (the first generation) have a powerful preference for identification 
by their country of origin.  Indeed, that is usually not only the country of their birth but 
also where some spent their childhood years.”  Also, “over half (57%) of Latinos with 
U.S.-born parents (the third generation and beyond) identify themselves first and 
foremost as an American.”6             
 
 
 
                                                 
62002 National Survey, p. 28.        
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2. NATIONALITY AND BASIC MEMBERSHIP 
How significant are the national identities of most Hispanics?  I wish to suggest, 
first, that the national identities of Hispanics actually matter to a significantly large 
extent.  And, second, the reason why the national identities of Hispanics matter to such a 
large extent is because their national identities are a type of basic membership.  I will 
begin with some illustrations. 
 Imagine a Hispanic family in which the mother, Claudia, is not an American 
citizen and does not feel identified with the American nation.  Despite the fact that she 
has lived in the United States for many years and is a U.S. permanent resident, she retains 
strong feelings towards her native country Mexico, and particularly towards her native 
town, Tijuana.  Her daughter, Maria, was born and raised in the United States and is a 
U.S. citizen.  Maria has a vague memory of a visit to Mexico as a child, but Mexico does 
not represent much to her because she was born and raised in America, and feels 
identified with the American nation.   
 Now suppose a war broke out between the United States and Mexico.  The war is 
characterized—as wars normally are—by particularly bitter sentiments against the other 
side.  Stories that Claudia, from Mexico, heard in her childhood come to her memory: 
stories, imaginary or real, about the heroic resistance against an establishment largely 
sponsored by the gringos.  Life on the border for her, like many others, kept alive the 
largely historical bitter-sweet feelings that many Mexicans on the border feel towards the 
rich and sometimes “kind neighbor” who is also the “suspicious enemy.”  Now that the 
war breaks out, all these memories come to mind and Claudia finds it impossible to avoid 
strongly bitter feelings against Americans.  Her daughter, however, is in a different 
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position since she is a member of the American nation.  Maria would naturally tend to 
side with the United States.  Her patriotism is aroused by what she sees as an essentially 
just war against Mexico.   
In a situation like this, mother and daughter would perhaps find themselves 
divided by national loyalties.  Even if not completely alienated from each other, the 
affinity of mother and daughter would at least be seriously tested.  The situation I am 
describing now is not wholly inconceivable.  It has, in fact, occurred before throughout 
history.  Think, for example, of the families that were divided over loyalties to the 
Empire or the Colonies in the context of the American Revolution.  Likewise, families in 
Latin America were divided in the XIX century over support to the cause of the Realists, 
Spaniards, or the cause of Independence led by the Creoles, natives of the colonies.  
Illustrations of this sort show the power of regional sentiments and loyalties, which are 
sufficiently manifest in nationalities.                            
Consider now an important soccer game between Mexico and Costa Rica, or 
Colombia and Argentina, games that will determine the classification to the World Cup.  
It is likely that these games will draw a high number of nationals that will support their 
team, and in many instances show antagonism, even if in a “friendly” way, towards the 
opposite team.  Why are these national sporting events so important?  What do they 
reveal about the supporters that fervently cheer for their national teams?  A victory of the 
national team is a source of collective pride and a defeat is a source of collective 
humiliation.  National teams are generally positive representations of “wide selves.”  And 
as David Copp puts it: “when we have wide selves, the accomplishments and failures of 
certain other people, groups, or entities are important to us emotionally, for their 
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accomplishments and failures can ground emotions of esteem.” 7  In the context of sport 
teams, we find that if they triumph, we all triumph; if they lose, we all lose.  These sorts 
of feelings are true of sports teams in general, but tend to be particularly true of national 
teams.   
Eric Hobsbawm, in discussing the consolidation of nationhood between 1915 and 
1950, highlights the role of sports in national feelings.  He comments that national sports 
became for national members “….an expression of national struggle, and sportsmen 
representing their nation or state, primary expressions of their imagined communities.”  
Similarly,  
what has made sport so uniquely effective a medium for inculcating 
national feelings (….) is the ease with which even the least political or 
public individuals can identify with the nation as symbolized by young 
persons excelling at what practically every man wants, or at one time in 
life has wanted, to be good at.  The imagined community of millions 
seems more real as a team of eleven named people.  The individual, even 
the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of his nation himself. 8 
The feelings expressed in the latter paragraph can be witnessed in—to use 
examples only limited to Latin America—the classificatory rounds for the Soccer World 
Cup; say, for example, a game between Uruguay and Argentina.  Other events, such as 
the Panamerican Games, the South American Games, the Cup of Liberators and the 
                                                 
7 “Social Unity and the Identity of Persons,” The Journal of Political Philosophy  10, 4 (2002), p. 383.  
8 Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002 [1990]), p. 143.  
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Caribbean Series, may also be the occasion for nationalist feelings to emerge in the 
benign context of sports. 
According to Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut, “patriotism [in Latin 
America] is often sharpened by periodic revivals of conflict with a neighboring Latin 
nation.  Thus, Colombians and Venezuelans, Ecuadorians and Peruvians, Chileans and 
Argentines have traditionally reaffirmed their sense of national pride in actual or 
symbolic confrontations with each other.”9 The sporting events I have in mind could be 
seen as symbolic confrontations between Latin American nations.    
Given the confrontation between nations, whether actual or symbolic, the question 
that arises is this: what is so special about nations?  This is a difficult question, but we 
know indeed that there is something about nations that arouses deep passions and feelings 
of loyalty.  Someone growing up in Venezuela, or any nation in Latin America or North 
America, most likely has a national identity.  Having a national identity means that one 
has feelings of loyalty towards one’s nation and these feelings often matter to a 
significantly large extent.  But why do these feelings matter to a significantly large 
extent?   
Nations give people a sense of commonality.  In a way nations are a community 
bound together by a dynamic that was discussed earlier: a strong sense of we that 
separates people from them.  More specifically, when I speak of “we” and “they” here, I 
am indirectly alluding to the cond ition of differentiation described in chapter four. Let me 
                                                 
9 Immigrant America: A Portrait, 2nd. ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1996), p. 135.     
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suggest that membership among Latin Americans and Americans in this national “we” is 
generally basic.   
Suppose we asked a Venezuelan, an American, or a Peruvian to characterize 
herself according to those traits that are essential to her own self-understanding.  Among 
those traits, she could most likely count her language, her birthplace, the people to whom 
she is related, certain tastes, habits, beliefs, etc.  It is likely that many of the essentia l 
traits she uses to characterize herself are the traits that make her a member of a national 
group.  Let us recall that these were precisely the two characteristics of basic membership 
discussed in chapter three: (a) certain traits are essential to someone’s self-understanding; 
and (b) those traits make the person a member of a particular group.   
Let me now refine the point about nationality as a type of basic membership.  
Take, for example, the language of the person just mentioned.  Suppose an essential trait 
of her self-understanding is the language she speaks, e.g., Spanish.  If she did not speak 
the language she currently does, she would not be the person she is.  But consider that it 
is not only Spanish; it is rather the kind of Spanish that makes her sound like a 
Venezuelan, a Mexican, an Argentinean, a Puerto Rican or a Peruvian; thus making her a 
member in one of those national groups.   
Think also of another possible essential trait: her sense of “home.”  We can 
picture asking her: “where is home for you?”  It is quite possible to imagine her, and a 
good number of people from Latin America and the United States of America, answering 
this question in national terms.  Home is Chile, San Salvador, Cuba, etc.10  We can 
                                                 
10 According to the 2002 National Survey, “foreign-born Latinos’ attachment to their country of origin 
emerges from their choice of the nation they consider their real homeland, in Spanish ‘patria,’” p. 34.   
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imagine people answering this question in more specific regional terms—this is 
particularly true of Americans.  Home is Boston, Texas, Chihuahua, Maracaibo, or 
Buenos Aires.  But even in these instances, we must bear in mind that these regions are 
part of an overarching national community.  Without this sense of homeland, the person 
in our example would perhaps not be who she currently is.  Thus, a birthplace and sense 
of homeland, which makes her a member of a national group, is essential to her self-
understanding. 
What I have said about the specific person in our example will tend to be true for 
many people in Latin American nations.  Latin American nationals tend to identify 
themselves with their nation of origin.  The point I wish to make, at any rate, is that many 
of the essential traits people from Latin America (and also the United States of America) 
will use to characterize themselves are precisely those traits that often make them 
members of their respective nations.  If this is correct, it is possible to say that national 
membership is generally a basic type of membership for Latin American nationals.   
To see the collective strength of national identities among Latin American 
nationals, due to national basic memberships, let us compare nations with an us-type 
group such as “Latin America.”  One could say, for instance, that Latin Americans—
according to José Vasconcelos, a “cosmic race”11—have a strong sense of solidarity as a 
group.    
                                                 
11 See “The Cosmic Race,” in Latin American Philosophy for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, 
Values and the Search for Identity, eds. J. Gracia and E. Millán-Zaibert (New York: Prometheus Books, 
2004), pp. 269-278. 
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 We could, in fact, think of Latin America as a large and overarching community.  
Ernesto “Che” Guevara speaks, for example, about “we” who are in constant 
confrontation with “them.”  The “we” Guevara has in mind is at times quite broad: it 
consists of those people who have been born not only in Latin America, but more widely 
in poor countries.  In a famous speech delivered on February 26, 1965, at the Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Conference in Algiers, he speaks about the Latin American, Asian, and African 
peoples as a “family” with a common aspiration that unites every one of them.  One of 
his opening sentences is: “Our common aspiration, the defeat of imperialism, unites us in 
our march toward the future; our common history of struggle against the same enemy has 
united us along that road” (my italics).12  The sort of we-versus-them rhetoric, as evinced 
in Guevara himself, has certainly served to mobilize Latin American (and so called “third 
world”) countries against imperialist powers, which happen to be “foreign.”13   
 Note, however, that the sense of “us” among those born in poor or Latin 
American countries has often been superseded by a stronger sense of “us”, e.g., national 
groups.  Guevara himself ended some of his speeches with a slogan that became one of 
the trademarks of the Cuban Revolution: Patria o Muerte! (roughly translated as “country 
or death!”).  “Patria” (patrie in French or das Heimatland in German) conveys the idea of 
a “homeland” or “birth soil” to which one is inalienably bound by virtue of being born in 
                                                 
12 “Our Common Aspiration: The Death of Imperialism and the Birth of a Moral World,” in Venceremos: 
The Speeches and Writings of Ernesto Che Guevara , ed. J. Gerassi (New York: Simon and Schuter, 1968).  
Guevara is an icon often displayed, but seldom read.  In my view, his writings are worthwhile reading, for 
they give us valuable insights into the “us-type” mentality.  
13 Hugo Chavez, current president in Venezuela, is a recent example of how effective a political weapon the 
we-versus-them rhetoric could be. 
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such soil.  This “patria” is a national community.  The observation shows the strength of 
national memberships among Latin Americans.        
Consider some historical examples in support of my previous point.  Let us think, 
for instance, of the War of the Pacific between Bolivia and Chile (1879-1884) after which 
Bolivia became a land-locked count ry; or the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia 
(1932-1935) with the latter seeking to gain access to the Atlantic Ocean.   Also, think of 
the peculiar conflict known as the Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras (1969) 
in which armed confrontations broke out after a series of preliminary soccer games for 
the World Cup.14  Examining the history of war and conflict between Latin American 
nations, one can see the power of nationality, which is often stronger than the Latin 
American “we.”  
But let us also remember that bellicose confrontations are not the only kind of 
events showing the differences that separate Latin American nationals.  We need to bear 
in mind here our earlier comment about symbolic confrontations reflected in sporting 
events.  At any rate, a Colombian is not to be confused with a Venezuelan, an 
Argentinean with a Chilean, or a Mexican with a Salvadorian.  All these nations have a 
set of symbols and rituals that give expression to an exclusive national “us.” 
Let me mention at this point that nationality remains strong even when Latin 
American immigrants become Hispanics in the U.S, a point that I will continue to 
elaborate in subsequent discussions.  Contrasting national and Hispanic memberships, 
this is how Portes and Rumbaut describe the situation of Hispanics in the U.S.:    
                                                 
14 See my example above regarding the manifestation of national feelings in sporting events.  
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Colombian immigrants certainly know that they are Colombian and 
Mexicans that they are Mexican; what they probably do not know when 
they arrive in the United States is that they belong to a larger ethnic 
category called Hispanics.  Colombians, Mexicans, Cubans, and other 
immigrant groups from Latin America are generally aware that they share 
common linguistic and cultural roots, but this fact seldom suffices to 
produce a strong overarching solidarity.  National experiences are too 
divergent and national loyalties too deeply embedded to yield to this 
supranational logic.15 
By way of conclusion here, let me make a clarification.  I am not suggesting that 
nationality is the only type of basic membership among Latin Americans.  In line with 
what I suggested in chapter three, we can think of transnational basic memberships, e.g., 
membership in a religious community.  I am rather suggesting that national membership 
is generally basic because many of the essential traits Latin Americans (and Americans) 
use to characterize themselves are precisely the traits that make them members of a 
national group.  The distinction is important because it allows us to see that national 
membership is basic, but it is not the only type of basic membership.             
  I began the current section with illustrations showing the intensity of national 
feelings.  Illustrations of this sort raise questions about the significance of nationality.  
Why is nationality so significant among Latin Americans and Americans?  I suggested 
that nations are communities with a strong sense of “we” and membership in this national 
“we” is generally basic.  Once we see that national membership is generally basic, we can 
                                                 
15 Immigrant America, p. 135.  
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also begin to see what is so significant about nations and why they draw intense feelings 
of loyalty.   
          
3. HISPANICITY AND BASIC MEMBERSHIP 
 We set out to inquire about the status of Hispanic membership.  Can Hispanic 
membership be thought of as basic?  We have seen that Hispanics do, as a matter of fact, 
have different national identities.  Furthermore, I have suggested that the national 
memberships of people included in the category of “Hispanic”—whether American or 
Latin American—are generally basic.  But even if we acknowledge that nationa lities 
among Hispanics are a type of basic membership, the question that must be raised is 
whether Hispanic membership can also be thought of as basic.  For reasons that I will 
explain in the next chapter, I think that the answer is negative.  But for the sake of 
discussion, let us grant for now that the answer to the possibility of Hispanic basic 
membership seems to be, at least in part, affirmative.   
 Think of someone born in the United States under the name of Maria Alonzo in a 
family of Salvadorian immigrants.  Such a person will most likely possess traits—many 
of them perhaps non-voluntarily acquired—that are essential to her own self-
understanding.  Some of the traits that are essential to Maria Alonzo’s self-
understanding—her parent’s homeland and history, and her physical traits—will perhaps 
make her think of herself as a Hispanic.  But we must also remember that Maria Alonzo 
has a nationality, which is a type of basic membership.  Maria Alonzo was born in the 
United States and presumably has an American national identity.  We could imagine that 
this national identity is highly significant for her because her membership in this national 
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“we,” like the membership of other Americans, is generally basic.  Maria Alonzo has 
both a Hispanic and a national membership, and the two memberships seem to be basic.  
Comparing these two memberships will help us to understand the status of Hispanic 
membership.     
I wish to suggest that Hispanic membership might have some degree of basicness 
for some of the people included in the category of “Hispanic,” but the degree of national 
basicness among Hispanics is pervasive and higher than Hispanic membership.  My 
suggestion entails three claims.  First, national membership is basic for all Hispanics—or 
at least a vast majority of them.  I will call this the criterion of pervasive basic 
membership.  A second claim is that Hispanic membership is basic for some, but not all 
Hispanics.  Let me mention here again that speaking about the basicness of Hispanic 
membership is an overstatement, for reasons that will be explained in the next chapter.  
But I grant, for the time being, the possibility of basic Hispanic membership for the sake 
of discussion.  Call this the criterion of partial basic membership.  Third, even when 
Hispanic membership has a certain degree of basicness, e.g., as with Maria Alonzo, 
national membership has a higher degree of basicness.  I understand by “robust 
membership” a type of membership that has a higher degree of basicness than other 
memberships.  According to the third claim then we have the criterion of robust 
membership.  I will now turn to a discussion of the three criteria.    
I have already pointed out that all (or almost all) Hispanics have a nationality, by 
which I primarily understand “national identity” or “feelings of loyalty towards a nation.”  
It is very hard to imagine a Hispanic without a nationality, i.e., someone who has a 
Hispanic identity, but not a national identity.  Here we must remember that Hispanics 
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have an American or a Latin American nationality since Hispanics are second-generation 
Americans or originally from Latin American nations.  As we saw in the four groups 
discussed above, some Hispanics have an American national identity, whereas others 
have national identities from Latin American nations—regardless of whether national 
identity coincides with citizenship or not.  The point now is that despite differences in 
national identities, all (or almost all) Hispanics do in fact have national identities.            
I also argued above that national identities are very powerful for people from 
Latin America (and America) because nationality is a type of basic membership among 
them.  If I am right so far, we can then see that all (or almost all) Hispanics have national 
identities, and these national identities derive from a type of basic membership in a 
national community.  The corollary is that national membership among Hispanics is 
pervasive, i.e., national membership is basic for all (or almost all) Hispanics.  In sum, the 
criterion of pervasive basic membership among Hispanics is met by the attribute of 
nationality.           
Let us now assume for a moment that Hispanic membership is also basic.  The 
question then is whether Hispanic membership is basic for all (or almost all) Hispanics.  I 
have granted that Hispanic membership might be basic for some Hispanics, e.g., Maria 
Alonzo.  But are all other Hispanics in the same position?  Consider one of the groups we 
discussed above, i.e., those who are not American citizens and do not ident ify themselves 
with the American nation.  I used the example of a Mexican migrant worker from Mexico 
who crosses the border purely for the purpose of obtaining a particular job.  Such a 
migrant has no interest in the American nation as such, but rather a particular economic 
opportunity that happens to be found in American territory.   
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Once the migrant crosses the American border he will become a Hispanic.  The 
migrant presumably has a Mexican identity, but how significant is his “Hispanic” 
membership?  One could imagine that it is probably not very significant.  In fact, one 
could easily imagine his Hispanic membership not being basic.  Suppose we asked the 
migrant to characterize himself according to those traits that are essential to his own self-
understanding.  He mentions, for instance, language and homeland, which make him a 
member of the Mexican nation.  One could point out that the Spanish language and 
Mexican origin also make him a member of the Hispanic group.  It does not mean, 
however, that his Hispanic membership is then basic.  The migrant’s essential traits make 
him view himself primarily as a Mexican and not necessarily as a Hispanic.  Whereas his 
Mexican membership contains traits that are essential to his own self-understanding, his 
Hispanic membership does not.  My point is that the migrant’s membership in the 
Mexican nation is basic, but his membership in the Hispanic group is not. 
Let us recall a point that was made in chapter three with regard to the 
characteristics of basic membership.  The two components of basic membership are (a) 
certain traits are essential to my own self-understanding and (b) these traits make me a 
member of a particular group.  Keeping these two components together is important 
because, if isolated from each other, we will have two misleading pictures.  First, one 
might simply think of traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding, but these 
traits usually derive from and are associated with a particular group.  Second, one might 
think that being a member in a particular group might be essential to a member’s self-
understanding.  But this is not always the case because membership does not always 
entail the sorts of traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding.  The upshot is 
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that membership is basic if and only if group traits are essential to a member’s self-
understanding. 
Now let us think again of the Mexican migrant who becomes a Hispanic in the 
U.S. by virtue of the fact that he speaks Spanish and has a Mexican homeland.  But note 
that these traits, which are essential to his own self-understanding, make him a member 
of a particular group, the Mexican nation.  This particular group is an us-type group 
because, among other reasons, membership in the group is basic and the group is 
identified from the inside—two of the conditions discussed in chapter four with regard to 
relevant groups.   
When it comes to Hispanic membership, however, it cannot be said that the traits 
that are essential to the migrant’s self-understanding make his membership in the 
Hispanic group similar to national membership.  He may indeed be, in some sense, a 
member in the Hispanic group, but this group per se is not characterized exclusively or 
primarily by the Spanish language and Mexican homeland (the traits that are essent ial to 
the migrant’s self-understanding).16  Now recall that membership is basic if and only if 
group traits are essential to a member’s self-understanding.  Whereas this condition can 
be applied to the particular group, Mexican, it cannot be applied to the Hispanic group.  
So despite the fact that the migrant is, in some sense, a member of the Hispanic group, 
this membership is non-basic.   
 Another brief example will also make the point of the non-basicness of Hispanic 
membership.  One might think of someone who has a Cuban relative three generations 
back, e.g., her grandfather.  But other than a relative the person has no ties with Cuba.  
                                                 
16 This point will be developed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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She considers herself an American and many of the features that are essential to her own 
self-understanding are the ones that make her a member in the American nation, and thus 
her American membership is basic.  She might additionally consider herself a Hispanic, 
but her Hispanic membership is not basic because none of the traits that are essential to 
her own self-understanding are also the sorts of traits that make her a member in the 
Hispanic group.  The person I have in mind might have a Hispanic membership, but such 
a membership will not be basic for her.   
 One could go even further.  Since Hispanicity does not have much relevance for 
her identity, she might also choose not to consider herself a Hispanic.  We could perhaps 
imagine someone choosing not to view herself as a Hispanic because the essential traits 
of her own-self-understanding make her an American, but not necessarily a Hispanic.  
She might choose to think of herself as a Hispanic-American, but she might also choose 
to think of herself as an American simpliciter.   
 If my observations are correct, Hispanic membership as a type of basic 
membership seems to have a partial extension.  Hispanic membership is basic for some, 
but not all Hispanics.   
 Incidentally, I suspect that many Hispanics will see their Hispanic membership as 
a matter of choice.  Thus they might choose to pick out some traits that will be cons idered 
“Hispanic,” but they may also choose not to pick out those traits.  As we saw earlier, 
Mary Waters describes a kind of identity that is voluntary and thus selective.  So, for 
instance, “you can choose those aspects of being Irish that appeal to you and discard 
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those that do not.”17  Hispanics might choose some traits of Hispanicity that they find 
appealing and also discard the unappealing traits.  Once choice is introduced, i.e., you 
choose and discard traits, then questions about basicness emerge.  Are voluntary traits 
essential to someone’s self-understanding?  If I can discard certain traits at will, are they 
really essential to my own self-understanding?   
 I will ignore the questions having to do with choice in the present context and 
simply assume that, whether a matter of choice or not, Hispanic membership is basic for 
some but not all group members.  Even if that is the case, the crucial point is that 
Hispanic membership as a type of basic membership has a partial extension.  My 
conclusion then is that whereas, as we saw before, nationality meets the criterion of 
pervasive basic membership, Hispanic membership does not meet this criterion.  
Hispanic membership meets, at best, the criterion of partial basic membership.   
 In our previous examples, I have compared national and Hispanic memberships.  
We must now make this comparison explicit and turn to the degrees of basicness between 
national and Hispanic membership.  I will now discuss the third criterion mentioned 
above, robust membership.     
 I mentioned before the way in which Portes and Rumbaut describe Hispanics and 
their national memberships.  Among Latin American nationals and Hispanics, national 
experiences “are too divergent and national loyalties too deeply embedded to yield to this 
supranational logic [i.e., Hispanic identity].”18 
                                                 
17 Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1990), p. 115. 
18 Immigrant America, p. 135.  
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The idea described here is that the national membership of Hispanics is robust, 
i.e., national membership has a higher degree of basicness than Hispanic membership.  I 
suggested above that nations are communities with a strong sense of “we” and 
membership in this national “we” is generally basic, which is one of the reasons why 
nations draw intense feelings of loyalty.  I now wish to develop this notion further and 
argue that national membership when compared with Hispanic membership is robust.    
 Let us begin with an observation about robust membership and conflict.  Robust 
membership does not exclude other basic memberships.  As suggested, one might be both 
a Hispanic and an American, and the two memberships might be basic.  But robust 
membership does often exclude other memberships that might have a similar degree of 
basicness.  What I mean is that robust membership is often exclusive, i.e., it does not 
allow for other memberships with a similar degree of basicness.  Robust membership is 
one of the reasons why in a situation of conflict we are likely to see people taking sides 
and defending those groups with traits that are most essential to their own self-
understandings—Serbs and Croats, Hutus and Tutsis, Catho lics and Protestants, 
Mexicans and Americans.   
 As mentioned in chapter four and in our previous discussion, it is certainly true 
that people usually have different layers of membership in different (and sometimes 
conflicting) us-type groups.  It does seem to be the case, however, that in certain 
instances one of the basic memberships in an us-type group could have the potential for 
overriding other basic memberships.  One can particularly see one membership prevailing 
over others in situations of conflict.  
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 If the observation is right, then it is possible to anticipate that in the case of a 
confrontation between the nationalities of Hispanics, Hispanic membership will subside 
and national membership will prevail.  The reason why national membership prevails 
over Hispanic membership is because national membership is much stronger than 
Hispanic membership.  If membership x overrides membership y, membership x is robust 
with regard to membership y.  National membership overrides Hispanic membership and 
hence the former is robust with regard to the latter.    
An analogy between the Latin American and Hispanic groups will support my 
claim.  One of the points I made in our earlier discussion is that national membership is 
robust with regard to Latin American membership.  Being a Hispanic is akin with being a 
Latin American in that each category encompasses different national memberships.  If it 
is true that national membership is robust with regard to Latin American membership, 
one could say a fortiori that national membership is robust with regard to Hispanic 
membership.  My claim then is that the criterion of robust membership is met by national 
membership and not Hispanic membership.  
 Let me now summarize, by way of conclusion, the tenets of my discussion.  First, 
I argued that nationality meets the criterion of pervasive basic membership.  Second, 
whereas nationality meets the criterion of pervasive basic membership, Hispanic 
membership does not meet this criterion because Hispanic membership meets, at best, the 
criterion of partial basic membership.  Third, even if one grants the possibility that 
Hispanic membership could be basic, national membership is robust with regard to 
Hispanic membership, which means that only national membership meets the criterion of 
robust membership.    
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4. CONCLUSION 
 I set out to inquire whether membership in the Hispanic group is central to 
members’ identities.  In order to understand the identity of Hispanics, I raised the 
question of whether Hispanic membership is basic.   
 I attempted to answer this question by exploring national membership and 
comparing national membership with Hispanic membership.  I suggested that national 
membership is basic for all (or almost all) Hispanics, but Hispanic membership is basic 
for only some Hispanics.  Additionally, national membership is more robust than 
Hispanic membership.     
  Three points follow from my line of thought.  First, if national membership is a 
type of basic membership for most Hispanics, national membership is likely to be highly 
significant for them.  Thus for most Hispanics, national membership is at the center of 
their identity.   
 Second, granting that Hispanic membership is actually basic for some Hispanics, 
Hispanic membership could be said to be highly significant for them.  Hispanic 
membership would then seem to be central to the identity of some Hispanics.   
 But here we must also remember that national membership is generally more 
robust than Hispanic membership.  Hence, my third point, if national membership is more 
robust than Hispanic membership, national membership is likely to be more significant to 
more people than Hispanic membership; and also more significant as a type of 
membership.  Given that nationality is more significant, it has a greater claim to being at 
the center of someone’s identity.  Even in cases in which Hispanic membership might 
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indeed seem to be central to someone’s identity, the situation for most Hispanics is that 
national membership is at the center of their identities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
HISPANIC IDENTIFICATION AND COMMON IDENTITY 
 
 I have looked at Hispanic membership in comparison with national membership.  
In this chapter, I wish to examine the Hispanic group and query whether this group as 
such satisfies the conditions of groups that have the function of endowing members with 
basic memberships.  I will concentrate on the first two conditions formulated in chapter 
four—the conditions of relevant identification and differentiation—and leave the third 
condition, intrinsic identification, for the next chapter.  The general question to be 
addressed now is this: does the Hispanic group satisfy the conditions of relevant groups 
discussed in chapter four? 
 
1. RELEVANT IDENTIFICATION 
 We know that according to the first condition outlined in chapter four, the 
condition of relevant identification, groups are identified according to properties that tend 
to make membership in a group basic.   
 Is the Hispanic group identified according to properties that make Hispanic 
membership basic?  The answer to this question, I will argue, is negative.  Let us look at 
two components in the question being raised: (a) is the Hispanic group identifiable, and 
(b) is it possible to single out the relevant properties of Hispanic membership?  I will 
address these two questions in turn and make two points.  First, there is a difficulty lying 
in the fact that Hispanics are not a clearly identifiable group.  Second, the reason why 
Hispanics are not clearly identifiable is because Hispanic membership is an 
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epiphenomenon of national membership—a type of membership that is currently more 
robust than Hispanic membership. 
 I will now begin with the point on whether Hispanics are identifiable.  Let us here 
recall that the sorts of groups we are concerned with are identifiable.  A group is 
identifiable when given a process of interaction, group members can discriminate 
members from non-members by recognizing certain social markers in fellow-members.  
The question that now arises is this: are members of the Hispanic group able to recognize 
each other as fellow-members (and discriminate those members from non-members)?  In 
order to address this question, let me begin with another one: what are the criteria 
according to which Hispanics are classified?          
 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the criteria for classifying Hispanics is 
either birth or heritage.  So, for example, “…people of Mexican origin [i.e., a Hispanic] 
may be either born in Mexico or of Mexican heritage [my emphasis].” 1  So, in other 
words, “Hispanic” may refer to at least three possibilities. First, a Hispanic is someone 
who is born in Mexico (or more generally, Latin America) and migrates to the U.S.  
Second, a Hispanic is someone who is born in the U.S. from Mexican, or Latin American, 
parents, and thus presumably has a Mexican (or Latin American) heritage.  Lastly, since 
                                                 
1 Roberto Ramirez and Patricia de la Cruz, The Hispanics Population in the United States: March 2002 , 
United States Census Bureau, June 2003, p. 1.  The meaning of the word heritage, or what it means to have 
a certain heritage, is not made clear in the report.  The report is alluding to the Standards for the 
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity.  See “Revisions to the Standards for the 
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity,” in Federal Register, vol. 62, no. 210, Thursday, 
October 30, 1997, Notices, p. 58789.      
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there are no constraints upon the idea of “Mexican heritage” one could perhaps include a 
third possibility: people who believe they have enough affinity with Mexican or Latin 
American “heritage” and are thus entitled to be classified as Hispanics. 
 The first criterion for classification posits that a Hispanic is someone who was 
born in a certain place.  But note that it is not just any place; it is rather a nation.  One 
clearly sees in this criterion that some Hispanics are first-generation immigrants who 
were born in Latin America, whereas other Hispanics are born and reared in the U.S.  So 
a first group of Hispanics consists of people born in Latin American nations, whereas the 
second one consists of American nationals. 
 For the first group, those born in Latin America, the criterion of birth would be 
enough to make them classify as Hispanics.  But for the second group, those born in the 
U.S., the criterion of birth is not enough for classifying as Hispanics, since many non-
Hispanics are born in the U.S. 
 Now let us look more closely at the group of those that classify as Hispanics 
under the birth criterion.  A Hispanic is someone who was born in Mexico, Honduras, 
Venezuela, etc.  But here we must bear in mind that all those national places are different 
from each other.  The result is that we are attempting to subsume a set of different 
national identities under an overarching category.  So the Hispanic category consists of 
Mexican-Venezuelan-Honduran-Chilean-Argentinean-Colombian-Bolivian-Ecuadorian-
Peruvian-Uruguayan-Paraguayan identities—and we haven’t finished mentioning all the 
possibilities. 
 We must here remember that Hispanics may be classified under a second 
criterion, namely, heritage—which includes those born in the U.S.  This, I think, makes 
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the situation more complicated.  Under this criterion, those born in Latin American 
countries and the U.S. are supposed to have a common heritage that makes them 
identifiable.  Here we must bear in mind that, as already mentioned, all the national 
places at stake are different from each other.  Thus, we are attempting to subsume under a 
single category a set of different national identities, or rather, “heritages.”          
 Let me now return to the original question about whether the Hispanic group is 
identifiable.  I said above that (based on the condition of relevant identification 
formulated in chapter four ) a group is identifiable when, given a process of interaction, 
group members can discriminate members from non-members by recognizing certain 
social markers in fellow-members.     
 The question that arises is this: could one say that the Hispanic group is 
identifiable according to a set of social markers that makes recognition among fellow-
members of the group possible?  Given the differences in identities among members of 
the Hispanic group, I doubt that the answer to the question is affirmative.  The answer to 
this question would be affirmative if either national identities were weaker than what they 
currently are, or Hispanic identity was stronger than what it is.  But given the current 
state of affairs, members of the Hispanic group would probably not recognize each other 
as fellow-members—meaning that the group is not identifiable in the sense that interests 
us.  I have not yet said everything I intend to say about the criteria for Hispanic 
classification, Hispanic common identity and the process of Hispanic identification.  I 
will return to these topics below.           
 I will now turn to the reason why the Hispanic group is not properly identifiable.  
Let me begin my argument by emphasizing the fact that, as we have seen, national 
  130 
memberships tend to be different from each other and also exclusive.  So a Mexican is 
not an Argentinean or a Chilean.  Similarly, a Colombian is not a Venezuelan or a 
Salvadorian. 
 Now, let us note that categorizing different and exclusive memberships is not the 
problem as such.  After all, we do this when we speak of Mexicans, Venezuelans and 
Bolivians as Latin Americans, or, say, Roman Catholics.  In these instances, we could 
even acknowledge that there are cases in which a Bolivian and a Paraguayan are united 
by their Catholic membership in a way that takes precedence over their national 
differences.  In such a situation, it could be the case that their religious membership 
competes with or is even more basic than their national memberships.      
 Nonetheless, the problem with the notion and phenomenon of Hispanicity begins 
when exclusive national memberships are categorized as a single group in which 
membership is supposed to have a certain degree of basicness.  We must remember that 
the importance of being a Hispanic presumably lies in that Hispanicity is very important 
to someone’s identity.  For if Hispanic membership is simply nominal (without a high 
degree of significance for someone’s identity), then it would be irrelevant (from the 
government’s perspective) whether someone classifies as a Hispanic or not.    
 Given the presumed value of membership in the Hispanic category and the way 
the category is defined, the following dilemma arises.  Either membership in the single 
Hispanic category is more robust than the national and exclusive memberships it entails, 
or the exclusive memberships are more robust than membership in the single category.  I 
argued in the previous chapter that the latter is the case, i.e., national memberships are 
robust with regard to Hispanic membership. 
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 Let me now pause for a moment and, before moving on, summarize some of the 
elements that have come up to this point.  In my discussion so far, we see that the 
following is the case: (a) Hispanics are classified by virtue of national memberships, (b) 
Hispanic membership is presumably basic, and (c) national memberships are more basic 
than Hispanic membership.   
 Now note that Hispanics are classified by virtue of memberships that are more 
basic than Hispanic membership itself.  The problem here lies in the attempt to subsume 
under a single categorial membership a set of nationa l memberships that is robust with 
regard to the categorial membership.  What this attempt shows is that the apparent 
basicness of Hispanic membership is an epiphenomenon of national membership.  
National membership is basic.  Hispanic membership might have the appearance of basic 
membership, but the apparent basicness of Hispanic membership really derives from 
national memberships.   
 For the sake of clarity, let me explain the argument in more detail and also more 
formally.  I will begin by thinking of a person P, whose Hispanic membership is 
presumably basic.  Let us remember that if P has a basic membership, she has a set of 
traits that are essential to her self-understanding and make her a member of a particular 
group.  In this case, the particular group would be the Hispanic group.   
 Suppose we tried to identify the traits that are essential to P’s self-understanding 
and that also make her a member in the Hispanic group.  P, for instance, has two traits 
that are essential to her self-understanding: she speaks Spanish and she was born in 
Ecuador.   
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 But now consider two points.  First, Hispanic membership is characterized by 
Latin American national traits.  A Hispanic, for instance, is someone who speaks 
Spanish, was born in Colombia (or from Colombian parents) or has a Mexican heritage.  
Thinking of P, the reason why she is considered to be a Hispanic is because she speaks 
Spanish and was born in Ecuador.  Formally speaking, we say that: 
Nationality=Hispanicity. 
 The second point moves us to a crucial step in the argument.  Let us recall that 
national membership is robust with regard to Hispanic membership.  What this means is 
that nationality has a higher degree of basicness than Hispanicity.  More precisely, there 
are more traits that are essential to P and make her a member in a national group than 
traits that are essential to P and make her a member in the Hispanic group.  The latter 
statement assumes, of course, that there are certain traits that could be essential to P’s 
self-understanding and make her a member in the Hispanic group.  I make this 
concession for the sake of argument, but we will see that such a concession is not entirely 
true.  According to this second point, let us say formally that: Nationality=Basic > 
Hispanicity=Basic  
 Given the two points I have just mentioned, consider that it would be 
counterintuitive to say that:  
 (i) Nationality=Hispanicity  
 (ii) Nationality=Basic > Hispanicity=Basic 
 (iii) Hispanicity=Basic 
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 Given that Hispanicity is defined by virtue of nationality, and nationality has a 
higher degree of basicness than Hispanicity, it does not follow that Hispanicity is basic.  
It rather follows that nationality is basic.   
 The argument is confirmed in practice.  Think of P again. The traits that are 
essential to P’s self-understanding are traits that probably make her a member in a 
national group, e.g., Ecuador.  Thus her Ecuadorian membership is basic.  We might 
think that the two traits that are essential to P’s self-understanding also make her a 
Hispanic (in a way that makes her Hispanic membership basic).  But the seemingly 
Hispanic traits (language and birthplace) are really traits of a particular national group, 
i.e., Ecuador.  We can then see that the Hispanic traits are epiphenomena of Ecuadorian 
traits.  When we attempt to identify the traits that are presumably essential to P and make 
her a member in the Hispanic group, we are really identifying national traits.  If I am 
right, it would then make sense to say that P’s Ecuadorian membership is basic.  But it 
would not make sense to say that P’s Hispanic membership is basic.        
 It is important to clarify what I am saying.  I am not saying that P could not be 
considered a Hispanic.  For purposes of census classification, to mention just one 
example, she would certainly be seen as a Hispanic.  She could also even view and think 
of herself this way.  But the fundamental question is whether her Hispanic membership is 
basic.  My point is that given the robustness of national membership, and the way 
Hispanicity is defined, Hispanic membership is non-basic.        
 The immediate question that comes to mind here is whether Hispanic membership 
could indeed become basic.  I will deal with this possible transformation in the next 
chapter.  Let me just mention here that Hispanic membership could indeed become a type 
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of basic membership.  But I think that two conditions would need to be the case.  First, 
Hispanicity would have to become an identity in itself and not simply a category or 
identity defined by virtue of other national memberships.  A second condition is closely 
related to the first one.  The nationalities that are currently included in the Hispanic 
category will need to lose their strength and cease to have the high degree of basicness 
that they currently have.    
 Let me briefly deal here with a possible objection that might be raised.  I said that 
P has two traits that are essential to her self-understanding and make her a member of the 
Ecuadorian nation.  But P has now migrated to the U.S., has become an American citizen 
and has renounced Ecuadorian citizenship.  In fact, she no longer considers herself 
Ecuadorian.  So, it would be more precise to say that the traits that are essential to P’s 
self-understanding formerly made her a member of the Ecuadorian nation.  Would it not 
follow that P’s Hispanic membership in the U.S. in then basic?    
 Two observations are in place.  First, bear in mind that basic membership entails 
(a) traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding and (b) make her a member in 
a particular group.  P renouncing a particular group does not automatically make her a 
member in another particular group.  Note that P has voluntarily renounced a group to 
presumably become a member, out of her own choice, in another group.  But we have 
now introduced the element of voluntary membership, which I explicitly contrasted with 
basic membership in chapter three.  P might renounce her Ecuadorian membership in 
order to voluntarily become an American.  She even perhaps now considers herself a 
Hispanic.  But this has been a matter of choice, and so her Hispanic membership (and 
American membership for that matter) is non-basic.      
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 Second, let me point out here that the Hispanic group is not a particular group 
because members of the group do not recognize each other as fellow-members.  The 
reader might have thought of this point already, but I have avoided making the claim 
explicit because it would make my argument circular.  I would be saying that Hispanic 
membership is non-basic because the Hispanic group is not particular and the reason why 
the Hispanic group is not particular (and hence properly identifiable) is because 
membership is non-basic.  My claim that the Hispanic group is not properly identifiable 
because Hispanic membership is non-basic is made on different grounds (i.e., Hispanicity 
is an epiphenomenon of nationality).  But the fact of the matter is that Hispanics cannot 
be considered a particular (and properly identifiable) group because the group does not 
have a common identity.  I will return to the topic of common identity in the next section.     
 At this point, we can then finally return to the question guiding our current 
discussion: what is the reason why Hispanics are not identified in the sense that interests 
us?  If my argument is correct, we can see the reason why the Hispanic group is not 
properly identifiable.  According to the condition of relevant identification, groups are 
identified according to properties that tend to make membership in a group basic.  But if 
we look for these properties among Hispanics, we will find that these kinds of properties 
are the ones that make Hispanics members of their respective nations.  Properties of basic 
membership are primarily national, and only epiphenomenally Hispanic.  Thus when we 
attempt to identify the properties of basic membership among Hispanics, we are really 
turning to national properties.  The end result is that nations satisfy the condition of 
relevant identification across the board.  Hispanicity, in contrast, borrows from national 
capital, but does not generally satisfy the condition of relevant identification.             
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2. DIFFERENTIATION AND COMMON IDENTITY  
 I will now turn to the condition of differentiation.  According to this condition, 
basic membership is necessarily connected with the difference-sensitive attributes of 
groups.  In chapter four, I argued that there is a necessary connection between group 
differences and the properties that are essential for the self-understandings of group 
members.  The way I put it was this: groups in which basic membership is possible tend 
to be those groups that can be distinguished by way of exclusion.  These groups have 
what I called the status of discernibility.  
 Much of what was said in the previous section can be applied here as well.  We 
could virtually paraphrase the previous argument and see why the Hispanic group does 
not satisfy the condition of differentiation.  I will not, however, proceed this way.   
 What I will do here is raise the question about whether the Hispanic group 
possesses the status of discernibility and suggest that the group does not have such a 
status.  The discussion in this section will draw from previous arguments and return to 
some earlier points.  But the present discussion will also add additional elements to my 
previous arguments.  Additionally, I will also engage two prominent theoreticians of 
Hispanic identity, namely, Jorge Gracia and Angelo Corlett.          
 Let us recall that groups have the status of discernibility when two circumstances 
are the case.  The first one is that group members have traits in common.  And, second, 
these common traits are such that they make the group distinguishable from other groups.  
Another way of formulating these circumstances is by saying that groups have a 
“common identity” that is unique to such a group.   
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 I now wish to focus on this notion of common identity.  The question is: do 
Hispanics have a common identity?  Gracia and Corlett have argued that this is certainly 
the case.  By examining their arguments, I will contend that the Hispanic group does not 
have a common identity in the sense that matters.     
 
a. Jorge Gracia and Hispanic Common Identity  
 Jorge Gracia adopts a historical- family view according to which the category of 
“Hispanic” reflects a “common identity” and thus the category is useful for the self-
understanding and empowerment of Hispanics.2  He claims, for instance, that “to adopt a 
name and define one’s identity is….an act of empowerment because it limits the power of 
others to name and identify us.”3  Elsewhere, he says that “the category ‘Hispanic’ is 
useful to describe and understand ourselves.  It also serves to describe much of what we 
produce and do, for this product and these actions are precisely the results of who we 
are….”4     
 To grasp the way Gracia believes we should use the category of “Hispanic,” a 
way that allows us to acknowledge the unity and yet diversity of the group, we must look 
at his conception of ethnic names.  In Gracia’s view, ethnic labels can be misleading 
because of their ambiguity and yet we should be able to retain those labels because they 
play a crucial role in the groups they name.  Accordingly, a satisfactory conception of 
                                                 
2 Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philosophical Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). And also “The Nature 
of Ethnicity with Special Reference to Hispanic/Latino Identity,” Public Affairs Quarterly, 13, 1 (January 
1999), pp. 25-42.  
3 Hispanic/Latino Identity, p. 46.  
4 Hispanic/Latino Identity, p. 66. 
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ethnicity must account for the unity and also diversity of ethnic groups.  The parameters 
of ethnic explanation should be: “first, the unity of ethnic groups and their difference 
from other groups; second, the diversity found within ethnic groups themselves.”5  
 Part of the confusion about ethnic groups and the reason why ethnic labels run the 
risk of becoming too broad and thus useless, is that we use the wrong criteria for ethnic 
identification.  Gracia examines five criteria for the identification of ethnic groups—
political, linguistic, cultural, racial and genetic—and contends that the criteria must be 
abandoned because they do not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for ethnic 
identification.  Gracia’s purpose then is to propose a criterion of ethnic identification that 
does not necessarily entail political units, language, culture, race or genetic relations; so 
that we can still identify ethnic groups but not have to link them to traits such as race, 
language, etc.       
 According to Gracia, we can successfully identify ethnic groups, acknowledging 
their unity and yet diversity, by implementing a historical criterion: “What ties the 
membership of an ethnic group together, and separates them from others, is history and 
the particular events of that history; a unique web of changing historical events supplies 
their unity.”6  
 The historical understanding of ethnic groups allows for a cluster of properties 
that makes ethnic groups unique without requiring that every single member of the group 
possesses the same exact properties.  A cluster of properties distinguishes ethnic groups 
by virtue of relationships that vary at times, but yet make the group distinguishable.  
                                                 
5 “The Nature of Ethnicity,” p. 33. 
6 “The Nature of Ethnicity,” p. 34. 
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 Gracia explains the point this way: a group of members ABCD is identifiable due 
to the relationship (aRb) between A and B; (bRc) between B and C; and (cRd) between C 
and D.  Now is A necessarily related to D or C?  Maybe or maybe not, but those specific 
relationships are not crucial.  What matters is that there is a cluster of historically 
relational properties within the set ABCD; and such a historically relational cluster of 
properties is enough for making the group identifiable.7   
 Gracia’s argument can now be illustrated with respect to the ethnic understanding 
of Hispanics.  We assume that Hispanics constitute an ethnic group, but then wonder 
about the criterion by which we can determine whether they are an identifiable ethnic 
group or not.  Can we distinguish Hispanics by virtue of their nationalities? The answer is 
obviously negative because some are Chilean, whereas others are Mexicans, 
Paraguayans, etc.  How about language?  The answer is once again negative because 
some Hispanics speak Spanish, but not all do.  The same goes for culture, race, and 
genetic relationships among Hispanics.  It would then seem highly unlikely to identify 
Hispanics as an ethnic group, unless we turn to Gracia’s historical criterion for ethnic 
identification.  Gracia points out that:  
….the concept of Hispanic should be understood historically, that is, as a 
concept that involves historical relations.  Hispanics are the group of 
people comprised by the inhabitants of the countries of the Iberian 
peninsula after 1492 and what were to become the colonies of those 
countries after the encounter between Iberia and America took place, and 
                                                 
7 “The Nature of Ethnicity,” pp. 33-36; and Hispanic/Latino Identity, pp. 47-55.  
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by descendants of these people who live in other countries (e.g. the United 
States) but preserve some link to those people.8 
 So Hispanics may have different races and come from various linguistic groups, 
cultural backgrounds and national communities.  But if someone is historically related to 
some segment of the group stemming from a specific region, i.e., the continent known as 
Latin America, after a particular date, i.e., 1492, he or she belongs to the ethnic group 
known by the term of “Hispanic.”  In short, Hispanics are an identifiable ethnic group 
because of a historical criterion. 
 I will now raise two objections to Gracia’s account on the ethnic identification of 
Hispanics.  My first objection is directly related to Gracia’s notion of historical relations 
as the criterion for ethnic identification.  The second objection goes against Gracia’s 
claim that Hispanics have a common identity and such an identity is a source for the self-
understanding and empowerment of Hispanics.   
 In Gracia’s account, Hispanics are an identifiable and distinguishable ethnic 
group because they possess a cluster of properties.  Were we to raise the question about 
the origins of the cluster of properties that distinguish Hispanics, Gracia’s account will 
point towards historical relations.  But let us now raise another question: where do the 
historical relations that form the basis for the cluster of properties of ethnic groups come 
from?  When raising the question about the origin of historical relations, I am assuming 
three elements: (a) history consists of narratives about certain events; (b) those narratives 
                                                 
8 Hispanic/Latino Identity, p. 48.  
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are shaped by those who tell the narratives; and (c) a way in which narratives are shaped 
by those who tell them is by means of categories.9   
 The bottom line with regard to the last element is that we cannot think of 
historical relations or narratives without using categories and those categories shape the 
content of the story.  A quick example will illustrate the point.  Fifty years ago the 1492 
event between Columbus and indigenous people in the now “Latin American continent” 
would have been classified under the category of “discovery.” Given a change in social 
sensibility and the need to use a different designation, the same event now goes under the 
category of “encounter.”10        
 So my specific question now is this: what is the origin of the categories used in 
telling the historical narrative that describes and characterizes Hispanics?  In other words, 
who defines the categories that shape the narrative of Hispanic identity?  The question I 
have posed requires a complex and multifaceted answer that would need to take into 
account shifting social sensibilities.  I would like to focus, however, on an important 
generator for the categories used in the historical narrative of Hispanic identity: the state.  
                                                 
9 The elements I mention do not mean, however, that historical descriptions are “subjective” or that that 
descriptions do not have truth-conditions.  For a discussion on these matters, see Behan McCullagh, The 
Truth of History (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 13-61.  For interesting discussions on the role of 
historical narratives in group identity, see Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a 
Multicultural Society, rev. ed. (New York: Norton, 1998), pp. 51-77.  See also Robert Fullinwider, 
“Patriotic History,” in Public Education in a Multicultural Society: Policy, Theory, Critique, ed. R. 
Fullinwider (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).   
10 The attribution of racial categories, for example, also provides a good example of different social 
sensibilities.  On this point, see a helpful discussion by Lawrence Blum, I’m Not a Racist, But…: The 
Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 98-108.   
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We could naturally turn to Latin American states, except that the phenomenon of 
Hispanic identity is primarily an American phenomenon and thus we must turn to the 
American state.   
 The Proclamation of George W. Bush inaugurating the 2001 National Hispanic 
Heritage Month gives us an interesting example of what I have in mind.  Quoting 
different examples and pointing out how Hispanics “have played an integral role in our 
country’s exceptional story of success,”11 the Proclamation classifies Hispanics under the 
category of “contributors to the American experience.”  We can now think of a 
contrasting example.  People of Mexican origin would have hardly been classified under 
the just mentioned category by the American state, approximately a hundred years ago, in 
the context of the Mexican-American war.         
 We could use illustrations of several shifting categories, but I want to now address 
the category of “Hispanic” itself.  According to the American government, a “Hispanic” 
is a “person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other 
Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.”12  Let us note several elements in this 
definition.  First, a Hispanic is a person with a particular origin.  Not any kind of origin 
would do, since the person under description originates from one of the national 
frameworks delimited in the category.   
                                                 
11 George W. Bush.  “Proclamation 7471 of September 28, 2001,” in Federal Register, vol. 66, no. 191, 
Tuesday, October 2, 2001, Presidential Documents, p. 50097.   
12 “Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting;” otherwise known as 
“Statistical Directive No. 15, ” Office of Management and Budget, May 12, 1977.  As mentioned in 
previous footnotes, the definition remains the same, but the category is now “Hispanic” or “Latino,” and 
“Spanish Origin” could also be used.  See “Revisions to the Standards,” p. 58789.   
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 There is now a very important second element strongly implied in the category: a 
Hispanic is a person of a national origin who is presumably now a member of the 
American nation.13  Without this qualification, the category would not make sense—since 
the category is not trying to capture Mexicans who are now living in Mexico, but rather 
Mexicans who now live in the U.S.—and presumably pledge allegiance to the U.S as 
well.  There is a diachronic change in membership: a person was, in the past tense, a 
member of the Mexican nation, and is now, present tense, a member of the American 
nation.   
 Now let us compare the Mexican who is a member of the Mexican nation and the 
person of Mexican origin who is currently a member of the American nation, and raise 
the following question: what do they have in common?  Or let us pose the question this 
way: is there enough affinity between the two people (the Mexican in Mexico and the 
American of Mexican origin) to subsume them under the same category?  According to 
Gracia, the two people in our comparison are connected with one another by means of 
historical relationships and thus they both can be justifiably subsumed under the category 
of “Hispanic.” 
 Several interesting points arise in our example and in Gracia’s reply, but let me 
focus on the starting point of the category “Hispanic.”  The category as it is being used in 
the current context, and indeed as it is used by Gracia, originates with the American 
government.  Were it not for Statistical Directive No. 15 released in 1977 by the Office of 
                                                 
13 I say presumably because this condition is not always true.  Not all the people that classify as 
“Hispanics” are always, in fact, members of the American nation.  We will see this point in more detail in 
chapter eight   
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Management and Budget, the term “Hispanic” would probably not have the same 
relevance it has now in our vocabulary and understanding of American society.  The 
category originally arises due to an effort of the American state to identify a segment of 
the American population who happen to have a particular background.  The attempt to 
identify people by means of the category “Hispanic,” has had as a result an increasing 
awareness in American society about the existence of “Hispanics.”  I will return to the 
significance of identification in the next chapter.    
 The upshot of the present discussion is that the identification of Hispanics as an 
ethnic group cannot only be understood in terms of historical relations.  The identification 
of Hispanics has to be understood within the context of the needs and policies of the 
American state.  If the latter claim is true, there is a political dimension in the 
understanding of Hispanics as an ethnic group.  The result, in fact, is that Gracia can 
speak of historical relations as the criterion for ethnic identification only because there is 
a previous political criterion that makes identification possible.  So the very criterion for 
ethnic identification that Gracia has rejected, the political unit, is the one that makes it 
possible for us to speak of Hispanics as an identifiable ethnic group.   
 In conclusion, the understanding of Hispanics as an ethnic group is not only 
historical; the understanding is also to a very large extent political.  My observation does 
not necessarily undermine the thrust of Gracia’s view, but I think that the observation 
does force him to rethink his justification for the criteria of ethnic identification.   
 Let me now move on to a second objection, which I believe is more crucial. In 
Gracia’s view, Hispanics have a common identity and this form of identity is a source for 
the self-understanding and empowerment of Hispanics.  The claim has two components: 
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(a) Hispanics have a common identity and (b) this identity is a source of self-
understanding and empowerment.   
 In looking at (a), we must ask ourselves: what do we mean when we say that 
Hispanics have a “common identity”?  There is a sense in which we might identify 
Hispanics as people who have a Latin American origin, which is, as we have seen, the 
way the category is defined by the American state.  But if “origin” is the principle of 
identification, why not do the same with other groups like the Irish, Germans, French 
Finnish, or for that matter the English who traveled to American soil from Boston, 
England?  We could propose, for example, that “the set of people in the now American 
nation who can trace their origins to the group of Boston travelers form a distinct and 
identifiable group.”  The latter is certainly possible: one could gather the group of people 
who trace their genealogical background to one of the members of the Boston group.  The 
group would indeed be identifiable in accordance with a principle of “origin.”                              
 Compare then two groups that are identified on the basis of the principle of 
“origin:” “Hispanics” and “descendants of the Boston group.”  We must wonder whether 
we are talking about identification with respect to each group in the same sense. Or more 
precisely: are the implications for identifying Hispanics the same as the implications for 
identifying descendants of the Boston group?   
 The answer to these questions is negative due to the following presupposition: 
there is a degree of significance in the identification of Hispanics that is absent in the 
identification of the Boston group descendants.  In other words, there is presumably 
something extremely relevant about being a Hispanic, so relevant that it demands public 
recognition from the American state.  Such a relevance and need for public recognition 
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does not apply to other types of groups that could conceivably be identified in some 
sense—as, for example, the descendants of the Boston group.    
   My comparison raises the following point: what do we mean by “common 
identity”?  The question is not so much whether Hispanics have a common identity.  
Clearly, in some sense they do, just as many other groups do.  The question is rather 
whether Hispanics have a common identity in the sense that matters.  I believe the 
questions that need to be asked are these:  is the common identity of Hispanics such that 
it reflects how meaningful it is to be a Hispanic?  Are the elements that unite Hispanics 
robust enough to give them meaning and direction?  Are the properties that seem to make 
Hispanics identifiable in some sense such that they endow Hispanics with basic 
membership?        
    I believe that the answer to these questions tends to be negative due to the 
property of nationality among Hispanics.  As I suggested earlier the notion that Hispanics 
have a relevantly distinctive cluster of properties is falsified because of the one property 
that pulls them apart, namely, nationality.  Identifying Hispanics, in the relevant sense, is 
not generally possible because of two reasons.  First, there is the fragmentation caused by 
national identities.  And second, there is the fact that properties of basic membership are 
primarily national, and only epiphenomenally Hispanic.  Thus it is difficult to identify 
Hispanics in the relevant sense as a distinct group of people that are unified by and have a 
common identity due to a cluster of properties.   
 If I am right so far, we can see not only why the thesis on the common identity of 
Hispanics in the pertinent context is put into question, but also why the second half of 
Gracia’s claim, i.e., (b) Hispanic identity is a source of self-understanding and 
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empowerment, is doubtful.  For given the robustness of national identities, people 
subsumed under the category of “Hispanic” tend to find the primary source of self-
understanding and empowerment in their nationalities, and not their Hispanicity.  The 
bottom line, once more, is that the significance and robustness of nationality tends to 
overshadow the thinness of Hispanicity.           
 I have then raised two objections against Gracia’s view on the ethnic 
identification of Hispanics.  First, I pointed out that Gracia’s notion of historical relations 
as the criterion for ethnic identification cannot be understood independently from the 
political criterion.  As a matter of fact, the category “Hispanic” stems from and is defined 
by the administrative apparatus of the American state.  The second point was related with 
Gracia’s claim that Hispanics have a common identity and such an identity is a source for 
the self-understanding and empowerment of Hispanics.  I have pointed out that the 
question we are asking is whether the common identity of Hispanics is robust enough to 
represent a primary source of meaning and direction.  My answer to this question tends to 
be negative because the primary sources of meaning and direction among Hispanics are 
generally associated with the robustness of their nationalities.   
 
b. Angelo Corlett and the  Genealogical Criterion 
 Angelo Corlett presents us with another attempt to depict Hispanics as a group 
with a “common identity.” 14  The general concern for Corlett has to do with ethnic 
classification for the purposes of civil rights policies.   
                                                 
14 Race, Racism and Reparations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
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 Given Corlett’s concern, it helps to distinguish between two different issues at 
stake.  First, Corlett claims that ethnic classification serves the interests of justice.  
Certain groups of people in the United States have been discriminated against based on 
the racial or ethnic group to which they belong.  Identifying groups that have suffered 
discrimination is then extremely important.  Such is, incidentally, part of the rationale 
behind the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity.  The 
government attempts to identify and gather data on populations that have historically 
“experienced discrimination and differential treatment because of their race or 
ethnicity.”15  The requirements of justice entail distinguishing and classifying those 
individuals for the purposes of retribution.  According to Corlett, we distinguish those 
individuals by means of a necessary and sufficient condition for ethnic classification: 
genealogical ties.16  I will not have much to say, in this context, about the issue of ethnic 
classification for the purposes of justice and retribution. 17   
 My interest is in the second issue underlying Corlett’s account: the presumed 
claim that ethnic identity, and particularly Hispanic identity, is essential for defining 
personhood.  If one wants to argue, for example, that Hispanics have certain civil rights, 
and a violation of those civil rights is a wrongdoing, one ought to be able to identify and 
classify Hispanics.  The latter observation is true because considerations of justice “are 
                                                 
15 “Revisions to the Standards,” p. 58782.   
16 Race, Racism and Reparations, p. 129. 
17 For an interesting discussion on the issue of Hispanics and affirmative action, see Jorge Gracia 
“Affirmative Action for Hispanics? Yes and No,” in Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, 
Race and Rights, eds. J. Gracia and P. De Greiff (New York: Routledge, 2000).  
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based on assumptions that certain names have referents,”18 and so the name “Hispanic” 
refers to members of the Hispanic group who are genealogically related to one another.  
When we identify Hispanics we assume that they have properties in common or a 
“common identity,” for “if there are no properties that are shared in common by all 
Latinos and if we cannot know what they are, then this poses a fundamental difficulty for 
the understanding of who we are….”19              
 Now, why is the presumed fact that Hispanics have a common identity for the 
sake of justice so important?  Here I return to my previous example about the members of 
the group that can trace their ancestors to a traveler of the Boston group.  Let us compare 
“Hispanics” with a group whose common identity consists in being the genealogical 
“descendants of the Boston group,” and ask ourselves whether the common identity of 
Hispanics is equally important in comparison with the common identity of the Boston 
group descendants.  The answer is negative because there is a degree of significance in 
the common identity of Hispanics that is absent in the common identity of the Boston 
group descendants.  The implication is that there is something extremely relevant about 
being a Hispanic.    
 Another illustration will help us to see the point.  Suppose I am applying for a job 
in a field in which I have no previous professional experience.  I am applying for a job as 
a publisher, but have no previous experience as one.  Given my circumstance, I could be 
said to be a member of the group known as the “publishing novices,” and have some 
properties in common with other members of the group.  I am turned down for the job 
                                                 
18 Race, Racism and Reparations, p. 41. 
19 Race, Racism and Reparations, p. 41.  
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and have grounds to believe that the reason for my rejection lies in the fact that I am a 
member of the “publishing novices,” and the hiring committee strongly preferred a 
member of the “publishing experts.”   
 Now suppose instead that I have grounds to believe that the reason why I was 
turned down for the job is because I am a Hispanic, African-American or Native-
American.  Whereas the rejection for being a member of the “publishing novices” would 
not count as legal discrimination, the rejection for being a “Hispanic” certainly would be 
discriminatory.          
 The illustration allows us to see that the issue at stake is not simply the common 
properties of groups. Many groups have common properties, but this is irrelevant for 
public justice.  There is something particularly vicious about discriminating against 
Hispanics because there is something particularly relevant about being a Hispanic.  The 
issue is that the “common properties” of Hispanics are such that they say something 
extremely important about who Hispanics are.  In short, Hispanic identity is essential for 
defining personhood.            
 Corlett fleshes out the assumption this way: “the problems of Latino and ethnic 
identities fall under the more general problems of personal and/or group identity.  That is, 
whatever turns out to make me a Latino, for instance, is part of what turns out to make 
me who and what I am more generally, for example, as a person.”20  So Latino identity is 
essential for defining personhood.  Elsewhere, quoting Walzer, he sustains that “ethnic 
identity is important because it enables us to relate to and connect with others who are 
                                                 
20 Race, Racism and Reparations, p. 46.  
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like ourselves in both experience and circumstance.”21  The implication in the latter 
statement is that since Latino identity is essential for defining personhood, the properties 
that Latinos have in common are extremely relevant.   
   In Corlett’s view then: (i) Hispanic identity is essential for defining personhood, 
and thus (ii) the common identity of Hispanics is relevant.  But I believe this view to be 
flawed.  The first claim says that Hispanic identity is extremely relevant because it 
expresses who I am.  In this context, Hispanic membership presumably classifies as what 
I have characterized as basic membership.  But the question here is whether Hispanic 
membership is indeed basic.  My answer to this question tends to be negative, for the 
national identities of Hispanics are far more significant than their Hispanic membership.  
In fact, as I argued earlier, the apparent basicness of Hispanic membership is an 
epiphenomenon of national membership.    
 If Hispanic identity is not essential for defining personhood, then claim (ii), on the 
relevance of Hispanic common identity, hardly follows.  The implication of Hispanic 
membership not being basic is that it is then not possible to speak of the common identity 
of Hispanics in the relevant sense.  The notion that Hispanics have a relevantly distinctive 
cluster of properties that creates a common identity in the relevant sense is false.   
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I have argued that the Hispanic group does not satisfy two of the 
conditions of groups that endow members with basic memberships.  The conditions I 
focused on were “relevant identification” and “differentiation.” 
                                                 
21 Race, Racism and Reparations, p. 128.  
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 The Hispanic group does not satisfy the condition of relevant identification 
because the properties by which the group is identified are not those that make 
membership in the group basic.  Members of the Hispanic group may be identified 
according to certain properties, but those are not properties that constitute basic 
membership.   
 I argued that the latter circumstance is the case because the properties of basic 
membership among Hispanics are really national properties.  Hence, I made the point that 
the apparent basicness of Hispanic membership is an epiphenomenon of national 
membership. 
 In turning to the second cond ition, differentiation, I raised the question of whether 
Hispanics have the status of discernibility.  Groups that satisfy the condition of 
differentiation are those that have the status of discernibility, i.e., a common identity by 
which the group can be distinguished from other groups. 
 Much of the discussion here focused on the views of Hispanic common identity 
advanced by Jorge Gracia and Angelo Corlett.  I argued that Hispanics do not have the 
status of discernibility because they cannot be said to have a common identity that 
distinguishes them from other groups.  Thus the conclusion is that the condition of 
differentiation is not satisfied by the Hispanic group. 
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CHAPTER 7 
HISPANIC IDENTITY-MAKING 
 
 In the previous chapter I argued that the Hispanic group does not satisfy two of 
the conditions, relevant identification and differentiation, of groups in which membership 
tends to be a primary source of meaning and direction.  There is yet a third condition, 
intrinsic identification, according to which groups are identified from the inside.  I have 
saved the discussion on the condition of intrinsic identification until now because this 
condition might be the key for understanding the potential future of the Hispanic group.   
 It is reasonable to say tha t Hispanics do not currently satisfy the condition of 
intrinsic identification.  Given that the group cannot be identified in the relevant sense 
and does not have the type of difference-sensitive attributes that matter, one can expect 
that the question of intrinsic identification is an irrelevant one.  The reason for the latter 
claim is that the condition of intrinsic identification builds on the other two conditions.  If 
the two first conditions are not satisfied, then a fortiori the third one will not be satisfied 
either.  If a group cannot be identified according to properties that make membership in 
such a group basic, and the group does not have the type of difference-sensitive attributes 
necessarily connected with basic membership, it is worthless to raise the question of 
whether the group can be identified from the inside.  Accordingly, Hispanics cannot be 
said to satisfy the condition of intrinsic identification.   
 Nonetheless, discussing this condition is very important because, as I mentioned, 
such a discussion could provide one of the keys for understanding what the direction of 
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Hispanic identity might be.  The discussion might help us see how Hispanicity could 
become a “tipping phenomenon.”    
 In the context of this discussion, I wish to advance the following hypothesis: a 
process of identification and identity-making could turn the Hispanic group into the type 
of group that satisfies the three conditions of relevant groups.  Thus, the Hispanic group 
could, in effect, become the type of group that endows members with basic membership.   
 Put differently, my conjecture is that the attempt to identify Hispanics from the 
outside prescribes a set of beliefs, principles and customs that may be internalized by the 
Hispanic group.  In this process of internalization, the group could acquire the kinds of 
properties that endow members with basic membership.  Succinctly, Hispanic 
identification could foster and strengthen Hispanic identity.     
 In formulating my hypothesis, I will make two points.  First, there is a parallel 
between national identity-formation and Hispanic identity-formation.  Second, the 
American state is one of the most significant agents in the process of Hispanic identity-
formation.  Throughout the discussion of these two points, we will see that the notion of 
“heritage” in historical cases of national identity-formation is a crucial one.  I will end 
this chapter with a discussion addressing Samuel Huntington’s views on Hispanics in 
American society.    
 
1. NATIONAL AND HISPANIC IDENTIFICATION 
A certain group of people are ostensibly identified as “Hispanics.”  But how is 
Hispanicity identified?  My suggestion is that there are some very important parallels 
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between the process by which national identities have been shaped and the way in which 
Hispanic identity is also being shaped.   
Incidentally, part of the reason why the phenomenon of Hispanic identity is so 
interesting is because it represents a laboratory for exploring nationalism.  John 
Hutchinson remarks that “the European Union offers scholars of nationalism a 
fascinating experiment in progress.” 1  The same is true about Hispanic identity.  
Like national identity, Hispanic identity is the result of a process that has at least 
two core elements: first, a political unit (e.g., a state); and second, basic forms of 
collective identity, e.g., language, myths, rituals, religion, social practices, etc.2      
The state represents a top-down direction in the emergence of Hispanic identity. 3  
As we have seen in earlier discussions, there is a significant public policy dimension in 
the identification of Hispanics.  The notion of “Hispanic” makes an appearance in the 
context of policies designed and enacted by the American state.  We see an example of 
these policies in documents such as the Office of Management and Budget Statistical 
Directive No. 15 released in 1977.  The category originally arises due to an effort of the 
American state to identify a segment of the American population that happens to have a 
particular background or origin.    
                                                 
1 “Nations and Culture,” in Understanding Nationalism, eds. M. Guibernau & J. Hutchinson (Malden: 
Polity Press, 2001), p. 93. 
2 This is what Eric Hobsbawm calls a “proto-nation.” Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, 
Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1990]), p. 46. 
3 The state is not the only crucial component of the top-down dimension.  One could also include media, 
lobbying organizations, intellectuals, religious organizations and the school system.   
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 But census categories, by themselves, would not be sufficient for the emergence 
of Hispanic identity.  Thus we must turn to the other direction of the process, i.e., bottom-
up.  Certain linguistic and cultural traits represent the basis on which Hispanic identity is 
built.  These are the “building blocks” of identity.  Without such prior collective forms of 
membership, it would be impossible to have Hispanic identity as such.  Thus, there are 
presumably certain features, e.g., language, customs, shared histories and event—and 
particularly for Hispanics, national origin—that serve as the building blocks for Hispanic 
identity.   
 A careful look at this process of identity-formation will reveal that from the top-
down direction, there is apparently a somewhat clear and distinguishable Hispanic 
identity.  But the situation from the bottom-up direction is different.  As I have insisted, 
Hispanics are not identifiable in the relevant sense because their identities are anchored in 
the robustness of nationality.  If we look at the bottom-up direction of identity formation, 
we will realize that Hispanicity attempts to capture a set of different national identities.  I 
have suggested that those national identities, and not Hispanicity, are the source of 
meaning and direction among members of the group known as “Hispanic.” 
 The important point in the dynamic of top-down identification, however, is that a 
process of identification is underway.  The fact seems to be that such a process of 
identification has not completely penetrated the bottom-up, and thus Hispanics are not 
relevantly identifiable, but top-down identification might very well lay its roots at the 
bottom.  This situation would represent a typical case of peasants turned into Frenchmen.   
 To restate the point in a slightly different manner, Hispanicity is currently 
identified from the outside by the American state and political agencies.  Nonetheless, 
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could this form of identification be assimilated and internalized by a group of people and 
thus become relevant and meaningful to them?  Such could certainly be the case.  If this 
were the case, Hispanicity could then come closer to representing a primary source of 
meaning and direction, and being the sort of group in which membership is basic.   
 
a. Unity, Destiny and Sacred Community  
 To imagine how the top and the bottom, or the outside and the inside, might 
merge, let us look at two typically nationalist statements that have had historical 
consequences.4  The first was written by Jules Michelet in the wake of the 1789 French 
Revolution; the second was written by Giuseppe Mazzini in 1861.  The two statements 
emphasize a typically nationalist motif, i.e., unity. 
 The first statement goes like this: 
Like children gone stray, and lost till then, they have at length found a 
mother; they had been so humble as to imagine themselves Bretons, 
Provencaux.  No, children know well that you are the sons of France; she 
herself tells you so; the sons of that great mother, of her who is destined, 
in equality, to bring forth nations.5  
 The second statement is this: 
                                                 
4 The meaning of nationality and nationalism is not always clear.  Although a problematic one, we could 
make a distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” forms of nationalism.  In this context, when I speak of 
nations and nationalism, it is mostly the ethnic variant that I have in mind. 
5 “On the Unity of the Fatherland,” in Nationalism: its Meaning and History, ed. Hans Kohn (New York: 
Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1965), p. 98.  
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[Mazzini speaking of the person who is called to write the national history 
of Italy] ….the writer will then proceed to trace the origin of our 
nationality from those Sabellian tribes, dwelling, as I have said, round the 
ancient Amiternus; who, along with the Osque, Siculians, and Umbrians, 
first assumed the sacred name of Italy, and initiated the fusion of the 
different elements spread over the Peninsula, by planting their lance—the 
symbol of authority—in the valley of the Tibur, in the Campagna, and 
beyond.6 
 The first element to be highlighted in these two passages is that several groups are 
merged into one large overarching entity.  So people who are formerly known as 
“Bretons” and “Provencaux” are now the children of France.  Similarly, people from the 
former “Sabellian” tribes along with the “Osque,” “Siculians,” and “Umbrians” are fused 
into a single group comprising the people of Italy.   
 Note also that there is a strong rationale for such a merger of groups.  For 
Michelet, groups are like “children gone astray.”   These children have finally “found a 
mother” with the advent of France.  The quasi-religious motive—one might think of a 
sentence in a famous hymn, “I once was lost, but now am found”7—has to do with 
destiny.  The lost children find themselves in that “great mother” who has a certain 
destiny: “in equality, to bring forth nations.”  One is left wondering about what is meant 
by “bring forth nations,” but for our present purposes what needs to be highlighted is the 
fact that France is supposed to fulfill some sort of destiny.  A quick glance at the way in 
                                                 
6 “On the Unity of Italy,” in Nationalism: its Meaning and History, p. 119.  
7 These are words from the famous 1779 hymn by Isaac Watts , “Amazing Grace.”  
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which the French have conducted themselves in world affairs since the XVIII century, 
would certainly seem to confirm the directive of “destiny” —one may, for instance, think 
of the so called First (1804-1814) and Second (1852-1879) French Empires.8   
 Similarly, Mazzini believes that writing the national history of Italy entails tracing 
the moment in which diverse groups “first assumed the sacred name of Italy” (my 
italics). Mazzini is not only concerned with the possibility of different groups coming 
together and forming a species of alliance or consortium.  It is rather that those groups 
altogether assume a “sacred” name.  The sacredness of the name presumably stems from 
the fact that the community represented by the name is also sacred.  In the sacred 
character of the community, we find the rationale for the merger.  Formerly different 
groups are fused together because they are supposed to be a sacred community —namely 
the community has the quality of being something like a “chosen people.”  
 Admittedly, the path towards national unity in Italy has been slower when 
compared with the French—we do not, for instance, find a unified “Italy” until the XX 
century.  Nevertheless, the statements of two of their respective nationalist ideologues, 
Michelet and Mazzini, have yie lded the intended result in each group, since the two 
groups are currently stable nations.     
 What I have considered so far is a typical cluster of themes characteristic of 
nationalism.9  First, we have the normative principle of unity: national groups ought to 
                                                 
8 This view seems to be echoed by Ernest Renan in his 1882 lecture in the Sorbonne, “What is a Nation?:” 
“It is to France’s glory to have proclaimed, through the French Revolution, that a nation exists of itself.  
We should not take it ill that others imitate us.  The principle of nations is ours.” Qu’est-ce Qu’une 
Nation?/What is a Nation?  (Toronto: Tapir Press, 1996), p. 23.  
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have a common unity.  Such a common unity often stems from the fusion of several 
formerly different groups—which has been, historically, the case in the emergence of 
many nations.   
 But the fusion of groups as such is not necessarily a nationalist theme.  Many 
groups might, after all, mingle with each other by means of, say, intermarriage, conquest 
and coercion.  Similarly, one may think of unity in terms of a common alliance.   But 
mingling or creating alliances are not necessarily the result of nationalist themes.  Renan 
puts it this way: “Common interests bring about trade agreements.  But nationality is also 
partly a matter of conscious feeling; it is simultaneously body and soul; a customs union 
is not a homeland [une patrie].”10  
 In the nationalist framework, the fusion, alliance and unification of groups is 
intended to produce strong bonds of solidarity.  Now, if a nation is more than a trade 
union or a common alliance, these feelings of solidarity must be justified in a certain 
way.  Justification might be either retrospective or prospective.  It is retrospective when 
the fusion of groups in the past is explained.  Such an explanation often requires an 
exercise of selective memory or what Renan calls “forgetfulness” (l’oubli):  
Forgetting, I would even say historical error, is essential to the creation of 
a nation, which is why the advance of historical study often poses a threat 
to nationality.  Historical inquiry, in effect, brings to light the violent 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 There is a wealth of literature exploring these nationalist themes. See Anthony Smith, Chosen Peoples: 
Sacred Sources of National Identity  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).    
10 What is a Nation?, p. 43.  
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events that are at the source of all political formations, even those whose 
consequences have been beneficial.11 
  In contrast, we have a prospective justification when there is a call for a 
consolidation of national unity—such as the one we sees in current African “nations” and 
in Hispanic nationalism.      
 I have mentioned that nationalists, whether speaking retrospectively or 
prospectively, in general believe that varying groups ought to be fused together for 
different possible reasons.  Among those reasons, we could typically find the two we 
noted in Michelet and Mazzini.  First, groups need to be together because they all have a 
common destiny; and second groups ought to come together because they are a sacred or 
chosen community.   
 In many historical cases, these themes—unity, destiny and sacredness—have had 
a quasi- religious character, which seems to have made nationalist feelings all the more 
potent.  In highlighting the religious provenance of these themes in history, Smith points 
out that the nation,  
is invested with sacred qualities that it draws from older beliefs, 
sentiments, and ideals about the nature of community, territory, history, 
and destiny.  The result is a national community of faith and belonging, a 
sacred communion, every bit as potent and demanding as that sought by 
the ancient Jewish prophets and psalmists.12   
                                                 
11 What is a Nation?, p. 19. 
12 Chosen Peoples, p. 23. 
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The latter comment does not imply that all forms of nationalism actually have (or 
need to have) explicit religious overtones, such as the ones we find in Zionism or the 
Afrikaner movement.  The comment rather implies that certain religious categories can 
often help us “explain the scope, depth, and intensity of the feelings and loyalties that 
nations and nationalism so often evoke.”13  One could perhaps think of national groups 
not as mere allegiances designed to satisfy common interests, but rather as peoples united 
by strong bonds and feelings of solidarity.  To many people, the nation has been 
something like a “communion” —a religious notion in itself.                                  
 
2. THE AMERICAN STATE AND HISPANIC IDENTITY-MAKING 
 An examination of the way in which the identification of Hispanics displays the 
nationalist themes I have mentioned merits a complete study and is certainly well beyond 
the scope of the current project.  What I wish to do now is simply to draw attention to 
some trends that illustrate how the identification of Hispanics is interwoven with some of 
the nationalist themes that have been discussed.   
                                                 
13 Chosen Peoples, p. 15.  Why is nationalism such a potent force in mobilizing people?  This is the 
question Smith attempts to examine.  His analysis focuses on the “sacred foundations” of the nation and the 
“relationship to the older beliefs, symbols, and rituals of traditional religions.” p. 4.  Nationalism is often 
cast in religious language.  Renan, for instance, rejects religion as the basis of national unity and 
nevertheless speaks of  “this sacred thing we call a people.” He speaks of nations in the following terms: “a 
spiritual principle, originating in the profound complexities of history; it is a spiritual family, not a group 
determined by the configuration of the soil.” What is a Nation?, pp. 44-45.    
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 The Presidential Proclamations inaugurating the Hispanic Heritage Month 
(September 15-October 15)14 every year—which are good examples of top-down group 
identification—provide telling illustrations about the unity of Hispanics.  Some of the 
themes that tend to constantly appear in the Proclamations are: diversity in American 
society, the achievements of Hispanics, and the contribution made by Hispanics and other 
groups to the American way of life.15  Along with these themes, one of the most salient 
features of the Proclamations is that Hispanics are identified as a community or people.  
 The standard view of the Proclamations seems to go along the following lines. 
There is a nation that is composed of diverse cultures or peoples (all of whom make a 
contribution to the American way of life).  Alongside the set of peoples that make up 
American society, we find one group, namely, Hispanics.16  Thus one can speak of the 
Hispanic people, and the Hispanic culture and heritage.   
 The 2000 Proclamation, for instance, states that “the vibrant Hispanic influence 
can be seen in all aspects of American life and culture, from distinctive cuisine to colorful 
festivals….” (my italics).17  The 2001 Proclamation speaks of how all Americans 
                                                 
14 An observance that began as a week in 1968 under the Lyndon Johnson administration and was then 
expanded to a month in 1988.   
15 These themes are not only present in the Proclamations inaugurating the Hispanic Heritage Month, but 
also in the Proclamations that inaugurate observances such as the National African American History 
Month, the Irish American Heritage Month and the Asian/Pacific American Heritage Month.    
16 It is interesting to note that although previous Proclamations speak of “Hispanics” and “Hispanic-
Americans,” the Proclamations issued under the Bush administration speak only of “Hispanic-Americans.”  
17 William J. Clinton.  “Proclamation 7338 of September 14, 2000,” in Federal Register, vol. 65, no. 182, 
Tuesday, September 19, 2000, Presidential Documents, p. 56457. 
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“celebrate the vibrant Hispanic American spirit that influences our Nation’s art, music, 
food, and faiths” (my italics).18  The 2002 Proclamation states that “the Hispanic 
American community has a long and important history of commitment to our Nation’s 
core values, and the contributions of this community have helped make our country great” 
(my italics).19  And the 2003 Proclamation contains the following statement: “During 
Hispanic American Month, I join with all Americans in recognizing the many 
contributions of Hispanic Americans to the United States, and in celebrating Hispanic 
heritage and culture” (my italics).20         
 The view of Hispanics as a people or community with a common heritage is also 
heard from agencies and organizations that advocate the recognition of a Hispanic 
identity.  An instance of those views may be clearly found in a recent report released by 
one of the oldest agencies aiming to represent Hispanics in the United States, the 
National Council of La Raza 21 —which describes itself as “the largest national 
constituency-based Hispanic organization and the leading voice in Washington D.C. for 
the Hispanic community.”22  In the foreword of the report —adapted from a speech 
                                                 
18 George W. Bush.  “Proclamation 7471 of September 28, 2001,” in Federal Register, vol. 66, no. 191, 
Tuesday, October 2, 2001, Presidential Documents, p. 50097. 
19 George W. Bush.  “Proclamation 7591 of September 13, 2002,” in Federal Register, vol. 67, no. 182, 
Thursday, September 19, 2002, Presidential Documents, p. 58955. 
20 George W. Bush.  “Proclamation 7706 of September 17, 2003,” in Federal Register, vol. 68, no. 184, 
Tuesday, September 23, 2003, Presidential Documents, p. 55253. 
21 State of Hispanic America: Latino Perspectives on the American Agenda, National Council of La Raza, 
February, 2004.  
22 State of Hispanic America, presentation. 
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delivered by Raul Yzaguirre, president of NCLR, to the Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
Institute, September 24, 2003—the current state of affairs is described in the following 
terms: “we are closer than ever to a national Latino community with a shared past, a 
common agenda and a united future” (my italics).23   
 Interestingly, as the growth of Hispanic political power is celebrated, the question 
is posed: “power to do what?”  The answer is that “we seek power to help this nation 
[presumably the American nation] fulfill its destiny, to live up to its ideals, and to go 
beyond the sometimes too narrow definition of what it means to be an American.”24  It is 
interesting to note the relationship between the attainment of power for a community and 
the task of fulfilling a national destiny.  Similarly, it is interesting to note the way in 
which “heritage” is described: “we believe in the sanctity of the heritage of language and 
culture and we treasure these gifts” (my italics).25  These themes have a clear nationalist 
tone.   
 It is indeed acknowledged that Hispanics have diverse backgrounds and origins.  
Thus “the Hispanic American community is a collage of distinct groups, including people 
with roots in Central and South America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Spain.”26  But by 
the same token, as already mentioned, Hispanics are characterized as a people who have 
what appears to be a common history or heritage.   
 Let me highlight the point that the notion of a heritage has been historically vital 
for the existence of many nations or peoples.  One of the elements constituting, in 
                                                 
23 State of Hispanic America, p. iii.   
24 State of Hispanic America, p. iii. 
25 State of Hispanic America, p. iv. 
26 “Proclamation 7338,” p. 56457. 
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Renan’s view, the “spiritual principle” of nationhood is “the shared possession of a rich 
legacy of memories of the past.”  Renan also puts it this way: “A heroic past, great 
figures, glory (true glory, that is) this is the social capital on which we base a national 
idea.”  An essential component of the legacy or social capital of a people is that of 
glorious heroes, “for our ancestors have made us who we are.”27   
 With the point on the significance of heritage in mind, it is interesting to note that 
one of the standard sections of the Proclamations mentioned above is a hagiography in 
which the accomplishments of Hispanic figures are emphasized.  One of those 
hagiographic sections describes the legacy of Hispanics thus: 
The achievements of today’s Hispanic Americans build upon a long 
tradition of contributions by Hispanics in many varied fields.  Before Dr. 
Ochoa and other Hispanic Americans began to explore the frontiers of 
space, Hernando de Soto and Francisco Vázquez de Coronado ventured 
into the vast uncharted land of the New World.  A thousand years before 
Mario Molina calculated the effects of human actions on the atmosphere, 
Mayan priests accurately predicted solar and lunar eclipses.  And before 
Oscar Hijuelos described a Cuban family’s emigration to the 1940’s 
America, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra gave us the classic adventures of 
Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. 28 
                                                 
27 What is a Nation?, p. 43.  
28 William J. Clinton.  “Proclamation 7220 of September 14, 1999,” in Federal Register, vol. 64, no. 180, 
Friday, September 17, 1999, Presidential Documents, p. 50417.  
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 One of the most striking features of this list is that it combines apparently 
dissimilar and unrelated figures.  Some of the people described on the list are indeed 
American nationals: Ellen Ochoa was born in California and Oscar Hijuelos was born in 
New York from Cuban parents.  Nevertheless, Hernando de Soto, who died in 
Mississippi during one of his expeditions, was born in Badajoz (modern-day Spain), and 
Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, who died in Mexico City, was born in Salamanca (also 
in modern-day Spain).  Mario Molina, professor at MIT, was born in Mexico City 
(although I ignore whether he has become a U.S. citizen or not).     
 As a matter of fact, some of the figures on the list would have hardly 
acknowledged any affinity with each other.  It is hard to imagine any degree of 
significant affinity between Cervantes and the Mayans.  It is also hard to imagine Soto or 
Coronado acknowledging any noteworthy degree of affinity with the Mayans or, more 
broadly, natives from the New World.  Similarly, Mexicans and Americans do not often 
think of themselves as people who belong to the same group in any pertinent sense.  
What I am trying to illustrate is that some of the figures mentioned on the list, if 
confronted with each other, would probably not have many significant characteristics in 
common, or recognize each other as fellow members of a relevant group.                  
 Nevertheless, having significant features in common or recognizing each other as 
fellow members is not essential for being included in a group of national heroes or 
become part of a nation’s heritage.  A puritan settler would probably not have had much 
affinity with a Pequot, or have acknowledged a Pequot as a fellow member in a relevant 
group, e.g., a coreligionist.  The situation would have been similar between a Virginian 
citizen and a slave from West Africa in the XVIII century.  A Roman Catholic in colonial 
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Maryland would probably not have seen someone from Congregational and Unitarian 
New England as a fellow member in a relevant group.  We could even think not only 
about lack of recognition as fellow members, but also conflict across groups—the Pequot 
War or, most notably, the American Civil War.   
 But what we need to see is that all the characters mentioned so far would, in 
someway or another, be thought of as part of the American “history” or “heritage.”  In 
connection with all the disparities and even conflict among these characters, the point 
about “forgetfulness” made by Renan is well taken.  Formerly disjointed groups are now 
a source for American national identity.                  
 There is then an important implication in combining dissimilar and unrelated 
figures.  Whether Cervantes and Ochoa, or the Mayans and Hijuelos, have significant 
degrees of affinity (or whether they all in fact equally belong to a relevant group) is not 
the essential point.  The point at stake is that we see in the combination of these 
characters the crafting of a heritage.  These characters ostensibly inform the lives of a 
community that has a “common heritage” and a “shared past.”   
 The crafting and consolidation of such a heritage is an important step towards 
Hispanic identity-building.  Renan would have probably put it this way: in order to apply 
the spiritual principle of nationhood one needs shared memories.  Having a shared past is 
essential for identifying Hispanics as a community or a people.                         
 Identifying Hispanics as a people could eventually have the following result: a 
series of fragmented (and sometimes conflicting) identities, e.g., Mexicans, Cubans, 
Puerto Ricans, may become a community of solidarity, with a given heritage, subsumed 
under the single category of “Hispanic.”  As I have suggested, the American state by 
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means of policies and documents is playing an important role in identifying and shaping 
the heritage of a community or people designated as “Hispanic.”   
 I have emphasized the role of the state as one of the elements in the process of 
identifying and shaping the heritage of Hispanics.  Let me, however, stress the fact that 
the state is one element among others.  One could certainly mention the census needs of 
the American state and the aim of political parties to attract potential voters.  In addition, 
one might also mention the fact that media networks attempt to have a clear target 
audience; and, similarly, one might indicate the needs of publicity agencies in their aim to 
detect the patterns and tendencies in a particular consumer population. 29  These are all 
phenomena, or what Renan might call “agents of unification,”30 that tend to individuate 
by means of identification a Hispanic people.  All these phenomena help to explain the 
potential and actual process of Hispanic unification.   
 Let me conclude with some thoughts on a possible tension that may arise for the 
Hispanic people.  We can see the tension I have in mind by asking ourselves the 
following question: could the emergence of the Hispanic people command, in fact, the 
sort of loyalty (and match the intensity of feelings and attachments) that nation-states 
currently evoke?   
 If the latter situation is the case, Hispanics might have a similar task to the one of 
Irish-Americans at the end of the XIX and beginning of the XX centuries.  In discussing 
the interesting phenomenon of Irish nationalism on American soil, Kerby Miller 
                                                 
29 Geoffrey Fox describes Hispanic media as the “image machine.” See Hispanic Nation: Culture, Politics 
and the Constructing of Identity  (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1996), pp. 40-66.   
30 What is a Nation?, p. 29. 
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describes the situation of Irish-American nationalist elites during the first part of the XX 
century in the following way:  
Except for some extreme Irish-American nationalists, most nationalist 
leaders made tortuous efforts to reconcile Irish and American patriotism 
and to reassure the American middle class, as well as hesitant middle-class 
immigrants and Catholic clergy, that Irish-American nationalism was fully 
compatible with aspirations to respectability and assimilation. 31      
   We already see a similar situation in the tension that arises between Hispanic 
nationalism and the view that such nationalism might undermine American unity.  
Samuel Huntington believes the following about Mexican immigration: “along with 
immigration from other Latin American countries, it is advancing Hispanization 
throughout America and social, linguistic, and economic practices appropriate for Anglo-
Hispanic society.”32   
 Huntington sees such a trend as a threat to the “American dream created by 
Anglo-Protestant society.”33  Hispanic nationalists such as Raul Yzaguirre would perhaps 
                                                 
31 “Class, Culture, and Immigrant Group Identity in the United States: The Case of Irish-American 
Ethnicity,” in Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology and Politics, ed. V. Yans-McLaughlin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 117. 
32 Who are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuter, 2004), p. 
221.  Huntington’s views on Hispanics are also presented in “The Hispanic Challege,” Foreign Policy, 
March/April 2004, pp. 30-45. 
33 Who are We?, p. 256.  
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want to reply to Huntington that Hispanic nationalism is not only compatible with, but 
actually helps to “expand the American agenda” (my italics).34   
 
3. HUNTINGTON ON IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 
 The growing influence of Hispanics is presumably shaping the future of American 
society.  As mentioned, Huntington sees this trend as a threat aga inst American national 
unity and American values.   
 In his book, Who are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity, 
Huntington makes three claims.  First, Anglo-Protestant values are the core of American 
culture.  Second, this culture is currently being eroded.  And third, one of the reasons for 
this cultural erosion is the influence of Hispanics.  It is the third claim that interests us.    
 According to Huntington, the reason why Latin American immigrants, and 
particularly Mexicans, pose a threat to American unity and values is because of certain 
immigration trends.  People from Latin America are immigrating to the U.S. in massive 
numbers and are not integrating fast or efficiently enough into American mainstream 
culture.35     
 Massive immigration might eventually cause a bifurcated American culture.  
Huntington believes the following: 
The high continuation of high levels of Mexican and Hispanic 
immigration plus the low rates of assimilation of these [Latin American] 
                                                 
34 State of Hispanic America, p. iv.  See the exchange between Yzaguirre and Huntington in Foreign 
Policy, May/June 2004, p. 4 and p. 90.    
35 See Who are We?, pp. 221-256.  
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immigrants into American society and culture could eventually change 
America into a country of two languages, two cultures, and two peoples.  
This will not only transform America.  It will also have deep 
consequences for Hispanics, who will be in America but not of it.36    
 Now consider that, as previous discussions point out, people from Latin America 
currently have a set of fragmented national identities.  The variety of identities stems 
from the fact that “Hispanics see themselves more as having separate and distinct cultures 
based on the country of origin rather than sharing a single culture as Hispanics or 
Latinos.”37  Given the variety of national origins and identities, it may then be difficult to 
speak of “Hispanic identity” in any relevant or robust sense.  Immigrants from Latin 
America generally see themselves not as Hispanics, but rather as Puerto Ricans, 
Mexicans, Argentineans, Salvadorians, etc.   
 The last point is very significant because it shows that there is currently no 
common or coherent Hispanic identity and culture.  It may then be true that Latin 
American immigrants are not integrating themselves into the American mainstream fast 
and efficiently enough.  Let us grant this point for the sake of argument.  But notice that 
neither is there a Hispanic identity or culture.   
 As a consequence, if Latin American immigrants do not become part of American 
mainstream culture fast enough, the result will not be a parallel Hispanic culture.  The 
                                                 
36 Who are We?, p. 256. 
37 Mollyann Brodie, Annie Steffenson, Jaime  Valdez, Rebecca Levin, and Roberto Suro, 2002 National 
Survey of Latinos. Report prepared by the Pew Hispanic Center and the Kaiser Family Foundation, 
December 2002, p. 33.   
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result might be a set of parallel sub-national cultures and identities: Mexican-American, 
Cuban-American, Venezuelan-American, Peruvian-American, Brazilian-American, 
Spanish-American, etc.      
 In all fairness to Huntington, he does distinguish between different immigrant 
groups, e.g., Mexicans, Cubans, etc.  And, in fact, it is particula rly Mexicans and 
Mexican-Americans who are the object of his observations.  In my view, however, he 
skews the analysis when he conflates different national groups from Latin America and 
assumes that they might have a common identity.  In other words, he wrongly assumes, at 
times, that diverse groups have a common Hispanic identity and that this Hispanic group 
is the protagonist of a phenomenon he labels “Hispanization.”    
 But now we must also consider another angle having to do with the people-
making phenomenon that was discussed above.  As already pointed out, members of the 
Hispanic group may currently have a set a fragmented national identities, but they are a 
people in the making.  Several agents are tapping into and shaping the emerging feelings 
of commonality that exist in a group still largely consisting of Latin American 
immigrants.  I pointed out above that among the agents of Hispanic people-making we 
may count political organizations and lobbying groups, e.g., National Council of La 
Raza, the Spanish-speaking media, and the American state.   
 Note the presence of the American state.  A point I made above is that the 
American state is a crucial agent in the engineering of Hispanic identity.   
Heritage-building, one of the crucial steps for people-making, is the task that the 
American state and public institutions, perhaps somewhat unaware of the causal effect, 
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have been carrying out for several decades.  The American state then is one of the key 
agents for transforming Latin American immigrants into “Hispanics.” 
 If my perspective is right, Huntington’s view of the situation is incomplete.  The 
Hispanic influence on American society —and consequently what he and others perceive 
as a threat to American unity and values—is more complex than what he assumes.  Latin 
American immigration and lack of integration into a core national culture are not the only 
factors contributing towards the formation of Hispanic identity.  The embryonic 
emergence of Hispanics, and their identity, results from a process of people-making in 
which one of the most significant agents is the state—i.e., the American state.     
 If these observations are on target, the issue of Hispanic identity in American 
society takes on a new meaning.  The question is not only whether Latin American 
immigration should be prevented or regulated—which is a conclusion that could be 
derived from Huntington’s observations.  The question is also one that state-officials, 
policy-makers and the general American public need to ask themselves: what should the 
national identity of American society be like?   
 I believe that Huntington is right to raise the question on American identity.  The 
American people should indeed ask themselves: who are we?  But I also believe that 
there is a second question that the American people ought to ask themselves, namely, 
who do we want to be?        
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I spoke about what Hispanics could become, namely, a people with 
an identity.  I began by observing that Hispanics do not satisfy the third condition of 
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relevant groups, intrinsic identification.  But looking at this condition might help us to 
understand Hispanic identity as a tipping phenomenon.      
 In analyzing the condition of intrinsic identification, I have advanced a particular 
hypothesis. A process of identification and identity-making may turn the Hispanic group 
into the type of group that satisfies the three conditions of relevant groups.  In short, 
Hispanics may become a group with a strong identity.  And this might be just the type of 
group in which membership is central to the identities of group members.   
 I elaborated on this hypothesis by making two points.  First, we must see Hispanic 
identity-formation in the context of national identity-formation.  I suggested that there 
might be a parallel between the two processes.  Second, one of the most important agents 
(among other agents) in the identity-formation process of the Hispanic group is the 
American state. 
 The last point has important implications for a recent discussion by Samuel 
Huntington on immigration and American national identity.  Here, I suggested that the 
formation of Hispanic identity must be understood not only as an immigrant 
phenomenon, but also a phenomenon that is caused by the American state.  From a public 
policy perspective, the question then is: what should American national identity be like? 
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CHAPTER 8 
ARE ALL MINORITIES EQUALLY “MINORITIES”? 
 
In1915, Horace Kallen argued that democratic principles required a “federal 
republic” view of American society.  The substance of such a republic would be “a 
democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common 
institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to 
their kinds.” 1  Despite the year in which Kallen’s writings were published, his views 
capture a contemporary thesis.  Following Kallen, let us call this thesis “cultural 
pluralism.”   According to cultural pluralism, the composition of American society entails 
a set of ethnic or cultural minorities whose membership in their cultural groups is central 
to their identities.   
Several assumptions underlie the thesis of cultural pluralism.  The first one is that 
membership in cultural groups is important for individual well-being, and so if cultures 
are not publicly recognized, the well-being of group members will be hampered.2   
 
                                                 
1 Culture and Democracy in the United States: Studies in the Group Psychology of the American Peoples 
(New York: Arno Press, 1970), p. 124.  Most recently, an explicit version of this “cultural pluralism” has 
been proposed by Michael Walzer in What it Means to Be an American: Essays on the American 
Experience (New York, Marsilio, 1996), pp. 23-49.     
2 See Judith Lichtenberg on the “flourishing argument.” “Nationalism, For and (Mainly) Against,” in The 
Morality of Nationalism, eds. R. McKim and J. McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 
160-162. 
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Second, borrowing from Horace Kallen’s metaphor, society is like an orchestra of 
diverse racial and ethnic voices and they should all receive an equal hearing. 3  Several 
cultural groups comprise society, and justice requires that all groups should be equally 
recognized, which is indeed the thrust of one version of multiculturalism.   
Combining these two assumptions, we have a picture of equal relevance across all 
cultural minorities.  In this picture, cultural membership is important for personal well-
being and so all groups should be equally recognized in order to guarantee the well-being 
of the members of all cultural groups.  In the words of Charles Taylor: “Just as all 
members have equal civil rights, and equal voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so 
all should enjoy the presumption that their traditional culture has value.”4  Given this 
presumption, all groups are genuine recipients of public recognition.  Cultural groups 
may be different from each other, but what they all have in common is that their 
member’s well-being is tied to the group and thus all groups are equally relevant.5  
 In this chapter, I wish to challenge the picture of equal relevance across groups.  
The picture is that in the American plurality of cultural voices, all voices are equally 
                                                 
3 Culture and Democracy, pp. 104, 124-125.   
4 “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. A. 
Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 68.    
5 According to Anthony Appiah, the value of multicultural education lies in creating a common loyalty and 
mutual understanding in a pluralist society.  He claims, for example, that “once I consciously grasp […] the 
significance and value of my identity for me, I can see what the significance and value of their collective 
identities would be for others.” “Culture, Subculture, Multiculturalism: Educational Options,” in Public 
Education in a Multicultural Society: Policy, Theory, Critique, ed. R. Fullinwider (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), p. 85. The assumption is that all acknowledged identities play a similar role in all 
respective groups.   
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significant because they all give group members meaning and direction.  I will argue that 
memberships in different minority groups have varying degrees of significance.  A 
comparative approach between two minority groups in American society, African-
Americans and Hispanics, will show that when looking at the status of cultural identities 
among different groups, one finds varying degrees of significance. 
I will then question the simple view that all cultural minorities are more or less 
the same, i.e., groups that provide members with a meaningful identity.  If my claim is 
true, it undermines the notion that all cultural groups are equally relevant.  Thus it 
becomes harder to see how different groups can be grouped in a common alliance of 
“minorities.” 
 
1. IS AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEMBERSHIP BASIC? 
a. Race and Basic Membership  
 A good starting point for our inquiry is to examine whether membership in the 
African-American group is basic.  I will argue that African-American membership is 
indeed basic.   
 Let me begin by quickly refreshing the notion of basic membership.  Membership 
is basic when the traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding are traits that 
make her a member in a group.  Note the two conditions in my characterization of basic 
membership.  First, there are certain traits that are essential to someone’s self-
understanding.  Second, these traits make the person a member in a particular group, 
since the traits are associated with such a group.   
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 What is the trait (or set of traits) that is both essential to the self-understanding of 
African-Americans and makes them a member of a particular group?  The immediate 
answer that comes to mind is race.  But we must be more precise about the meaning of 
race and the way in which it is pertinent for relevant membership.  So let me now discuss 
race and its meaning for group members. 6   
 Looking at the way in which African-Americans are identified will he lp us to 
understand the meaning of race.  My question here then is: what is the criterion by which 
members of the African-American group are identified?  The answer seems to be quite 
obvious.  African-Americans are identified on the basis of race.   
Note, however, that race as the basis of relevant identification is bound to run into 
a difficulty.  One could wonder whether race per se is the kind of property that is 
essential to the self-understanding of group members.  One may wonder, for tha t matter, 
whether any physical trait is necessarily essential for the self-understanding of group 
members.  
The answer to the question of whether a particular trait is necessarily essential to 
someone’s self-understanding is negative.  Consider that not all members of all cultural 
groups are physically identical.  Group members may have some physical traits in 
common, but not all physical traits in common.  For example, not everybody within a 
single group has the same hair color, mouth size, height, weight, etc.  If a group then is to 
                                                 
6 Although I do not address it directly, Anthony Appiah’s discussion and analysis of “race” is illuminating.  
See his  “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” in Color Conscious: The Political Morality 
of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 30-43 
  180 
be distinctively identified on the basis of physical traits that are essential to members’ 
self-understanding, the matter that needs examination is: which traits and why?   
In the case of African-Americans, we know that they are presumably identified on 
the basis of a physical trait related with skin color.  But we also need to know why they 
are identified on the basis of this particular physical trait and not a different one.  
Claiming that African-Americans are identifiable on the basis of race per se is not 
enough; we also need to know why race is the basis of relevant identification.   
The question we are then looking for is not simply what the criterion is for 
identifying members of the African-American group.  The criterion seems to be very 
simply “race.”  We are looking instead for the answer to two interrelated questions.  First, 
why is a particular physical feature the criterion by which African-Americans are 
currently identified?  Second, why is the criterion by which African-American are 
identified essential to the self-understanding of group members?   
In order to address these questions, we must turn to certain beliefs and social 
conceptions associated with race.  These beliefs and social conceptions derive from a 
historical process of racial formation.     
     
b. Racial Formation  
 Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue that racial formation has been a 
prominent characteristic of political and social life in the United States of America.7  The 
American social structure has a racial dimension that has become crucial for 
                                                 
7 Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 2nd. ed. (New York: Routledge, 
1994.     
  181 
comprehending human relationships and conflicts.  In this social structure, “we utilize 
race to provide clues about who a person is.”8   
 Omi and Winant at times speak about “race” in general, but it is clear that their 
discussion specifically revolves around African-Americans.  The upshot of the discussion 
is that the racial understanding of African-Americans is a salient characteristic of 
American social life. 
 According to Omi and Winant “race” is a concept that allows us to understand the 
conflicts and interests that arise due to different types of human bodies.  It is not, 
however, physical features or human bodies as such that motivate conflicts and interests; 
the latter arise from social and historical meanings associated with human bodies.  While 
bodily traits are understood according to social and historical meanings, one should not 
assume that the concept of race is extremely ambiguous and simply arbitrary.  Omi and 
Winant concede that the concept is indeed imprecise and vague, but that does not mean it 
is not useful.  Accordingly, “a more effective starting point is the recognition that despite 
its uncertainties and contradictions, the concept of race continues to play a fundamental 
role in structuring and representing the social world.”9  The task of the social theorist then 
is to examine the phenomenon of race in American society and attempt to give a causal 
explanation for its existence.    
 The causes for the racial dimension in American society are many and ve ry 
complex, but one particular source for the formation and reproduction of the African-
                                                 
8 Racial Formation, p. 59.  
9 Racial Formation, p. 55.  
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American race has to do with political institutions.10  Omi and Winant comment that “the 
state from its very inception [in American history] has been concerned with the politics of 
race.  For most of U.S. history, the state’s main objective in its racial policy has been 
repression and exclusion.  Congress’ first attempt to define American citizenship, the 
Naturalization Law of 1790, declared that only free ‘white’ immigrants could qualify.”11  
And the distinction and codification of races (or rather a particular race currently 
classifiable as “African-Americans”) due to governmental policies has been a continual 
characteristic of American political history.  The self-representation of “race” among 
Blacks has changed throughout history, but one constant feature of American society is 
that the conditions and rules for racial identification have been replicated due to the 
enactment of governmental policies.  
 An important implication about the concept of race is that it serves not only to 
classify and identify African-Americans, but also to define who they are.  By defining 
who they are, the category of “race” becomes an important component for the self-
representation of African-Americans.  And although Omi and Winant do not flesh out the 
point this way, one can draw out the following implication from their discussion: the 
                                                 
10 I focus, following Omi and Winant, primarily on the shaping force of political institutions.  But other 
institutions, for example religion and media, are just as important for shaping group identity.  For an 
interesting study on the role of religion in African-American identity, see Eddie Glaude “Myth and 
African-American Self-identity,” in Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity: An Introduction  
(New York: New York University Press, 2003).   
11 Racial Formation, p. 81.  It is not exactly clear what the authors mean by the “state,” but we can ignore 
this point without undermining the broader discussion.   
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social and historical meanings surrounding the notion of “race” have become essential to 
the self-understanding of African-Americans.   
 A historical process of identification and exclusion policies has facilitated a state 
of affairs in which a particular group is identified according to a physical trait defined as 
“race.”  Given the exclusion of the group on the basis of this criterion, the trait has 
become essential to the self-understanding of group members.  What I mean by this is 
that one of the essential traits for the self-understanding of African-Americans is their 
skin color.  An African-American could not presumably conceive of and characterize 
herself without thinking of her skin color.  This state of affairs generally makes 
membership in the African-American group basic.12           
  
2. RACE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 African-Americans also belong to a national group that has traits that tend to be 
essential to the self-understanding of its members.  I will now argue that since these 
national traits are essential to the self-understanding of group members, including 
African-Americans, the national membership of African-Americans is also basic.  I will 
also point out that, for African-Americans, there is a tension between their racial and 
national memberships.    
 In order to understand the basicness of American national membership, let us take 
a closer look at American national identity.  Imagine someone who is raised in the United 
                                                 
12 For an interesting discussion, from a social science perspective, on the elements and implications of 
racial identity and solidarity among African-Americans, see Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza,  Black 
Pride and Black Prejudice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 11-60.    
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States of America.  Such a person will most likely grow up speaking a certain language, 
English, pledging allegiance to a national flag and other patriotic symbols, participating 
in a life that is organized and ruled by a set of governmental policies, adhering to the 
values of freedom and justice, and developing habits of mind that create a certain degree 
of social cohesion.   
 Members of the American nation belong to a community that represents a whole 
worldview and thus they participate in a collective story.  This story talks about the 
Pilgrims, the Founding Fathers, the saga of Independence, the Civil War, a land of 
freedom that attracts immigrants from the rest of the world, etc.   
 Now, the national story also contemplates failures and contradictions.  For 
example, one may count as failures the fate of Indians in the hands of the English-
speaking settlers, the inability in the past to effectively and immediately incorporate 
immigrants from certain parts of the world (e.g., Ireland, China and Japan) and, in 
general, the inequalities of a society presumably characterized by fairness and justice.  
 Chief, however, among the failures told in the national story are the incidents of 
slavery and racism against Blacks.  These incidents stand as a testimony of how a group 
has been constantly excluded in a land of liberty and justice for all.  They also stand at 
the center of national landmarks, i.e., the Civil War and the Civic Rights movement, 
which have presumably pushed the nation forward in the struggle for liberty and justice.  
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 The point that needs highlighting is that there is a national story that informs the 
identity of a whole community.13  Even some of those that have been excluded are 
protagonists of such a national story by virtue of the fact that they have been unjustly 
excluded and should now be included.  Inclusion in this context means that the American 
nation might have a diversity of backgrounds, cultures and races.  Nonetheless, at the end 
of the day, all those groups ought to be equally recognized and have equal participation in 
a community that is a national unit.  There is an overarching national story for a single 
community subsumed under a particular state.     
 The importance of this national community is that it represents a primary source 
of meaning and direction for most of its members.  Membership in the American nation is 
central to the identity of most members, which means that the traits associated with 
membership in this particular group are essential to the self-understanding of group 
members.  These members belong to a national community with a certain history and a 
set of practices and values that give meaning and direction, in a very vivid manner, to 
their lives.                                
 Now consider that African-Americans are part of the American nation, which has 
implications for the national identity of African-Americans.  African-Americans belong 
to a national community characterized by traits that are essential to the self-understanding 
of group members (e.g., language, history, values, etc.).  Since African-Americans are 
members in this national community, some of these national traits are presumably 
                                                 
13 For the role of collective histories and narratives, see Robert Fullinwider, “Patriotic History,” in Public 
Education in a Multicultural Society, p. 205.  See also Jonathan Glover, “Nations, Identity and Conflict,” in 
The Morality of Nationalism, pp. 23-25.      
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essential to the self-understanding of African-Americans.  Thus the national membership 
of African-Americans is basic.       
 At this point, however, an important situation arises with regard to African-
Americans and their membership in the American nation.  Let us here remember that, as I 
argued earlier, membership in the African-American group is basic.  Thus African-
Americans possess, at least, two basic memberships: national and racial memberships.   
 Keeping this dual membership in mind, consider the following situation: African-
Americans have been excluded and unassimilated members of the American nation for 
much of its history.  As a consequence, there is tension between basic memberships that 
arises from the fact that African-American assimilation into the American mainstream 
has not been, for multiple and complex reasons, fully successful—a fact that is, according 
to Nathan Glazer, the driving force behind contemporary multiculturalism. 14   
 The tension between national and racial memberships is perceptively pointed out 
by W.E.B. Du Bois.  He expresses the tension this way: “one ever feels his twoness, —
An American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring 
ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn 
asunder.”15 
 In conclusion, then, the national membership of African-Americans, in 
conjunction with their racial membership, is basic.  Given, however, historical 
circumstances of racial exclusion there has been, for African-Americans, a salient tension 
between their American national identity and African-American membership.    
                                                 
14 We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 78-121.  
15 The Souls of Black Folk  (New York: Bantam Books, 1989 [1903]), p. 3. 
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3. HISPANICS AND AFRICAN-AMERICANS  
 I have discussed African-American membership to this point.  It is now time to 
compare African-Americans with another group that has often been thought of as being 
analogous with African-Americans, i.e., Hispanics.  In comparing the two groups, I will 
argue that three compelling reasons show significant differences for purposes of minority 
recognition in American society between African-Americans and Hispanics.  All three 
reasons are closely interrelated with each other, but I will discuss them separately for 
analytical purposes.         
 
a. Basic Memberships   
 The first reason for distinguishing the two groups has to do with the various basic 
memberships of both African-Americans and Hispanics.  A closer look at their basic 
memberships will be the point of departure for our discussion.  My goal is to show 
several important differences that have vital implications for the relevance and public 
recognition of each one of the groups. 
 Let me begin by pointing out that the national memberships of both African-
Americans and Hispanics are generally basic.  I argued in chapter five that the national 
membership of Hispanics is basic; and I also argued in the previous section of the current 
chapter that the national membership of African-Americans is basic.  In this regard, the 
two groups are apparently similar.                      
 Note, however, that whereas there is a tension between the national and racial 
memberships of African-Americans, since the two memberships are basic, there is no 
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similar tension among Hispanics.  In chapter five, I pointed out that national membership 
is basic for most Hispanics, but their Hispanic membership is not generally basic.   
Additionally, I argued in chapter six that the traits that are essential to someone’s 
self-understanding and also seem to make such a person a member of the Hispanic group 
are really national traits.  As a consequence, Hispanic membership is not basic and its 
apparent basicness is really an epiphenomenon of nationality.  The result is that given the 
weakness of Hispanic membership, it is not basic and hence does not come close to 
competing with national basic memberships.  So, unlike African-Americans, there is no 
tension between national and Hispanic memberships.   
 I have spoken about the tension of two basic memberships among African-
Americans and also the lack of a similar tension among Hispanics.  Let me turn here to 
the following question for a moment: why is there no tension between basic memberships 
among Hispanics?  Part of the answer to this question has already been mentioned: 
Hispanic membership is currently an epiphenomenon of national membership.   
 But there is also more to be said.  The process of identity-formation that I 
previously discussed, in chapter seven for Hispanics and the current chapter for African-
Americans, will also show us part of the answer to our question.   
 Here we must remember that Hispanics and African-Americans are to a certain 
extent the byproduct of an identity-formation process.  In this process, African-American 
identity has developed a level of significance that is lacking with respect to Hispanic 
identity.  In the context of the work of Omi and Winant, I suggested that the criterion of 
race has served to identify African-Americans and has become essential to their self-
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understanding.  A social and historical process of racial formation linked with 
governmental policies has brought about such a situation.   
 The historical and social process tha t has engendered and shaped the racial 
identity of African-Americans has been absent with respect to Hispanics.  The latter is 
obvious, since (as we will see in more detail below) African-Americans have been part of 
American national life, one way or another, for centuries, whereas Hispanics did not start 
making a highly visible and significant appearance until the sixties.  Nonetheless, as I 
have also pointed out, the identity-making role of the American state with regard to 
Hispanics may change (and is currently changing) the significance of Hispanic 
membership.       
 At this point in time, however, the fact is that there is a tension between basic 
memberships among African-Americans that is absent among Hispanics.  This is the first 
important difference between the two groups.                      
 Let me now finally go back for a moment to the claim that the two groups are 
similar in that national membership is basic in each group.  This is indeed true, but here 
the following question must be raised: when looking at the national memberships of both 
African-Americans and Hispanics, which national membership is basic?  An attempt to 
answer this question will have us turn to the other two reasons that show why the two 
groups are significantly different for purposes of public recognition in American society.           
 
b. Political Memberships      
 African-Americans are full members of the American polity.  This should be an 
obvious fact, but it is often taken for granted.  Understanding this fact will allow us to see 
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a very important quality that distinguishes African-Americans from many members of the 
Hispanic group.  
 Assertions about the membership of African-Americans in the American state 
must be immediately qualified because African-Americans have not always had access to 
the social and political goods available to the rest of American society.  So African-
Americans have been “excluded members” or “barred citizens” of a political community, 
which is indeed, as we have seen, a condition that raises difficulties in analyzing African-
American membership.   
 The fact of the matter, however, is that African-Americans are currently full-
members of the American political community.  Even if this claim is contested, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that if African-Americans are not, in fact, full members of the 
political community, they ought to be.  The fact that they have not been full members 
throughout American history is regarded as an evil that ought to be corrected.  So either 
African-Americans are currently, in fact, full members, or ought to potentially have full 
membership in the American polity.        
 In order to illustrate what I mean by full-membership, let us look at citizenship.  
The American citizenship of African-Americans is normally clear and unproblematic.  
Since African-Americans are not, for the most part, Ghanaian, Nigerian, Gambian or 
Malawian citizens, it follows that their American citizenship is unquestionable.  African-
Americans are not commonly recognized as subjects of particular African states, meaning 
that they are not entitled to the rights or liable to the duties of other citizens belonging to 
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African states.16  For example, African-Americans are not entitled to vote in Rwanda, and 
are not obligated to pay taxes in Ethiopia or defend the Nigerian state.   
 In contrast, African-Americans possess rights recognized by the American state 
(not always recognized, but again this is part of the African-American struggle) and 
presumably have duties towards the American state, manifested, for example, in the 
obligation to pay taxes and defend the American territory.  The fact that the citizenship of 
African-Americans is unquestionable, showing that they are full members of the 
American state, should be obvious in one of the hyphenated terms that currently describes 
them, namely, African-Americans.  
 One may observe at this time that some African-Americans are immigrants.  For 
example, Jamaicans, Haitians and Black South Africans who migrate to the United States 
are likely to be classified as “African-Americans.”  This might be true, but when we refer 
to African-Americans we do not normally think of an immigrant group.  We refer instead 
to a group that has been on American soil for many generations.  The ancestors of 
African-Americans were brought to the United States against their will as slaves, but the 
fact remains than since then several generations have gone by.  Thus African-Americans 
are a stable and well-established group in the fabric of American society and are also (or 
ought to be) full members of the American polity. 
 In describing the African-American condition, let us say that “all members of the 
African-American category are also members of the American state.”  To repeat, there 
                                                 
16 Let me reinforce the point that this expectation is one of the most prominent characteristics of modern 
states.  In characterizing modern states, Chistopher Morris puts the point this way: “Members of a state are 
the subjects of its laws and have a general obligation to obey by virtue of their membership.” An Essay on 
the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 46.     
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might be some exceptions (e.g., Jamaicans), but they are largely minimal and irrelevant 
for our discussion.    
 Let us now turn to Hispanics.  If we take the same statement and apply it to 
Hispanics, “all members of the Hispanic category are also members of the American 
state,” we will immediately detect the falsity of such a statement.  Surely, a more accurate 
statement is that “not all members of the Hispanic category are also members of the 
American state.”  The political membership of Hispanics, in contrast with African-
Americans, is problematic in that not all Hispanics are, in fact, members of the American 
polity.   
 Roughly speaking a Hispanic may be someone who (a) is born in a Latin 
American country and migrates to the U.S., (b) Someone who is born in the U.S., and is 
thus an American citizen, from Latin American parents or, at least, ancestry.  By the 
same token, one may break down (a) into other two groups: (a.1) those who have the 
intention of returning to their original Latin American countries, and (a.2) those who 
have the intention of getting permanently settled in the U.S.   We could continue refining 
these two groups.  If (a.1), two other groups are possible: (a.1.1) those who are 
recognized by the American state by some type of guest-worker or non- immigrant visa, 
and (a.1.2) those who are not recognized by the American state, i.e., illegal immigrants.  
If (a.2), then two possibilities: (a.2.1) those who have already been admitted as 
permanent residents and (a.2.2) people aspiring to become permanent residents (some 
members of (a.1)).           
 One could continue refining the taxonomy, but we have enough detail for 
illustrating our claim that not all members of the Hispanic group are also members of the 
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American polity.  Clearly, some members of the group known as “Hispanics” are also 
members of the American state, whereas others are not.  For instance, not all Hispanics 
are American citizens, or even legal residents.    
 Among the latter group, i.e., illegal aliens, some have the intention of becoming 
members of the American state, whereas others do not.  Additionally, among those 
intending to become members of the American state some have the possibility of doing 
so, whereas this is not true for others.   
 In conclusion, while the political membership of African-Americans is 
unproblematic, the political membership of Hispanics in the American state is highly 
problematic.  It is just not possible to generally assume that Hispanics are, or ought to 
necessarily be, members of the American polity.   
 
c. Self-Image of the American Nation 
I have said that, in contrast with Hispanics, we should assume that African-
Americans ought to be members of the American polity.  This is simply an 
uncontroversial statement.  But let us now wonder: why should it be assumed that 
African-Americans ought to be members of the American polity, whereas the same 
cannot be assumed with regard to Hispanics?  The answer to this question will show a 
third significant difference between the two groups.   
It is necessary to look at the self- image of the American community.  As I said in 
an earlier discussion, communities, not least, national communities, have a certain 
narrative.  This narrative consists of a story that often includes many of the traits that are 
essential to the self-understanding of community members.      
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 As suggested earlier, African-Americans stand at the center of the American 
national story.   And in a certain sense the particular story of African-Americans can be 
seen as a struggle of many generations for greater participation and full recognition in the 
larger national community.  The point is that the history of African-Americans is 
embedded in the history of the American nation.   
 Now compare Hispanics and African-Americans.  The contrast we will notice is 
that while we may take it for granted that African-Americans are part of the American 
national story and experience, the same is not true about Hispanics.    
 I suggested that African-American history is embedded in American history.  
When looking at the history of Hispanics, we will see a contrast because Hispanic history 
is not embedded in the American national story.  It is perfectly possible to appreciate the 
American national story without any reference to Hispanics, whereas it is virtually 
impossible to comprehend the national story without references to slavery, the Civil War, 
the Civil Rights movement, art forms such as Jazz, Blues and Rock ‘n’ Roll, etc.  In 
short, it is almost inconceivable to tell an American national story that does not have any 
reference to those members classified under the category of “African-American.”   
 One may reply, of course, that the American national story could contemplate 
events like the purchase of what is now New Mexico (and more generally, the 
Southwest), the Mexican-American war, the Spanish war, etc.  But two observations must 
be made.  First, those events have not been essential for the shaping of the American 
national story; they are indeed important events, but they are not at the center of the story 
reflecting the American self- image.  Second, and most importantly, those events, and 
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generally speaking events entailing exchanges with Latin American countries, belong to 
the history of American foreign relations and not the national story. 
 An important implication derived from the latter point is that Hispanics are 
originally “foreigners,” i.e., people from a foreign land who migrate to the U.S.  
Accordingly, historically speaking, Hispanics are perceived as a subset of the category of 
“immigrants;” a category that implies the insertion of an outside group into American 
society.  Thus, Hispanics have some affinity with Italians, Poles, Irish, and Koreans, all 
national outsiders who migrated to the U.S. 
 It is true that “immigration” is an essential component of the American national 
story (America is thought of as “a nation of immigrants”), but Hispanics are only a subset 
of such a component.  One could perfectly well understand immigration without 
including Hispanics—and including instead other groups such as Indonesians or French-
Canadians.  The central point is that although immigration is essential for understanding 
the American self- image, the particular immigration of Hispanics is not.   
 As a consequence, Hispanics are not essential to the national story and hence 
whether Hispanics are American nationals or not is irrelevant.  In contrast, African-
Americans are intrinsic to the national story and are thus necessarily an element of the 
American national self- image.   
 The difference between the two groups in the American self- image is an 
important one.  This difference shows that one group is central whereas the other is 
peripheral to the American self- image.  The difference between center and periphery also 
answers the question of why African-Americans ought to be full members of the 
American policy, whereas this is not necessarily the case with Hispanics.      
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4. DIFFERENT QUESTIONS, DIFFERENT SCENARIOS 
 I set out to question the simple view that all cultural minorities are more or less 
the same, i.e., groups that provide members with a meaningful identity.  Questioning this 
simple view implies challenging the perception of equal relevance across groups.  For all 
groups to be equally relevant they would have to be analogous.  What is the analogy 
between African-Americans and Hispanics—the two largest minorities in American 
society?  It can be inferred from my previous discussion that, given the differences 
between the two groups, not much can be said to answer this question positively.           
 Now how do the differences I have described above come up in issues of public 
recognition?  Addressing this question will allow us to see more clearly the trouble with 
the view that Hispanic and African-American identity are similarly relevant because they 
each provide group members with meaning and direction.       
 I have claimed that African-American membership is basic, whereas Hispanic 
membership is not.  If this claim is right, then one could suggest that two separate issues 
arise with respect to the public recognition of African-American and Hispanic identities 
in American society. 
 Since African-American membership is basic, the issue is whether African-
American identity ought to be publicly recognized or not.  One possibility here is to 
simply come to terms with the fact that a tension may emerge between racial and national 
identities, but point out that the tension is inevitable and thus racial identity ought to be 
publicly recognized.   
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 Another possibility is to argue that we desire a “color-blind” society and thus, in 
order to achieve a state of color-blind equality, we must seek to reverse or minimize the 
social and political mechanisms that have created and continue to reproduce racial 
consciousness.  The question here of course is whether, given the current significance of 
racial consciousness, such a reversal would be feasible without causing unacceptable 
degrees of social disturbance.  The issue, at any rate, is this: given the basicness of 
African-American membership, should it be publicly recognized or not?   
 Since Hispanic membership is not basic, the issue of public recognition is 
altogether different.  I pointed out in chapter seven that, by recognizing “Hispanic 
identity,” the American political apparatus is fostering an identity-making process.  The 
end result of this process could be the creation of an identity and membership that may 
indeed become basic.  The issue is whether Hispanic identity ought to be recognized so 
that Hispanic membership becomes basic.           
 Several alternatives arise with respect to the recognition of Hispanic ident ity.   
One may point out that the identity-making process is undesirable, since it will only bring 
further social fragmentation.  According to a different alternative, the identity-making 
process is what the American pluralistic ideal is all about: welcoming foreigners that 
become hyphenated Americans.  According to this last alternative, the identity-making 
process is harmless because, despite the fact that Hispanic membership could eventually 
become basic, such an identity will not ultimately undermine American national unity.   
One could also acknowledge that, one way or the other, the identity-making 
process is irreversible—due not only to state policies, but also massive migration, 
interest-group organizations such as The National Council of La Raza and the League of 
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United Latin American Citizens, and a powerful Spanish-speaking media.  Given the 
irreversibility of the process, American society should do its best to accommodate the 
new internal ethnic identity. 
 It is important to point out here that even if one believes that the identity-making 
process of Hispanics is desirable or irreversible, the distinction between different 
members in the Hispanic group must be kept clear.  The distinction, for instance, between 
a Hispanic who is an American citizen and a Hispanic who is an illegal immigrant is 
important because otherwise it will be unnecessarily difficult to address the question of 
Hispanic public recognition in American society.     
 The issue of public recognition is obviously geared towards full members of 
American society.  The issue does not have to do with the public recognition of 
foreigners or non- immigrants visiting the U.S.   The matter at stake is not recognizing 
cultures in Turkey or France, or even cultures of Turkish and French visitors to the U.S.  
The matter is rather related to members of the American polity, which excludes visitors 
and illegal aliens.   
 Confining the question of public recognition to American nationals reinforces my 
point about the difference between the African-American and Hispanic situations.  If we 
isolate national members, one could perhaps make a plausible case for the recognition of 
African-Americans, whereas the case for Hispanic recognition would be far more 
complicated.   
 Since, as we saw above, all African-Americans are members of the American 
polity, the African-American community as a whole is entitled to the question of public 
recognition.  But since, as we saw above, as well, not all members of the Hispanic 
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category are also members of the American state, the issue of cultural recognition does 
not apply to all Hispanics.  It only applies to those members of the Hispanic category that 
are also members of the American state.      
 The point that needs highlighting, at any rate, is that the problem of public 
recognition with respect to African-Americans and Hispanics is crucially different.  The 
two situations must be addressed by raising two different sets of questions and looking at 
separate scenarios.  This state of affairs breaks the apparent analogy between the two 
groups.   
  
5. CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter I have compared African-Americans and Hispanics.  The purpose 
of the comparison is to show that not all cultural minorities in American society are 
equally relevant.   
 I began by establishing that given a historical process of racial formation, the 
racial membership of African-Americans is basic.  But the American national 
membership of African-Americans is also basic.  Hence, for African-Americans, there 
are, at least, two basic memberships, racial and national, which due to historical 
circumstances of social and political exclusion, could be in tension with each other.     
I then compared African-Americans with Hispanics.  I argued that there are three 
reasons why the two groups are significantly different from each other for purposes of 
relevance and public recognition in American society.  
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First, the basic memberships of the two groups are different.  As mentioned, 
African-American membership is basic.  As I argued in previous chapters, the same is not 
true for Hispanics—i.e., Hispanic membership is not basic. 
Additionally, African-Americans may find a tension between their racial and 
national memberships.  The national membership of Hispanics is basic, but for Hispanics 
there is no similar tension.   
Second, the political membership of the two groups is different.  We may assume 
that African-Americans are members of the American polity, whereas this is not true of 
Hispanics.  Some Hispanics may be members of the American polity, but, given their 
immigrant status, many are not.          
Third, African-Americans stand at the center of America’s self- image.  Hispanics, 
who consist of a contingent immigrant group, do not have a historically prominent role in 
the American self- image.   
I finally made the point that given the differences outlined above, the question of 
public recognition in American society is fundamentally different for African-Americans 
and Hispanics.  Generally, it makes sense to raise the question about public recognition 
for African-Americans.  Nonetheless, it does not make sense to raise the question in the 
same terms for Hispanics.  Hispanics are in a different situation than African-Americans, 
and, thus, have to deal with questions that may not be equally applicable.     
At the end of the day, my suggestion revolves around a plain point.  Instead of 
simply claiming that American society consists of a plurality of voices, all of which are 
equally entitled to public recognition, we should take one voice at a time and ponder 
whether such a voice does indeed have the merits for public recognition.     
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION: ANY CHEERS FOR HISPANIC IDENTITY? 
 
 The general conclusion of my dissertation is twofold.  First, Hispanic identity is 
not what American policy-makers and society in general commonly assume.  Members of 
the Hispanic group have a weak communal identity.  Second, Hispanic identity might be 
a tipping phenomenon, i.e., Hispanicity might be on its way to becoming a significant 
identity.    
 In my project, I have addressed questions along the lines of what Hispanic 
identity is and what it is not; and also questions about what Hispanic identity could 
become.  I have not, however, for the most part addressed normative questions.  For 
instance, what should Hispanic identity be like?  And I have not raised questions about 
the direct implications of a potential Hispanic identity for the American polity.  Think, 
for example, of this question: what contributions, if any, would Hispanics, and their 
newly formed identity, make to the American nation?        
 In this final section, I will briefly address two questions that will hopefully set the 
stage for future projects.  My discussion here is tentative and rather speculative, which 
indicates that more work needs to be done in this regard.  First, does Hispanic identity 
necessarily pose a threat to American national unity?  Second, are there any benefits 
derived from a potential Hispanic identity?  
 I will begin my discussion with the general assumption that social unity is a good.  
There are a number of transactions taking place in social settings that can simply happen 
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on the basis of cohesion.  Without this cohesion, the societies I have in mind would not 
be able to function optimally.   
 Two reasons will reinforce my point.  First, cons ider efficiency.  Social cohesion 
brings about clear channels of communication and thus allows for efficient transactions.                    
Think for instance of legal or economic transactions.  In order for these sorts of 
transactions to take place effectively, it is desirable to have certain common traits such as 
language and also legal commonplaces.   
 Imagine, for instance, a social unit composed of three linguistic subsets.  In order 
to carry out business across groups on a regular basis, it would be highly desirable to 
have a common language.  Language in this case would be a type of lingua franca—
either from one of the linguistic subsets or a neutral language—that allows for the 
possibility of understanding and thus being able to transact among groups.  Without a 
lingua franca, transactions would be either impossible or would not happen as efficiently 
as if there were a common language.   
 If transactions are not possible, all subsets will be negatively affected.  If they are 
possible, but without a common language, consider the costs attached to having to 
translate and interpret the content and idiosyncrasies of different linguistic groups on 
every single transaction.  Imagine a society in which transactions in different languages 
were very frequent—occurring on a daily basis, thousands of times.  Every time someone 
goes to the market and attempts to buy groceries, she finds herself having to carry out the 
transaction and perhaps negotiate in a foreign language.  Now imagine that this is the 
case with more complicated transactions such as purchasing a car or a house.  With the 
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absence of a common language, frequent and complex transactions in a social unit will 
have higher costs.  A lingua franca reduces costs and facilitates operations.   
 Now consider a second reason why cohesion allows societies to function 
optimally.  Social cohesion makes the delivery of a good such as justice possible.1  This 
reason is closely related with efficiency, but it also goes beyond efficiency in that it 
constraints the existence of a social unit.  Let me explain.  If a social unit is inefficient, it 
is undesirable but not necessarily wrongful.  And we would certainly not say that it is 
wrong for this unit to exist under its current condition.  If, in contrast, a social unit fails to 
deliver justice—and more strongly, the social unit is unjust—the unit would not only be 
undesirable, but should not exist under conditions of injustice.      
 Oversimplifying, let us say that what we might call a just society minimally 
entails two formal elements: (a) a legal code; and (b) the administration of such a legal 
code.  Note that a precondition for a legal code and its administration is some kind of 
language that can be understood by all those affected.  Note also that another 
precondition for legal codes and their application is cohesion.  I will focus on this last 
point; and so I will now elaborate on the topic of cohesion and justice.  
 Legal codes place constraints on and regulate societies; they determine what is 
legally right and wrong.  Now, in order for legal codes to be operational, they have to be 
perceived as legitimate by the subjects of such a legal code.  Legal codes do not operate 
                                                 
1  Although my discussion addresses a different question and makes different points, in speaking about 
efficiency and justice as attributes of an optimal society, I borrow from Chritopher Morris’ discussion on 
the justification of states (on grounds of efficiency and justice).  See An Essay on the Modern State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 136-166. 
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in the abstract, but are rather applied in particular societies.  And for this application to 
work, societies must come to accept the code and its administration as legitimate.2    
 When I speak about acceptance and social legitimacy, I do not mean that all rules 
and procedures must be perceived as legitimate by all the members of a social unit at all 
times.  The requirement for a comprehensive social consensus would be absurd.  People 
disagree on rules.  Criminals will certainly often disagree with the legitimacy of some 
rule.  My claim is weaker.  What I want to say is that some rule and procedure must be 
perceived as legitimate by most members of a social unit at most times.  Otherwise, rules 
would cease to be operational and not be enforceable.   
As an illustration, think of prohibition in the United States in the 1920s. One of 
the reasons why prohibition ceased to be operational is because it was not perceived by 
most members of a society as a legitimate rule that could be legitimately applied in most 
instances.  Given the lack of social legitimacy, the rule was hardly enforceable and had to 
be dropped.          
 Now imagine a social unit with three different subsets: A, B and C.  The social 
unit has an overarching legal code constraining all three subsets.  Now suppose that A 
and B accept the legal code on grounds of legitimacy and C does not.  The reason for this 
state of affairs is that A and B share a set of common values, whereas C does not share 
these values.  The legal code will then be operational in subsets A and B, but not in 
                                                 
2 My discussion here has been helped by Russell Hardin’s ideas on the origins and enforceability of social 
norms.  See his One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 
79-106. 
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subset C (unless, of course, subsets A and B exercise a great deal of coercion on subset 
C).              
 Let us here remember that a just society entails, formally speaking, a legal code 
that is properly administered.  Also, legal codes are operational when perceived as 
legitimate by the subjects of a certain group.  If one subset within a particular social unit 
does not perceive the legal code as legitimate, such a legal code may not be operational 
for the whole system.  Given this one subset, and the lack of a fully operational legal 
code, the condition of justice in the social unit may be undermined.  One can infer from 
this line of reasoning that, for purposes of justice, a society is better-off when all subsets 
agree on the legitimacy of the legal code than when they do not.         
 The very simple thought-experiment of social units and subsets illustrates what 
might be at stake in societies wanting to implement a constitution that may not be 
perceived as legitimate by all sub-groups.  One immediately thinks of the European 
Union and the prospects for a common constitution among different national groups.  
One also thinks of groups with cultural minorities that do not share the values and legal 
norms of the majority group.  Similarly, the thought-experiment also illustrates what 
might be at stake in societies that have a sub-set of illegal immigrants—people who 
obviously do not abide by immigration laws.                  
 The kernel of my discussion is that cohesion between subsets of a social unit is 
highly desirable for purposes of justice—understood, formally, in terms of legal codes 
that must be administered.  A high degree of social cohesion facilitates the delivery of 
justice.  If an optimal society is a just one, conditions that facilitate justice, such as social 
cohesion, are desirable.      
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 By way of general conclusion so far, let us say that social unity is a good because 
it allows societies to function optimally.  Optimal societies are, among other things, 
efficient and just.  The value of unity and cohesion lies in enhancing the conditions of 
social optimality.        
 I will now turn to an obvious question.  I have spoken of social units that are 
supposed to be optimal in rather vague terms.  An essential question now is this: what are 
the relevant social units?  I think it is not difficult to see that one of the most relevant 
social units in our contemporary world is the nation-state. 
 One might immediately observe that nation-states are not as robust as they used to 
be, and they will someday be an organizational arrangement belonging to the past.  
Nation-states are not perennial—they have not always been with us and will not always 
be.  Indeed, they may soon be supplanted by other forms of social arrangement more 
suitable to the modern world.  This trend is evinced by increased globalization and the 
weakening of national ties.  These judgments are particularly tempting when we see 
ongoing experiments such as the European Union along with other prospective supra-
national consortiums.     
 These observations are true.  But a moment’s thought will show the scope of the 
nation-state.  People are citizens of nation-states.  Citizenship here means that people are 
legally bound by duties and legally entitled to rights within a national unit.  One might 
think of oneself as a “citizen of the world.”  But even if fashionable, cosmopolitan 
citizenship, unlike national citizenship, is legally non-binding.  A citizen of a nation-state 
has binding obligations towards national fellow-members, e.g., defend the national 
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territory.  A citizen of a nation-state is also accorded rights within a national unit, e.g., the 
right to property. 
 Consider that constitutions, as truly enforceable and binding texts, are national 
documents.  The courts of justice that matter and affect most people are national systems.   
Tax-codes and regulations are national in scope.  When we speak of welfare reform or 
Social Security reform, we refer to the welfare and Social Security systems of a particular 
nation-state.  Economies, as systems that must be protected and grow, are primarily 
national in scope.  Tariffs, loan interest rates, housing markets and product quality control 
would be unintelligible to most people without the underlying assumption that these rules 
are enforced within national units. 
 If nation-states are relevant units for purposes of social optimality, it follows that 
national unity is a good.  National cohesion enhances the conditions of social optimality.  
Cohesion allows for the possibility of efficient transactions among people and also the 
proper administration of a formal justice system, which, as mentioned, tends to be 
national in scope.   
 It would seem then that we have good reasons to desire and promote national 
unity.  So, in general terms, nation-building policies serve a positive purpose, since they 
advance national unity.  Similarly, there are good reasons to be concerned about the 
fragmentation of national unity.  The concern about multicultural policies may be exactly 
of this kind: they tend to undermine national unity.  This is the nerve that Samuel 
Huntington touches, and, in my view, he is right about raising the question on American 
national unity.   
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 Incidentally, let me briefly mention that the case I am making for national unity 
does not necessarily rest on the sort of nationalism that privileges a group for a higher 
reason.  National unity is a good not because there ought to be something intrinsically 
“sacred” about nations as such, although, in some instances, the phenomenon of 
nationalism may be better understood by looking at religious impulses.3  But rather 
national unity is a good because there are benefits derived from this sort of unity.  In this 
context, I generally agree with Russell Hardin in his analysis of group identity.  He 
believes that group identity does not derive from “primordialist” or “irrational” human 
instincts.  Instead, “if we can rely on the actors’ knowledge to determine what it is 
rational for them to do, we may often find apparently group oriented action intelligible 
without the mystification of primordialism and without strong claims of moralism 
either.”4     
 But the view that national unity is a good begins to get more complicated when 
one claims that cultural membership is also a good.  Try to think of a nation that has 
several minority cultures and real- life nations will immediately come to mind, e.g., 
Canada, Australia and the U.S.  In these nations, national unity might be a good.  But 
now think about the implications of the view that cultural membership is also a good.  
This is the nerve that different stripes of multiculturalism generally touch.   
Consider a situation in which national unity and cultural membership are in 
conflict—e.g., Muslims in France.  Two views are possible.  First, weakening national 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Anthony Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).  Some religious themes help to understand the process of people-making that I 
described in chapter seven. 
4 One for All, pp. 16-17. 
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unity is justified on the grounds that cultural membership is a higher good than national 
unity.  Second, strengthening national unity is justified on the grounds that cohesion is a 
higher good than cultural membership.  Multiculturalists will naturally follow the first 
route, whereas someone like Huntington will follow the second one.    
 Incidentally, I find much to commend in Will Kymlicka’s analysis on this type of 
conflict, although I do not necessarily agree with his views on accommodation rights for 
immigrant groups and am rather skeptical about his type of multiculturalism. 5  Part of 
Kymlicka’s contribution is the attempt to reconcile the two goods (national unity and 
cultural membership) and argue that they are not against each other.6     
 On the one hand, Kymlicka is a proponent of accommodation rights for 
immigrant groups.  On the one hand, however, Kymlicka observes that “nation-states did 
not come into being at the beginning of time, nor did they arise overnight: they are the 
product of careful nation-building policies, adopted by the state in order to diffuse and 
strengthen a sense of nationhood.”  Additionally, he comments that “the successful 
diffusing of a common national identity is, in many countries, a contingent and 
vulnerable accomplishment —an ongoing process, not an achieved fact.”7  There is then a 
place for nation-building policies that promote national identity and unity.   
                                                 
5 See my discussion of this topic in chapter two.  
6 See, for instance, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 152-176.  When I speak about this type of conflict, I refer particularly 
to immigrant groups and not, in Kymlicka’s terminology, minority nations. 
7 Politics in the Vernacular, p. 229. 
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 Kymlicka’s attempt is commendable, but I doubt that the poles of accommodation 
rights and national unity could be easily reconciled.  More importantly, for our purposes, 
it is unnecessary to raise this dichotomy in the context of Hispanics in the U.S.  Be that as 
it may, I will come back to this discussion below.     
 I have so far made the point that national unity is a good, a point that could be 
challenged by multiculturalism on the grounds that membership in an ethnic group or a 
minority nation is a competing good.  We now have enough elements in the discussion to 
be able to turn to the Hispanic situation.   
 Let me begin with a very elementary question: what type of identity do Hispanics 
have?  I have argued throughout the previous chapters that, whatever else it might be, 
Hispanic identity is not very strong.     
 Now let us look at another question.  Is Hispanic identity a higher good than 
national unity?  The question assumes that Hispanic identity is a good, which, in my 
view, is false.  But let us assume for a moment, for the sake of argument, that Hispanic 
identity is a good of some type.  Since Hispanic identity is not very strong, I very much 
doubt that it is a higher good than national unity.  Given the benefits of national unity and 
the weakness of Hispanic identity, there is no competition between the two items when 
compared against each other.  National identity is a higher good than Hispanic identity.       
 But here we must remember another point, one that was made in chapter seven.  
Given a process of people-making, Hispanic identity may be on its way to becoming a 
more significant identity.  If one posits that national unity is a good, as I have, this may 
be a troublesome trend.  We must then be concerned about the possibility of Hispanicity, 
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or any other minority identity for that matter, undermining national unity.  Huntington 
seems to be right in what he perceives as a crisis of national identity.  
 Now we have finally reached the point in which we can address the first question 
we set out to answer: would Hispanic identity necessarily undermine American national 
unity?  Much of the answer to this question will depend on the type of identity that 
Hispanicity turns out to be.   
 In speculating about what Hispanic identity should and might become, let me 
make a distinction between strong and soft multiculturalism.  Strong multiculturalism 
contemplates group rights and official recognition of minority groups.  This is the kind of 
multiculturalism that Kymlicka proposes.  Under this type of multiculturalism, cultural 
membership is central to members’ identities and is thus entitled to public recognition, 
which often takes the form of group rights.  Kymlicka’s view is fueled by a concern with 
the Canadian situation, i.e., two distinct cultural groups (one of which, Quebec, is a 
minority) within a federated nation.  My concern, however, is not Canada but Hispanics 
in America.    
 Now contrast strong multiculturalism with what I will call, for the lack of a better 
term, “soft” multiculturalism.  This soft version consists primarily of voluntary 
memberships in fluid cultural groups that are fully integrated into a national core culture.8  
                                                 
8 The type of voluntary membership I have in mind here is the one described by Mary Waters in her famous 
study of European ethnic groups in America, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1985).  Cultural membership in my melting pot model has some affinity 
with the type of fluid membership David Hollinger describes in Postethnic America: Beyond 
Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995).  Nonetheless, I do not think, like cosmopolitans do (and 
in some sense, Hollinger as well), that all memberships are voluntary and fluid.     
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What I have in mind here is very different from group rights and minority nationalism.  
The type of membership in this context also contrasts with what I have called basic 
membership—which consists of traits that are essential to someone’s self-understanding 
and make her a member of a particula r group.9             
 The best image for describing soft multiculturalism is one that has been long used 
when explaining the immigrant experience in the United States: the melting pot.  
Immigrant groups are assimilated into a national core culture that is also transformed by 
the new groups.  The melting pot as I describe it is both additive and assimilationist.  On 
the one hand, immigrant groups add new elements to the essence of a national culture; 
and, on the other hand, these groups become fully assimilated into such a national 
culture.       
 In my view, this type of soft multiculturalism is the one that that should prevail in 
the Hispanic situation.  Given the historical record, one might even venture to say that 
this will be the case.  Multiculturalism, American-style, is largely about taming the 
former national identities of immigrants, transforming and delivering them in benign 
holidays and practices that are enjoyed by everyone (think, for instance, of St. Patrick’s 
day and Chinese food).  If Hispanic identity is framed within a soft multiculturalism, it 
will not necessarily be in conflict with American national identity and unity. 
 But we must also remember here the hypothesis I advanced in chapter seven.  A 
process of identification and people-making by the American state, may turn Hispanics 
                                                 
9 There are exceptions, of course, to the possibility of voluntary membership in particular groups within a 
national unit.  For instance, whereas Hispanic membership might very well be voluntary, it is not clear that 
African-American membership could simply be voluntary.     
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into the sort of group in which membership is basic, i.e., essential to the self-
understanding of group members.  I don’t think that this possibility by itself would pose a 
serious and immediate threat to American national unity.  But in the context of my 
discussion on soft multiculturalism, this possibility is unnecessary.   
There is no need for Hispanic membership to become basic.  It is preferable to 
follow a safe route, one that has worked historically: the melting pot.  If my observation 
is right, it will be advisable for the American state to keep in check any actions that 
would seriously engage in Hispanic people-making.  In the scenario I have in mind, the 
American state should refrain from heritage-building and group recognition by means of 
rights.  A better route would be simply to recognize an elastic population consisting of 
immigrants who are in the process of assimilating themselves into American mainstream 
culture.  These immigrants might contribute towards a core culture and heritage, which is 
after all part of the story about the melting pot.  But these immigrant communities do not 
need particular and distinctive heritages that would characterize them.          
 I have addressed the first question we set out to answer.  Now let me raise the 
second question: does a home-grown Hispanic identity represent any benefits for the 
U.S.?  The benefits could be many, but I will simply focus on a particular one.  I will 
suggest that, in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations, Hispanic identity could 
serve an important purpose.  My suggestion is that the phenomenon of Hispanic identity, 
always framed within the scheme of soft multiculturalism, could serve as an instrument 
of foreign relations and national security.  More specifically, given the proximity with 
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Latin America and the need for vital relationships with the region, it is in the best interest 
of the American government and society to have a home-grown Hispanic constituency. 10   
 In making this point, let me borrow here from the case recently made by The 
Economist for Turkey’s inclusion in the European Union. 11  The case for Turkey’s 
admission rests on the potential benefits available to both Turkey and the EU.  For 
instance, Turkey’s “military strength and foreign-policy clout would be valuable” to the 
EU.  Turkey would also create a bridge for the EU to reach out to the Muslim world and 
presumably increase its influence in the region by “showing that Islam can be compatible 
with liberal democracy.”   
 The sorts of issues arising between the Islamic world and the West are different 
from U.S.-Latin American relations.  Similarly, when addressing the Hispanic situation, 
unlike Muslims in Europe, we speak of identity-building and recognition of an identity in 
the making, and not inclusion of a ready-made group—which tends to make the Turkish 
situation more complicated.  The two situations, however, are analogous in that a 
powerful group derives benefits from incorporating or, in the Hispanic case, stimulating 
and recognizing the identity of a different group.   
 I am not suggesting that the U.S. recognizes a “Latin American” identity, but 
rather, in line with the soft multiculturalism mentioned above, an American home-made 
identity that builds a bridge to La tin America.  Building bridges to the region serves the 
                                                 
10 John Skrentny argues that the Civil Rights revolution has to be understood within the context of the cold 
war.  The impulse for racial and ethnic equality was motivated by a concern for national security.  I have 
found his discussion very helpful for the views presented here.  See his book, The Minority Rights 
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), particularly, pp. 21-65. 
11 Oct. 9, 2004, p. 13. 
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national interest.  It is clear that the U.S. needs to pay attention, for instance, to the unrest 
that has been developing in countries such as Venezuela, with the inflammatory anti-
American rhetoric of Hugo Chavez, for the past few years.  More importantly, the U.S. 
needs to increase its clout and raise its profile in neighboring Latin America in order to 
offset Anti-American sentiments in the region.  Having a Hispanic contingent at home 
consisting of Latin American émigrés—whose identities have been engineered and 
assimilated into a U.S. national scheme—can be invaluable in helping to achieve these 
purposes.        
 The value of the Hispanic population in the service of the national interest—
although this time Mexico’s national interest—has been perceptively noticed by 
Mexico’s president, Vicente Fox.  Fox has called himself the president of 123 million 
Mexicans, with 23 million living in the U.S., and has promised “to defend the rights of 
his constituents regardless of which side of the border they call home.”12  The comment 
caters to Mexicans in the U.S., a community that could be mobilized in order to influence 
U.S. foreign policy towards Mexico.  This kind of perception illustrates how ethnic 
identities, in this case “Mexican-American,” can be an instrument of national 
advancement.     
 Note that suggestions on the role Hispanic identity (or ethnic identities in general) 
as a potential instrument of national advancement, do not necessarily entail a view on the 
place the U.S. ought to have in world politics.  One could assume, for instance, a strong 
                                                 
12 New York article quoted by Nathan Glazer in “Assimilation Today: Is One Identity Enough?,” in 
Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What It Means to Be An American, ed. T. Jacoby 
(New York: Basic Books, 2004),  p. 70.  
  216 
view of the U.S.’s role in the world, i.e., the U.S. is a world power and as such it is in the 
U.S.’s best interest to expand its hegemonic role in the world and Latin America.  Some 
have even argued that it is not only in the U.S.’s best interest, but also in the world’s 
interest (or Latin America’s interest, to be more specific) for the U.S. to play the vigorous 
role of hegemon. 13  Nonetheless, one could also assume a weaker view of what Ernest 
Lefever called “America’s imperial burden.”14  On this thinner and non- interventionist 
view, robust relationships are mutually beneficial—not only the U.S., but also Latin 
America derives benefits from strong ties with its northern neighbor.  I think that 
regardless of whether one adheres to the strong or weak view of the U.S., Hispanic 
identity could be an instrument of benefit to the U.S. 
 I started out with the assumption that national unity is a good and thus there are 
good reasons to be concerned about the possibility of Hispanic identity (or any type of 
group identity for that matter) undermining American national unity.  But given the right 
type of multiculturalism, American multiculturalism, Hispanic identity will not be likely 
to weaken national unity.  Some could see Hispanic identity as a threat to American 
national unity.  But as long as Hispanicity remains within the framework of soft 
multiculturalism, I think that this identity would be harmless.  Additionally, Hispanic 
identity might be beneficial in that it is well-suited for advancing the national interest of 
the U.S. in Latin America.      
 These are controversial points and someone like Huntington might not be inclined 
to agree with them.  I believe, however, that as long as the American state continues to 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Niall Ferguson’s recent book, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: 
The Penguin Press, 2004).  
14 America’s Imperial Burden: Is the Past Prologue? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). 
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practice a soft and benign multiculturalism and engineer Hispanic identity under a solid 
scheme of common American values, the potential benefits strikingly counterbalance 
potential risks.  In the case I have in mind, soft multiculturalism becomes a matter of 
national interest. 
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